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Military C4I facilities form an enormous network of
distributed, heterogeneous computers. Operating these
computers such that commanders can exploit their computing
power effectively requires a resource management system.
Management System for Heterogeneous Networks (MSHN) is a
program under development specifically designed to address
this need.
Security for distributed computing systems is of
particular importance to the Department of Defense.
Previously developed resource management systems have
largely neglected the issue of security. This thesis
proposes a security architecture through which MSHN can
achieve its goal of providing optimal usage of computing
resources while simultaneously providing security
commensurate with the software and data processed.
A demonstration of the security framework was created
using Intel Corporation's Common Data Security Architecture
(CDSA) . CDSA provided the cryptographic mechanisms required
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Military C4I facilities form an enormous network of
distributed, heterogeneous computers. Operating these
computers such that commanders can exploit their computing
power effectively requires a resource management system.
Management System for Heterogeneous Networks (MSHN) is a
program under development specifically designed to address
this need.
Security for distributed computing systems is of
particular importance to the Department of Defense.
Previously developed resource management systems have
largely neglected the issue of security. This thesis
proposes a security architecture through which MSHN can
achieve its goal of providing optimal usage of computing
resources while simultaneously providing security
commensurate with the software and data processed.
A demonstration of the security framework was created
using Intel Corporation's Common Data Security Architecture
(CDSA) . CDSA provided the cryptographic mechanisms required
to build the security framework. CDSA is a layered
architecture that presents a common interface through which
application programmers and cryptographic hardware/software
vendors can develop their respective products independently,
yet be assured they will work together properly when
integrated.
xv
CDSA is fundamentally dependent upon a Public/Private
Key Infrastructure (PKI) . CDSA assumes that user identities
will be encoded in the form of digital certificates.
Digital signature and encryption mechanisms provided by CDSA
form the basis for the security architecture proposed for
MSHN.
The security framework for MSHN has resulted in the
specification of a MSHN security layer which defines the
interface through which MSHN components access security
mechanisms. The MSHN security layer provides services for
encryption, decryption, digital signatures and verification,
certificate creation, verification and revocation, and other
security-relevant functions.
The security-enhanced MSHN architecture uses the
security framework to guarantee integrity and
confidentiality of communications between the user, MSHN
components, and the computing resources running user
applications
.
A proof of concept demonstration was implemented. It
was written in C++ for execution on three Windows NT
personal computers connected via a local area network. The
demonstration program shows that we can secure MSHN
communications and that CDSA is a viable option as a




The information technology community is in the midst of
a paradigm shift. Until recently, the processing of highly
compute -intensive applications was performed by isolated
supercomputing platforms. It is now possible for such
applications to be executed by a network of computers bound
together by an overarching framework that presents the user
with the appearance of one powerful, virtual heterogeneous
machine (VHM)
.
Efforts are currently underway to define and implement
a management system for user applications running in the
VHM. Management System for Heterogeneous Networks (MSHN) is
an emerging resource management system whose primary
function is to accept user jobs, and determine what jobs
should be executed on which machines throughout the VHM and
when.
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss and analyze
the security requirements of an application program running
in a distributed, heterogeneous, networked environment. In
particular, a security architecture suitable for
Management System for Heterogeneous Networks (MSHN) will be
proposed. Additionally, this thesis investigates the
possibility of implementing the proposed security-
architecture via commercial off-the-shelf security software.
Intel Corporation has recognized the need for a
security infrastructure that is applicable to a distributed,
multi-platform computing environment. The result of Intel's
research is the publication of a security infrastructure
termed Common Data Security Architecture (CDSA) . The use of
CDSA as a means of providing a suitable level of trust has
been investigated. This thesis will analyze MSHN's security
needs and recommend a solution via CDSA. Finally, a
prototype demonstration of the security architecture is
presented.
B . MOTIVATION
Significant challenges exist in securing any computing
system, however, the usual problems are exacerbated when a
process is distributed across numerous computing
environments. Previously developed resource management
systems have largely neglected the issue of security.
Existing systems lack scalable mechanisms for authentication
and privacy [Ref . 1] . The current prototype of MSHN does
not provide protection against the threat of unauthorized
disclosure or modification of the user's data.
Consider, for example, a user application which
simulates the operation of a newly designed jet engine.
This sort of simulation, depending on the fidelity of the
model, may require the enormous consumption of computational
resources. Thus, such an application may be an ideal
candidate for execution via MSHN. However, if the
simulation results are not properly protected, their
unauthorized disclosure could provide competitors with an
unfair advantage
.
Similarly, if the engine were destined for a military
aircraft, compromise of the simulation results could provide
adversaries with information that might imply countermeasure
techniques. Or worse, if the adversary could modify the
simulation results without detection, they might cause the
design to be flawed. Clearly, the users of MSHN will demand




This chapter will discuss the benefits of distributed
computing and describe an example application of a military
command and control decision support tool that would be
suited to operating in a distributed computing environment.
2. Management System for Heterogeneous Networks
This chapter will describe the status of the MSHN
architecture, which is currently under development. It
provides a high level view of the processing and




Essentials of Secure Systems
This chapter discusses the fundamentals of computer




This chapter describes Intel ' s Common Data Security
Architecture (CDSA) . Along with an overview of the CDSA
design, this chapter discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of Intel's specification.
5. Security Enhanced MSHN Architecture
This chapter will describe an augmented architecture
for MSHN that utilizes underlying capabilities to provide
limited security protection. The security-enhanced
architecture originates from the description of MSHN in
Chapter III, modified to take advantage of the security
mechanisms noted in Chapter IV. A proof of concept
demonstration program, written using CDSA, will be
described. It implements a primitive set of security
mechanisms for the security enhanced MSHN architecture.
6 . Recommendations and Conclusions
This chapter recommends areas of additional research
and concludes with a summary analysis of MSHN security.
II. DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING
For many years the computer industry has been
progressing from centralized computing (mainframes) to
decentralized, distributed computing operations. Earlier
generations of computer users were forced to rely upon
centralized processing because of the computational power
required, the lack of communications network capacity, and
because everyone could not afford to purchase their own
computers. This situation no longer exists.
The explosive growth in personal computer and
workstation usage has resulted from their ever- increasing
processing capabilities, continued decrease in acquisition
costs, and substantial user friendliness improvements
provided via graphical user interfaces. Personal computers
and workstations have empowered users to control the
processing of their data in a more direct manner.
Moreover, distributed computing has become the method
of choice not only because of the personal computer
evolution, but also because of the connectivity of personal
computers to more powerful computers via local and wide area
networks. The ability to share data resources among
multitudes of disparate users is a tremendous benefit to
all. The Department of Defense (DoD)
, like any other
enterprise, realizes the significance of information
technology as a key component, critical to the success of
its mission. The philosophy for the integration of
information technology into the DoD is described below.
A. JOINT VISION 2 010
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has outlined
his future vision of twentieth century warfare in a document
titled Joint Vision 2010 [Ref . 2] . Figure 1 captures the
concepts of JV 2010 in one diagram.
Figure 1 Tenets of JV 2010 [Ref. 2]
JV 2010 is based upon the tenets of dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-
dimensional protection. Note that the four tenets are all
encompassed by information superiority. In an era of
diminishing force structure, the success of our nation's
military defense is tied to its ability to do more with
less. Information superiority is the force multiplier that
enables a smaller, more agile, technologically superior
force to succeed in battle. The doctrine that outlines how
the Department of Defense will achieve information
superiority is published in Joint Pub 6 [Ref . 3]
.
B. C4I FOR THE WARRIOR: JOINT PUB 6
C4I represents command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence. C4I encompasses the procedures
that a commander employs to direct his forces, as well as
the policies to be used to communicate information between
them. C4I For the Warrior is the vision for future command
and control systems. In this case, the Warrior refers to
the warfighting commander. In order to accomplish his
mission, the warrior needs a fused, current, and accurate
representation of the battlespace along with the ability to
coordinate with, respond to, and order all his forces. The
U.S. Marine Corps concisely defines the importance of
command and control in the following quote from its
doctrine
:
War is a process that pits the opposing wills of two commanders against
each other. Great victories of military forces are often attributed to
superior firepower, mobility, or logistics. In actuality, it often is the
commander who makes good decisions and executes these decisions at a
superior tempo who leads his forces to victory.
Therefore, victory demands that commanders effectively link decision
making to execution through the concept of command and control.
Warfare will continue to evolve and command and control processes,
organization, and supporting systems will continue to change, but the
basic concept of command and control will remain the key to the decisive
application of combat power. More than ever before, a command and
control system is crucial to success and must support shorter decision
cycles and instantaneous flexibility across vast distances of time and
space. [Ref. 3]
Clearly, if we are to achieve information dominance, we
need automated tools to help us develop plans faster than
our adversary. Command of joint forces in war is an
intense, competitive and stressful process. The joint force
commander is not only faced with making life and death
decisions in complex situations but must do this, in limited
time, in an environment of uncertainty. Command is as much
a problem of information management as it is of carrying out
difficult and complex warfighting tasks.
Command, control, communications, computers and
Intelligence (C4I) systems supporting US military forces
must have the capability to rapidly adapt to the demands of
the commanders who use them, as well as the environment in
which they are used. They must make available the
information that is important; provide it where needed; and
ensure that it gets there not only in a timely manner, but
also in a format that is usable by the receiver. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff summarize the goal of C4I systems as
follows: "The fundamental objective of C4I systems is to get
8
the critical and relevant information to the right place in
time to allow forces to seize on opportunity and meet the
objectives across the range of military operations." [Ref.
3] .
Decision Support Systems are at the heart of the
commander's planning process. Computer driven simulation
programs can be used to assess the likely effectiveness of a
given war plan before any casualties are incurred. The
results of the simulation runs can then be used to adjust or
modify plans until the commander is satisfied with their
predicted results. Decision support through modeling and
simulation can provide a significant advantage to the
warfighter. An example of their use is described next.
C. C3ISIM: A CASE STUDY
C3ISIM is a simulation model developed as a tool to
study Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
related issues [Ref. 4]. The following analysis discusses
the nature and purpose of C3ISIM, to include its usage in
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, as well as an assessment of
the value of its contribution in that engagement.
The analysts who employed C3ISIM in support of
Operation Desert Shield initially attempted to use the model
to assist in the analysis of air defense networks currently
in place in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. While researching and
collecting data on air defense equipment, the mission
9
changed. As the air campaign planners developed their
strategy, the C3ISIM analysts were tasked to perform a
detailed study of the first few hours of the attack plan.
This new task was added because of C3ISIM's ability to
simulate both fighter to fighter engagements and SAM
(Surface to Air Missile) to fighter engagements.
Additionally, it shows via computer display, a high
resolution graphic display of the simulated battle as it
unfolds. This unique feature, along with the raw attrition
numbers generated by the program, enabled the air campaign
planners to maximize their measure of force effectiveness
(MOFE) , which in this case, was to minimize attrition of
friendly aircraft.
C3ISIM proved to be a valuable tool in the development
of the Desert Storm Air Campaign. C3ISIM enabled planners
to "play" their campaign plan on the computer. From the
simulation they were able to perceive potential attrition
"hot spots" as well as vulnerabilities in the Iraqi air
defense system. Planners could use this information and
tailor their war plan to avoid the enemy's strengths and
exploit its weaknesses. As a decision aid, the information
generated by C3ISIM may have saved the lives and expensive
aircraft of U.S. pilots. Of course, it must be understood
that it was only one of many tools used to aid in the
decision making process. Other analysis methods and models
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were investigated and used for comparison. Ultimately,
C3ISIM was perceived as a valid model by the users because
it passed their "gut check." Also noteworthy is what C3ISIM
did not do. It did not develop the air campaign, nor did it
make the process any easier or faster. What it did do was
help the planners produce a better overall product. And
from this perspective, C3ISIM was completely successful.
Models, by definition, are an abstraction of reality.
Analysts, as well as the user community, must remember that
a model, no matter how detailed, will never completely
simulate all aspects of battle. The level of detail
provided by C3ISIM was adequate for its intended use.
However, there will always be a conflict between detail
(realism) and speed of model execution.
C3ISIM was only marginally acceptable in terms of
timeliness. Once the air campaign began, C3ISIM was no
longer a viable tool because each simulation run took too
long to execute. The C3ISIM analysts noted:
The initial runs we made covered the first three hours of real time, but
required almost eight hours to execute on the computer. We were able to
conduct two executions per day at that rate. The number of times we ran
the model with different 'rolls-of-the-dice' was certainly constrained by
how quickly we needed the answer to the attrition question. [Ref. 4]
Like any other computer program, its outputs are only
as good as the inputs. At this time the air tasking order
was extremely volatile. Changes to the air picture occurred
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on a continual basis. C3ISIM was slow, and since it was a
Monte Carlo model, it required numerous executions, using
the same data set, before trends could be reliably detected.
Therefore, once the air plan had been established and
started, C3ISIM could not produce attrition estimates in
time for the execution of a mission. Throughout Desert
Storm, the mission of C3ISIM turned to that of trying to
determine the cause of downed aircraft, rather than
attempting to predict future losses.
Nonetheless, C3ISIM demonstrated its applicability and
suitability as a decision tool for combat planners. By
analyzing and simulating an extremely complex problem,
C3ISIM not only confirmed the planner's "gut feeling," but
also provided insights that may have otherwise gone
undiscovered
.
C3ISIM is one of a number of complex decision support
tools available to a commander. The compute power required
to process these programs grows unbounded as the user
demands more fidelity and realism from the software. During
Desert Shield, C3ISIM was run on a Silicon Graphics 24 0GTX
workstation. Consider the advantage that a network of
cooperative computers would have provided if it had been
available at the time. Simulation runs could have executed
concurrently on dozens if not hundreds of powerful
workstations. Simulation results would have been returned
12
in time for planners to adjust their battle plan. Thus, the
usefulness of the C3ISIM model could have extended into the
tactical battle planning process.
D. SUMMARY
Decision support systems and the explosive growth of
networked computing have irrevocably changed the paradigm by
which computers of all types are employed. Long gone are
the days of mainframe monsters tied to dumb terminals.
These changes have affected the manner in which the military
and commercial industries will employ information technology
assets. Joint Vision 2010 requires information superiority
for success in battle. Distributed systems are a key
enabler to that objective. It is imperative that the
Department of Defense take advantage of distributed
computing, for our adversaries surely will.
13
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III. MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS (MSHN)
A. PURPOSE
Modern computer networks have grown in size and
complexity as fast as the technology will allow. They also
span greater distances and include machines of varying
types. This expansion has resulted in the need to
effectively manage large heterogeneous computer networks, to
deliver good performance to all users, regardless of their
individual measure of quality of service. In response to
this need, a team of computer science experts, funded by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
, is
currently developing a resource management system named
MSHN1 .
The goal of MSHN is to provide a computing environment
that delivers each user's specified quality of service,
subject to the available resources, the user's individual
priorities, and the preference of each user for different
forms of the requested data. Given a set of jobs, MSHN will
determine where and when to run each job. MSHN evolved from
SmartNet, which was a heterogeneous framework for minimizing
the time at which the last job of a set of computationally
intensive jobs finishes on a suite of heterogeneous
1 Pronounced "mission".
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computing resources [Ref. 5]. SmartNet treats the set of
compute resources available as one virtual heterogeneous
machine (VHM) . SmartNet achieves superior performance by
determining scheduling solutions based upon knowledge of the
VHM and job characteristics. MSHN differs from SmartNet in
several ways: (1) it strives to support Input/Output
intensive and real-time jobs in addition to compute
-
intensive jobs; (2) it accounts for the fact that many
different resources may be needed, not just a central
processing unit, to execute a job; and (3) it manages
adaptive applications.
One of the key improvements of MSHN over traditional
resource management systems is that MSHN is intended to
support adaptive applications. Adaptive applications are
those which can produce results using either a variety of
algorithms or in a variety of forms. MSHN uses knowledge of
these various forms to choose the appropriate one for the
given operating environment. MSHN is intended to help
achieve the goals set forth in Joint Vision 2010, and C4I
For The Warrior, by allowing a commander to maximize the
utility of his computer network, particularly in a volatile
wartime environment.
In addition to improving the performance of other
applications, MSHN is intended to expand the usefulness of
compute intensive, batch processed jobs such as C3ISIM. Had
16
MSHN been available during the Gulf War, it may have been
possible to use C3ISIM's simulation results throughout the
air campaign, as opposed to only prior to the start of the
battle
.
B. MSHN PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
The MSHN architecture is still under development. The
description that follows is based upon the architecture
design as of April 30, 1998. While the ultimate MSHN
architecture may differ slightly, the main components and
concepts are expected to remain unchanged.
MSHN will consist of a client-server architecture. It





An abstract description of each of the components is
provided below, and portrayed in Figure 2. Although these
components are shown together, they may in fact reside on
separate machines. There will usually be many different
client applications, linked with the client libraries
running at any given time. Additionally, it is conceivable
that some of the components may be replicated.
17
1. Client Library
The client library is linked with both adaptive and
non-adaptive applications. It provides a transparent
interface to all of the MSHN services [Ref . 6] . The client
library performs several functions. It intercepts system
calls to (1) monitor end-to-end performance, (2) record
resource requirements, and (3) forward requests to start
another process, when appropriate, to the Scheduling Server.
It forwards the end-to-end performance measurements to the
Resource Status Server, and the recorded resource
requirements to the Resource Requirements Database. The
final implementation of MSHN may forward the performance
measurements and resource requirements through a local
proxy. Finally, it will also intercept calls from the
Scheduling Server which indicate that a different form of
the application, other than the one that is currently
running, should be executed.
2 . Scheduling Server
The Scheduling Server performs the highly complex task
of scheduling multiple jobs, from multiple users, onto one
(or several) computers from a pool of heterogeneous
computing platforms. The sophisticated algorithms that the
Scheduling Server will use to make decisions is beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, it is essential to know the
interfaces presented by the Scheduling Server.
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The Scheduling Server will accept scheduling requests
from the client libraries. The Scheduling Server will query
both the Resource Status Server and the Resource
Requirements Database. These queries will respond with near
real time information on the status (load) of the VHM, and
the resource requirements of the application. Once this
information is obtained, the Scheduling Server can calculate
a mixture of computing and network resources which will,
with high probability, deliver the requested quality of
service
.
Additionally, in the event of a significant deviation
from the initial resource status estimate, the Scheduling
Server will receive notification from the Resource Status
Server. For example, if a communications path is severed,
or a machine fails, the Scheduling Server will be notified
and can recalculate a new scheduling solution for the
affected applications. The Scheduling Server may then
signal the client library and advise it to compute using a
different algorithm, or perhaps recommend that it shift
execution to a different computing resource.
3 . Resource Requirements Database
The Resource Requirements Database is a repository of
information pertaining to the execution of user
applications. A job consists of the code and data required
to execute a user's application. The database records
19
statistics on the run time characteristics of jobs, such as
CPU, memory, and disk usage. The Resource Requirements
Database provides this information to the Scheduling Server
as requested. It is updated by the client libraries.
4. Resource Status Server
The purpose of the Resource Status Server is to
maintain a highly dynamic database of estimated loads on the
various resources of the VHM [Ref . 6] . The Scheduling
Server will query the Resource Status Server to obtain an
initial estimate of the load on various compute resources.
After making a scheduling decision, the Scheduling Server
will notify the Resource Status Server of the additional
loads that it expects the client application to place on the
compute resources.
Also, during the execution of an application, the
Resource Status Server will be updated periodically with
statistics regarding the computing and networking resources









Figure 2 Overview of MSHN Runtime Architecture [Ref . 6]
C. SUMMARY
MSHN is a tool currently under development. Its
purpose is to manage (adaptive) jobs in a heterogeneous
environment, so that the system delivers good quality of
service. Given the conceptual description from above, we




IV. ESSENTIALS OF SECURE SYSTEMS
A. THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
Clearly, no computer system is 100% secure. There will
always be some level of risk associated with the use of such
a system. Therefore, it is more appropriate to describe the
level of trust you have in that system, rather than calling
it secure. Trust, in this context, refers to the degree to
which you believe the computing system will behave in the
manner it was designed to behave. In other words, we expect
the computing system to enforce a security policy.
Information security is commonly viewed as a combination of
the following features:
1. Secrecy:
Secrecy is defined as the protection of information
from unauthorized disclosure.
2 . Integrity:
Integrity is defined as the protection of information
from modification or deletion.
3. Availability:




B. BUILDING A TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM
The Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [Ref. 7] describes the
techniques that should be considered when developing a




A security policy is a statement of intent with regard
to control over access to and dissemination of information.
It must be precisely defined and implemented for each system
that is used to process sensitive information. Two common
policies are the Mandatory Policy and the Discretionary
Policy.
A mandatory policy is one where the computer system
enforces access control. One common implementation of
mandatory policy uses a set of ordered labels that have been
assigned to each data container and user. Access control
decisions are determined by the relationship between the
user's label and the container's label in the label
hierarchy. Mandatory policies are often found in military
applications, where users are assigned security clearances,
and data are marked with a security classification. Only
those users with a clearance equal to or higher than the
data's classification label are permitted access.
24
Conversely, a discretionary policy allows the users of
the computer system to decide who should receive access to
the information they control, and the system enforces those
access control decisions.
2. Accountability
The second basic control objective addresses one of the
fundamental principles of security: individual
accountability. Individual accountability is the key to
securing and controlling any system that processes
information on behalf of individuals or groups of




Each individual user of a system, whether they are
an actual person or a process running on behalf of a user,
must identify itself before obtaining access to the
resources of the computer system.
b) Authentication
Authentication is the process of binding the
identity of a user to who they say they are. Identification
and authentication work together, and are often called I&A.
A trusted computer system must have irrefutable proof that
an identified user is legitimate, and not an impostor.
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Once ISA has been established, then the trusted
computer system can provide authorization control. In most
computer systems, users may have differing access
requirements depending on their role in the organization.
Some users may require access to certain sensitive
information that should not be revealed to other users. The
administrator of such a system needs the ability to decide
what level of access to bestow upon an authenticated user.
Note that for this feature, granularity is an important
attribute. Some applications may require access control per
individual user, while others may wish to grant access to an
entire group of users
.
c) Audit
A trusted computer system should provide an audit
capability. Thus, if an anomaly or a breach should occur,
the audit trail could assist developers and administrators
in their efforts to isolate and remedy the problem.
Additionally, this feature can help investigators assess the
extent of damage that may have occurred, and decide on an
appropriate course of action.
Note that while auditing cannot prevent attacks,
it does provide a psychological deterrence to insider crime.
If a valid user knows that his actions are being recorded,
he may be less likely to attempt an illegal action, even
though the system might allow him to do so. Auditing is
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extremely valuable as a tool for alerting appropriate
personnel, recording the extent of a breach, and assisting
in the eventual repair of security events.
3 . Assurance
The third basic control objective is concerned with
guaranteeing or providing confidence that the security
policy has been implemented correctly and that protection
relevant elements of the system do indeed accurately mediate
and enforce the intent of that policy. By extension,
assurance must include a guarantee that the trusted portion
of the system works only as intended. To accomplish these
objectives, two forms of assurance are required:
a) Life-Cycle Assurance
Life cycle assurance refers to the steps taken by
an organization to insure that the system is designed,
developed, and maintained using formalized and rigorous
control and standards [Ref . 7]
.
b) Operational Assurance
Operational assurance focuses on the features and
system architecture used to insure that the security policy
is uncircumventably enforced during system operation [Ref.
7] .
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C. REFERENCE MONITOR CONCEPT
An abstract model of the operation of security
mechanisms was proposed by James P. Anderson in 1972. His
idea was called the Reference Monitor Concept [Ref . 8] .













Figure 3 Reference Monitor Concept
The Reference Monitor Concept provides a theoretical
framework for the design and implementation of security
mechanisms which will enforce a particular security policy.
The reference monitor allows active entities, called
Subjects, to make reference to passive entities, called
Objects
,
based on a set of current access authorizations.
Subjects, such as users, and processes, cause information to
flow among objects, or change the state of the system.
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Objects, such as files, displays, and printers, are entities
that contain or receive information.
The heart of the Reference Monitor is the Reference
Validation Mechanism (RVM) . The RVM arbitrates access
requests. When the RVM receives a request for access from a
subject, the RVM consults the authorization database. If
the authorization database contains permission for the given
subject/object pair, then access is granted, and the current
authorization database is updated along with appropriate
entries into the audit trail.
Any actual implementation of a reference monitor must
satisfy three design requirements [Ref . 8] :
Completeness: the reference monitor must be invoked
upon every reference by a subject to an object,
Isolation: the reference monitor and its database
must be protected from unauthorized alteration, and
Veriflability : the reference monitor must be
relatively compact, organized, simple, and
understandable so that it can be completely
analyzed, tested and verified to perform its
functions properly.
In practice, it is extremely difficult to produce an
implementation of a reference monitor that fulfills these
requirements. Software flaws will exist in all but the most
carefully analyzed programs. Sophisticated software
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engineering techniques and configuration control can
certainly assist in the development of a high quality
product, but they do not provide 100% assurance.
Nonetheless, the reference monitor concept remains as an
ideal, theoretical basis for the design of trusted systems.
D. SECURITY MECHANISMS
1. Identification and Authentication
Identification and authentication is a first step
towards controlling access to information. It is a two-step
process where the user first tells the system who they are,
followed by proof to the system that who they say they are
is in fact who they are. I&A mechanisms generally rely on
one or more of the following three items:
Something the user knows : the most common form of
this technique is the use of a password,
Something the user has: smart cards, tokens or
identification badges are forms of something the
user may have , and
Something the user is: physical properties of the
user ' s anatomy are examples of something he or she
is. Finger prints, retinal scans, voice recognition
and many other techniques are available to prove
identity with a reasonable degree of assurance.
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2 . Cryptography-
Cryptography is the science and art of secret writing -
keeping information secret [Ref . 9] . Most people are aware
of cryptography as a means for scrambling a message such
that it can only be read by the holder of some secret code,
however, confidentiality is only one of many services that
cryptography can provide. Cryptography is an essential part
of modern secure systems because of its ability to provide
the following communications security services:
Secrecy: protection against unauthorized
disclosure,
Authentication: undisputable proof of the
originator of a message,
Integrity: detection of unauthorized modification
or deletion of a single bit of a message, and
Nonrepudiation: undisputable proof of a
transaction, such that neither party involved can
deny the transaction after the fact.
Cryptography is implemented via encryption algorithms.
Encryption Algorithms are mathematical functions that
scramble data. There are numerous algorithms available.
They can be divided into two categories: [Ref. 9]




a) Symmetric Key technology
Symmetric key ciphers use an algorithm for
encryption and decryption with the same key (see Figure 4)
.
Therefore, symmetric key schemes required that both the
sender (User A) and receiver (User B) possess the same key
in order to communicate in a secure manner. The
confidentiality and authenticity of their data relies on the












Figure 4 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric key systems require a trusted source for
the generation and distribution of keys. The difficulty of
symmetric key technology is the distribution process. Since
the basis for trust lies in the secrecy of the keys, keys
cannot be sent via unsecure means
.
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Key management in a symmetric system can be a non-
trivial problem. Consider the fact that for each pair of
users in an organization, there must exist a unique key.
The total number of keys required can be calculated by the
following formula:
N = [U * (U - 1) ] /2
where N = Total number of unique keys, and U =
number of unique users. Thus, if there are 100 users in an
organization who wish to securely communicate encrypted
messages, a total of [100 * (100-1) ]./2 = 4950 keys would be
required. Clearly, key management can get out of hand
quickly, even in a small organization.
b) Asymmetric Key Technology
Cryptographic algorithms where one key is used to
encrypt and a second key is used to decrypt are called
















Figure 5 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
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Asymmetric key systems offer significant
advantages over symmetric systems when it comes to
management and distribution of keys.
Public/Private key cryptography is a family of
asymmetric key algorithms that offers several unique, and
highly useful properties. The public/private key pairs
(PPK) are generated such that when one key is used to
encrypt, the other is used to decrypt. The user's public
key is freely published for anyone to use, while the private
key is kept secret. [Ref. 9]
Public key technology can be used to implement
several important security mechanisms: confidentiality,
authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation. To transmit a
secret message from User A to User B, User A would encrypt
the message using User B's public key. The only person who
could decrypt the message would be the holder of User B ' s
private key, which presumably, User B has kept securely to
himself. User B can decrypt the message, but how does he
know it came from User A? Anyone could create a message and
encrypt it with User B's public key. This problem is solved
by digital signatures, which are described later in this
chapter.
Asymmetric key systems offer a significant
advantage over symmetric systems in terms of key
distribution. Since private keys remain secured with the
originator, there is no need for a pre-planned secured
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communications path or courier system to deliver keys.
Public keys can be transmitted via electronic mail, posted
on a web page, obtained via voice telephone call, or any
other means, without regard to compromise.
The management of keys in an asymmetric system is
much simpler than in a symmetric system due to the reduced
number of keys required. For each user in the system, there
are only two keys that need to be managed: the user's public
and private key pair. Referring back to the previous
example, in an organization of 10 symmetric key users, a
total of 4950 keys were required. The same organization
using asymmetric keys would require only 200 keys. This
promises a significant workload reduction in terms of
administrative costs. Public key systems are scalable.
They easily expand with the growth of the enterprise.
Public key technology offers a wide range of
advantages over symmetric techniques, however, it is not
without its drawbacks. One significant disadvantage stems
from the fact that the encryption and decryption algorithms
are significantly slower. Consider the following comparison
of two of the most popular cryptographic algorithms, Data
Encryption Standard (DES) , a symmetric algorithm, and the
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) Cryptosystem, a public key
algorithm.
The most efficient current hardware
implementations of RSA achieve encryption rates of about 600
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Kilobits per second, as compared to 1 Gigabit per second for
DES . Stated another way, RSA is roughly 1500 times slower
than DES. [Ref. 10]
Even more important, the use of public keys
requires an infrastructure designed to satisfy the following
questions
:
How do I obtain someone's public key, and
How do I know keys are valid?
Obtaining another user's public key may be as
simple as placing a telephone call to the user and
transmitting the key verbally. This simple solution might
not always be practical. Another alternative is to post
public keys on a web site that is open to anyone who might
need your key.
The Consultative Committee for International
Telegraphy and Telephony (CCITT) recommendation X.500 is a
series of recommendations that define a directory service
[Ref. 11] . The directory provides a means for mapping users
to their public keys. Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) is another example of an automated means for
obtaining public keys.
Once the user has obtained the required public
key, he or she must be assured that is legitimate, and not a
forgery. Authentication of public keys is performed by
electronically wrapping the key and other user data in a
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certificate. The certificate is electronically signed by a
trusted third party. This signature guarantees the
authenticity of the certificate, much as a notary public
performs the same function on paper documents.
c) Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a block of data that was
created through the use of a cryptographic signing
algorithm. The algorithm is applied to some input data
using a private key. Digital signatures can be used for the
following purposes
:
Authenticating the originator of a message or
process, and
Verifying the integrity of a message since it was
signed by the originator.
Digital signatures provide authentication by
virtue of the extreme computational difficulty of decrypting
a signed message without the proper public key. The
successful decryption of a digitally signed message with a
public key virtually guarantees the message was signed by
the holder of the corresponding private key.
Integrity of messages can be guaranteed by
combining digital signatures with message digests. A
message digest, or hash, is a small piece of data that is
generated by processing the message through a hashing
algorithm. A hashing algorithm uses a sophisticated
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mathematical routine to produce a message digest that is
extremely difficult to reverse. That is, given the hash, it
is almost impossible to determine the message that was used
to create it (there would be many)
.
Additionally, the hashing function is designed
such that any change in the message will produce a
completely different message digest. Therefore, if the
originator of a message creates a message hash and signs it,
the receiver of the message can verify the integrity of the
message by recalculating the hash and comparing it with the
one sent with the message. If they agree, then receiver can
be reasonably certain that the message arrived without the
change of a single bit
.
Hashing algorithms and message digests suffer from
a phenomenon known as collisions . The strength of a message
digest is limited by the number of bits used to compose the
hash. Normally, a message digest is small, perhaps several
bytes, compared to the input message from which the hash was
derived that may be several kilobytes to megabytes.
Clearly, since there are more combinations for possible
messages than there are for corresponding message digests,
there will exist a number of messages that, when hashed,
produce exactly the same message digest. This is a
collision. The possibility of a collision implies that a
person with sufficient computing resources and time can
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generate a bogus message that produces the same hash as an
authentic message, and therefore, break the integrity of
your message. Thus, collisions and their risks should be
considered when choosing a hash size and algorithm.
d) Digital Certificates
A digital certificate is an unforgeable binding
between some user (person or process) to a public key in a
particular domain as attested to by the digital signature of
the owner of the certificate domain. Certificates can
attest to the identity of the certificate holder and may
include a set of authorized actions the holder may perform.
CCITT recommendation X.509 defines a standard format for the
content of certificates [Ref. 11].
The owner or creator of a certificate domain is
known as the certificate authority (CA) . The digital
signature placed upon a certificate by the CA forms the
basis for trust in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system.
The community of trusted certificates can be expanded by
cross certification. When two or more CA's agree to trust
each other's certificates, users can infer trust based upon









User Domain A User Domain B
Figure 6 Cross Certification
Cross certification allows for the development of
an expandable, hierarchical certificate authority structure.
This infrastructure is essential to the success of public
key technology. However, certificate authorities have
another important job aside from the creation of
certificates. What happens when a certificate is no longer
valid? The revocation of certificates is a serious issue.
Certificate revocation can be handled in a number
of ways. Usually, when a certificate is created it will
include a field to indicate the expiration date of the
certificate. The user of the certificate can check the
expiration date prior to allowing any transaction, much the
same way a credit card is checked for expiration before a
purchase is committed.
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There may be cases when a certificate authority
wishes to revoke a certificate prior to its expiration date.
For example, consider an employee who is terminated for
cause. While the former employee's certificate is still
within the validity date, the employee maintains the ability
to identify himself as a member of the firm. This positive
identity may grant him access to confidential data.
Clearly, the firm would have the need to revoke the
certificate immediately. Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) were developed for this purpose. A CRL, as the name
implies, is a listing of certificates that are no longer
valid. Now when a user wishes to check the validity of a
certificate, they must check the digital signature of the
signer as well as the revocation list. Provided that both




Building a secure computing system is no trivial
affair. A great deal of research has gone in to the
development of sound security principles and mechanisms.




V. COMMON DATA SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In early 1995, Intel Corporation recognized the need
and corresponding opportunity for a security infrastructure
that was open, interoperable, and applicable across multiple
computing platforms. The initial idea was to provide
personal computers with a basic infrastructure so that the
essential ingredients for a security solution were
available. As a result of their research and development,
Intel published a specification called the Common Data
Security Architecture (CDSA) [Ref . 12]
.
Intel based their architecture upon a number of
fundamental assumptions. These assumptions include design
characteristics, and trust relationships.
In order to achieve their goal of interoperability and
extensibility, the architecture was designed from the start
to be built in a series of layers. Each layer is designed
to provide services to the layer above it . The layered
approach is modular, adaptable, and portable. Each of these
features is highly desirable in any industrial -strength
software engineering project.
Intel makes broad claims regarding the security of CDSA
[Ref. 12] . Nonetheless, the security provided by CDSA is
limited by the protection provided by the underlying
operating system. Since cryptography forms the heart of
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CDSA protection, the protection of keys and methods on each
host becomes a critical aspect of security. If these keys
are subject to unauthorized modification or disclosure, the
application executing on top of CDSA is compromised. Thus,
we see that unless carefully integrated into a high
assurance platform, CDSA protection will only deter
attackers with limited resources. The premise of our work
is that CDSA may, in fact, be integrated into a platform
having a level of assurance commensurate with the data.
Another architectural assumption that bears discussion
is the representation of trust relationships. CDSA relies
on digital certificates as the basis for identification and
authentication functions. Certificates may also carry
authorization information. CDSA does not mandate trust
relationships or security policies, but it does allow
applications to enforce them using its services.
CDSA defines the infrastructure for a comprehensive set
of security services. The CDSA consists of three basic
layers (see Figure 7)
:
A set of system security services,
The Common Security Services Manager (CSSM) , and
Add- in Security Modules.
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The layered design of the architecture allows for
extensibility of security mechanisms as future enhancements
become available. In addition to the vertical layers, the
security modules are horizontally divided by function.

























Figure 7 Common Data Security Architecture [Ref . 12]
A. SYSTEM SECURITY SERVICES
Sophisticated security protocols, based on the Common
Security Services Manager and its add- in modules, may be
defined and implemented at the system security services
architectural layer. CDSA documents claim that the
following services can be provided: [Ref. 12]
Secure and private file systems,
Protocols for secure electronic commerce,
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Protocols for private communications,
Multi- language access to the CSSM API, and
CSSM management tools.
Examples of these protocols may include Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) [Ref
. 13], Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)
[Ref. 14], Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [Ref. 15], and Secure
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) [Ref. 16].
These protocols support secure file systems, secure
electronic commerce, secure network communications, and
secure electronic mail, respectively. An example of multi-
language support is the CSSM-Java API, which allows Java
developers the capability to include CSSM functions in their
applications. CSSM management tools may include
installation and configuration utilities.
B. COMMON SECURITY SERVICES MANAGER (CSSM)
The main infrastructure component of CDSA is the Common
Security Services Manager. The CSSM integrates the security
functions required by applications programs. From the
application developer's point of view, this is a great idea,
because it facilitates the design and implementation of the
final product. It allows the developer to concentrate on
his primary mission, i.e., producing an application program,
rather than the low level details of complex cryptographic




CSSM Core Services, and
Module Managers
.
The services provided are shown below in Figure 8
CSSM Security API
CSSM Core Services










Figure 8 CSSM Services [Ref . 12]
1. CSSM Security API
The CSSM Security API is the defined interface through
which application programs access security services. The
API includes hundreds of function definitions related to
security. Applications may request security services
directly through the CSSM Security API or indirectly via
layered security services and tools implemented over the
CSSM API. In addition, the API provides a means for
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accessing service-provider, module -specific mechanisms via
pass- through functions.
2 . CSSM Core Services
Services that pertain to the installation and
management of the CSSM are Core Services. These services
are implemented by the CSSM, not by add-in modules. The
four Core Service categories are described below.
a) Security Context Management
A security context is a run-time data structure
that contains the security related parameters required to
execute a cryptographic function. In order to perform
cryptography, applications programs must gather numerous
attributes, such as algorithm identifiers and key sizes.
These attributes are aggregated by a call to a security
context creation function. A handle to the new security
context is returned to the application. The application may
use the context handle as an input to a cryptographic
function along with the data to be operated upon.
Security context management functions handle the
creation and deletion of contexts. The use of security
contexts is beneficial because of their reusability. Once
the overhead of creating a context has been spent, there is
no ' further performance penalty for reusing the context as
needed. An application that repeatedly performs a CSSM API
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function can improve its execution performance by saving
context handles for future function calls.
b) General Module Management
An add-in module is a product provided by a
hardware or software vendor that performs security services
.
In order for an application to use the functions of an add-
in module, the add- in module must be selected and installed
(attached) . Information pertaining to attached components
is stored in a registry. The module management functions of
the CSSM allow an application to query the features and
status of add-ins. The query may return descriptive
attributes specific to the particular add- in. The
application can use the results of the query to selectively
determine which add- in modules to dynamically load and use.
This feature could be useful in a dynamic operational
environment where the security requirements of the
application are subject to change. Naturally, the module
management also offers functions for detaching and
uninstalling modules after they are no longer required.
c) Integrity Services
Protection of CSSM components from tampering is
provided by integrity services. Upon creation, the CSSM
itself is digitally signed. At the time of installation,
the CSSM will verify its signature. This assures the user
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that the CSSM is authentic and has not been modified since
it was distributed from the manufacturer.
Additionally, the integrity of add-in modules can
be checked as they are dynamically loaded. The CSSM
performs an authentication procedure as part of the add-in
module attachment process. If the authentication fails, the
attachment will abort, and the add- in module will not be
available to the application program.
CDSA's notion of self -protecting integrity domains
is flawed, without an underlying domain mechanism. If a
malicious element is able to control the portions of the
system upon which CDSA depends, it can completely subvert
CDSA integrity. Once again, we see that CDSA is only as
trustworthy as the underlying computing platform.
d) Memory Management
CSSM- created objects require allocation of random
access memory for non-persistent storage. Therefore, the
CSSM includes functions for the management of memory
resources. Application developers have the option of
allocating memory within the application program, or
requesting the CSSM to allocate it from the CSSM's own
memory heap. This memory management option supports the
broadest range of potential architectures. Applications can
use the CSSM memory management functions to free memory
dedicated to objects that are no longer needed.
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3 . Module Managers
The matching of a CSSM Security API function call to
the appropriate Service Provider Interface (SPI) function is
the job of the module manager. The CSSM has organized
security services into four basic categories and has defined
a module manager for each service as follows
:
Cryptographic Services Manager,
Trust Policy Services Manager,
Certificate Services Manager, and
Data Store Services Manager.
Each module manager administers the corresponding add-
in module installed on the local system. Module managers
define the API for their particular module.
C. SECURITY ADD-IN MODULES
Cryptographic operations, security policy decisions,
and certificate manipulation operations are performed by
security add- in modules. Application developers may
purchase add- in modules from hardware and software vendors,
thus freeing themselves from the burden of developing
security specific code. Add-in modules are divided into
four functional subsets:
1. Cryptographic Service Provider Module
The CSSM does not perform cryptographic algorithms.
Rather, the CSSM provides applications programs with access
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to cryptographic mechanisms implemented via Cryptographic
Service Provider (CSP) modules. For this reason, the CSSM
is known as crypto with a hole, where the hole is filled by
the CSP vendor's product [Ref . 12]
.
The benefit of modular CSPs lies in their
exchangeability. Application developers can pick and choose
their CSP as required. CSPs may be implemented in hardware
or software. The application requesting CSP service uses
the same API function calls in either case. However, we
would expect that a hardware implementation would be more
tamper resistant than a software CSP.
A general purpose CSP can be used to perform the
following cryptographic functions and services: [Ref. 12]
Bulk Encryption and Decryption,
Digital Signing and Verification,
Cryptographic Hash,
Key generation,
Random Number Generator, and
Encrypted Storage of private keys
.
Specific instances of CSPs may include more or less





The primary purpose of the trust policy module is to
answer the question "Is this certificate trusted for this
action?" [Ref. 12] Thus, application developers can place
the policy-specific business rules of their application into
one module. Whenever an access decision needs to be made,
the application forwards the requester's certificate, and
requested action to the trust policy module for review. The
trust policy module will respond appropriately, based upon
the access control rules programmed into the module.
3 . Certificate Library Module
The certificate library module performs operations on
memory-resident certificates and certificate revocation
lists (CRLs) . CDSA defines the following operations that
any certificate library module should be able to perform:
[Ref. 12]
Create new certificates and new CRLs,
Sign existing certificates and existing CRLs,
Verify the signature of existing certificates and
CRLs,
Extract values, such as a public key, from
certificates,




Reinstate revoked certificates, and
Search certificate revocation lists.
CDSA does not mandate any particular certificate
format. Those design decisions are left up to the module
developer. Therefore, as new standard certificate formats
are designed and accepted by industry, updated certificate
modules can be employed without have to redesign the
application program.
4 . Data Storage Library Module
The primary purpose of the data storage module is to
provide secure, persistent storage for certificates, and
certificate revocation lists [Ref . 12] . A data storage
library module performs the following operations
:
Opening and closing data stores,
Creating and deleting data stores,
Importing and exporting data stores, and
Data object manipulations, such as insertion,
update, deletion, and retrieval.
Service providers may design and implement data storage
library modules from scratch or they may take advantage of
an underlying commercial database management system (DBMS)
.
Either way, the application developer need not be concerned
with the details of storing data objects.
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D. SUMMARY
Since its release for public review, Intel's CDSA has
generated support from the computing industry. In January,
1998, The Open Group announced that it had adopted Intel's
Common Data Security Architecture (CDSA 2.0) specification
as an industry-accepted specification for the development of
secure applications that are interoperable, extensible, and
offer cross platform support [Ref . 17] . MSHN can benefit
from the services provided by CDSA. Chapter VI describes a
security-enhanced MSHN architecture, along with a prototype
demonstration that uses CDSA security mechanisms.
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VI. SECURITY ENHANCED MSHN ARCHITECTURE
Given the initial MHSN architecture described in
Chapter III and the requirements for security as discussed
in Chapter IV, we now describe an enhanced MSHN
architecture and prototype demonstration, designed to
satisfy a limited security policy.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
1. Application Level Security
MSHN is designed to execute in a heterogeneous
computing platform environment. Machines within the VHM may
have differing operating systems, central processing units,
and communications protocols. MSHN acts as middleware: it
will not require any OS modifications, nor will it rely upon
any of the unique security features of any particular OS or
CPU.
MSHN executes in user mode. Each of MSHN's components
runs with the privileges of the user who invoked it. It is
intended that MSHN not have arbitrary control over the host
executing it. This implies that MSHN should not have
supervisory, i.e., "root", privilege within a system.
Therefore, MSHN can provide confidence of correct security
policy enforcement only to the extent that any application
can. The dependency of MSHN upon the operating system
underlying it determines the assurance environment . User-
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level middleware will only be as secure as the operating
system and hardware it relies upon. No matter how well any
user-level middleware is able to deny an attack, it will
still be susceptible to penetration if the underlying OS is
weak. The dependency upon underlying mechanisms is also
true of other resource management systems, such as Globus
[Ref. 18], and Legion [Ref . 19] which exist above the
operating system. They are vulnerable to attacks via
underlying layers
.
2. User Identification and Authentication
Each user will have an individual account on every
machine they are authorized to use throughout the VHM.
Therefore, the assumption is that the I & A facilities
(i.e., login and password) of the user's client machine
along with those of the compute resources will be used to
verify the identity and authenticity of the user. (Details
of the overall MSHN architecture are still under development
and the use of remote login facilities may be considered) .
For each user, MSHN will maintain a list of the machines
where that user has an account . The Scheduling Server will
consult this list as part of its algorithm for determining




In this thesis, we suggest that MSHN rely on public key
technology for the implementation of security mechanisms.
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Our enhanced architecture assumes the existence and
availability of standard directory services such as
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) or X.500.
Additionally, we assume that some form of standard
certificate, such as X.509 will be available.
This approach to key management is in contrast with
that taken by the National Computational Science Alliance,
of which Globus is a member [Ref . 1] . Their approach uses
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) public key encryption software for
securing messages. PGP relies upon introductions for
establishing trust relationships. These relationships are
fundamentally ad hoc, whereas X.500 is authority based, and
therefore more appropriate for the Department of Defense
[Ref. 20]
.
The Legion resource management system eschews any
notion of hierarchical trust. For this system, it is
proposed to tie key management and authentication directly
to each object with the support of an authorizing component
in the architecture [Ref. 19] . Thus, each object proclaims
itself, and other entities in the system must interpret that
proclamation. See [Ref. 21] for further discussion of
related work.
It is assumed that the MSHN Core components (Scheduler,
RSS, RRD) each have a public/private key pair available. To
simplify the architecture, the Scheduler, RSS, and RRD will
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share a common MSHN core certificate. Hence, the MSHN core
components will also share a common public/private key pair.
Additionally, each user can obtain a certificate that
provides a binding between the user's identity and his/her
public key.
4 . Compute Resources
MSHN will maintain a database of registered compute
resources (including network and file and database servers)
.
MSHN core components will be responsible for adding,
deleting and updating this database. All of the code and
data required to run the job will either be packaged by the
client library and transported to the compute resource for
execution, or the MSHN execution shell at the compute
resource will fetch the code and data from the appropriate
locations. Since our revised architecture will rely upon
the Public Key Infrastructure, there must exist facilities
for the storage of private keys at each compute resource
The prototype demonstration will use the key storage
facilities provided by the CDSA crypto- service module to
satisfy this requirement.
5. Client Library
It is assumed that the client library is benign, that
is, free from malicious code.
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6. User Intent
It is assumed that since the users do not have to use
MSHN to run their jobs (they already have permission to
execute jobs on machines in the VHM)
, they will not
intentionally mislead MSHN with bogus run-time parameters.
B. MSHN SECURITY POLICY
Based upon the assumptions above and their implied
restrictions, we now describe the security policy for our
proposed enhanced MSHN architecture.
MSHN will use cryptographic techniques to create
separate domains between the MSHN core components
and the user's application,
MSHN will protect its databases (RSS/RRD) from
malicious updates attempted by non-MSHN jobs,
MSHN will authenticate messages communicated between
its core components such as Query/Response messages
between the Scheduling Server and the RSS/RRD,
MSHN will provide guaranteed integrity of
communications, if required by the user,
MSHN will provide confidentiality protection of
communications (encryption) if required by the user,
and
MSHN will provide an audit trail.
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C. DOMAIN FRAMEWORK
The notion of a program integrity policy was proposed
by L. Shirley and R. Schell [Ref. 22]. Program integrity
means that modification to executable programs by
untrustworthy subjects is prohibited. In essence, it is a
policy to ensure that more sensitive programs remain
tamperproof . Shirley and Schell recommend solving the
program integrity problem by assigning programs to an
ordered set of access classes. The access classes map to
separate domains, and an underlying kernel mechanism
enforces the integrity policy.
The basis for protection in the enhanced MSHN
architecture is the separation of components into domains
via cryptographic techniques. Figure 9 displays the MSHN
domain framework. The domains are ordered in terms of
privilege. From MSHN's point of view, user applications
are the least privileged and are granted the least trust,
while MSHN core components are more privileged and are
granted a higher level of trust
.
Additionally, users are separated from one another by
relying upon authentication and a unique session key for
each job submitted to MSHN. The use of a per job session
key also allows the MSHN core components to guarantee the
authenticity of status messages sent by executing user jobs
and to reject bogus database updates.
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By creating domains, the damage incurred by a security
incident, such as the compromise of a key, is limited to the
components of that domain.
The intent of the enhanced security architecture is to
develop a framework that can take advantage of program
integrity mechanisms, such as those described by Shirley and












Figure 9 MSHN Domain Framework
The computers that MSHN will execute upon do not
necessarily have the ability to run applications in separate
domains. Through the use of cryptography, this domain
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framework will allow all MSHN resources to maintain separate
lightweight security domains.
D. MSHN SECURITY MECHANISMS









Authentication of messages between MSHN components
using public key technology is relatively straight forward.
Assume each component has a private key maintained in a
secure manner. Also assume that each component has a
corresponding public key which is published in a known
directory service. Then, each component could be assured of











1. Client Library generates an Update message, and passes it to the CL Security Module.
2. Security Module digitally signs the Update message using its private key.
3. Security Module transmits signed Update message to RRD.
4. Security Module optionally creates an audit record and sends it to the audit server.
5. RRD receives the signed Update message and calls its Security Module to verify the
signature using the Client Library's public key.
6. If the signature verification is successful, the RRD is assured that the Update message
could only have come from an authentic MSHN Client Library.
Figure 10 PKI Authentication Protocol
We note that this protocol does not ensure the
confidentiality of the Update message. If the
communications path between the components is subject to
eavesdropping, then the unauthorized disclosure of the
Update message is possible. If confidentiality were
required, then the Update message would require an
additional step before transmission. First, the Update
would be digitally signed with the originator's private key
(guaranteeing authenticity) . Second, the signed Update
message would be encrypted, using the receiver's public key
(guaranteeing privacy) . This same protocol could be used in
a similar manner for the authentication and confidentiality
of messages between any of the components of MSHN.
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An alternative, and more efficient method for the
authentication of messages between MSHN components would be
to use public key techniques to distribute a symmetric
communications session key to all the components. Once the
initial overhead of distributing the symmetric key has taken
place, then encryption of messages could be performed using
the much faster symmetric algorithms. This method would
protect the authenticity of the message and guarantee
privacy. Figure 11 describes the hybrid public key

















MSHN Scheduler Security Module generates a symmetric session key along with
a message digest of the same key. The digest is encrypted with the MSHN Core
private key. The key and digest are bundled and encrypted with the MSHN Core
public key, and transported to the other MSHN Core components.
2. Security Module at RSS and RRD decrypt the bundle using their MSHN Core
private key. Privacy of the bundle is guaranteed because only the holder of the
MSHN Core private key could decrypt it.
3. Security Module at RSS and RDD decrypt the message digest of the session key
using their MSHN Core public key. Authenticity of the digest originator is
guaranteed because only the holder of the MSHN Core private key could have
encrypted the digest.
4. Security Module at RSS and RDD generate a message digest of the session key
and compare it with the digest included in the bundle. If the digests match, the
integrity of the session key is guaranteed.
Figure 11 MSHN Core Component Session Key Distribution
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The communications protocols described earlier have not
been formally evaluated. The actual implementation of the
key exchange and message authentication procedures may
require the use of a timestamp and/or nonce (one time use
number or identifier) [Ref . 13] to prevent replay attacks.
E. REVISED ARCHITECTURE
The implementation of the MSHN security mechanisms will
require that several components be added to the architecture
described in Chapter III. A high level view of the revised




















Figure 12 MSHN Revised Architecture
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1. Security Modules
Each of the original components: Scheduling Server,
Resource Status Server, and Resource Requirements Database
will be augmented by a Security Module. The purpose of the
Security Module is to perform the following cryptographic
operations
:
Generate symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs,
Calculate Message Hash (Digest)
,





The Security Module at the Scheduling Server has the
additional responsibility of creating and maintaining a MSHN
Job Request Database.
2 . Key Storage Service
A secure key storage facility will reside and execute
at each compute resource within the VHM. Each compute
resource must have a unique PPK pair. The private key of
that pair will be stored and protected by the key storage
service. The private key will be used to guarantee that the




The audit server will be the repository for the audit
log. As transactions are processed throughout the MSHN
components, applicable audit entries will be forwarded to
the audit server for inclusion into the log. The audit
server will provide an interface through which the MSHN
administrator can review previous MSHN activity, and modify
the list of events to be audited.
F. MSHN EXECUTION SCENARIO
The best way to describe the function of each of the
MSHN components is to walk through a sample job execution
flow from initiation by the user to return of the output
from the compute resource. The following notation will be
used to describe the cryptographic procedures:
Ekey[] : Encrypt contents of [] using key
Dkey[] : Decrypt contents of [] using key
SkeyO : Create a Digital Signature of () using key
K
s
: Symmetric MSHN core session key
K.j : Symmetric MSHN job session key
Upri : User ' s private key
Upub : User's public key
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Ucert : User's certificate
Corepri : MSHN core private key
Corepub : MSHN core public key
Core cert : MSHN core certificate
Rpri : Compute resource private key
Rp^: Compute resource public key
Dig: Message Digest
The following discussion describes a typical job
execution scenario, assuming that the user choose both the
integrity and confidentiality security option.
1. Initialization
Prior to the execution of any jobs, a MSHN
initialization procedure takes place. During this
procedure, the MSHN core components, i.e., Scheduler, RSS,
and RRD, will synchronize on a unique symmetric session key.
The symmetric key will be used for bulk encryption due to
its significant performance advantages. The initialization
procedure is invoked by the Security Module on the Scheduler
(or other designated MSHN core master server) at the request
of the MSHN Administrator. The MSHN Administrator will
start the Scheduler and supply it with a parameter
specifying the required MSHN Core communications security
option. The MSHN Core communications security option ranges
from no security checks, to integrity check,
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confidentiality, to a combination of integrity and
confidentiality.
The Security Module on the Scheduler will generate a
unique, symmetric MSHN session key (Ks ) . The security
module will generate a message digest (Dig) of the MSHN
session key and encrypt the message digest with the MSHN
core private key. Then it will bundle the MSHN Session key
with the encrypted digest and encrypt the bundle with the
MSHN core public key.
Bundle = Ecorepub [Ks , Ecorepri (Dig (Ks ) ) ]
The bundle will then be transmitted to the other core
components
.
The Security Module on the RSS and RRD will receive the
bundle from the Scheduler and decrypt it using the MSHN core
private key. The message digest will be decrypted using the
MSHN core public key. Next the MSHN session key will be
verified by generating a message digest of the key and
comparing it to the digest that was included in the bundle.
If the verification test passes then we have established the
secure transmission of a session key at each of the MSHN
core components and MSHN is prepared to accept user jobs.
2. MSHN Job Request
The user at the client machine starts the MSHN shell.
The user will specify the required communications security
option. All the job information, parameters and the user's
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certificate are bundled and, if requested, signed with the
user's private key, and encrypted with the MSHN Core public
key.
Bundle = Ecorepub [Supri (Ucert , Job Info)]
The bundle is then transmitted to the Scheduling
Server.
3 . Scheduling
The Security Module at the Scheduling Server will
receive the user's job request bundle and decrypt the bundle
using the MSHN Core private key. The Security Module will
verify the user's certificate based upon the certificate
validation level and verify the signature on the inputs
using the user's public key from the enclosed certificate.
If the verification test passes, the Security Module will
generate a unique request identifier, followed by the
creation of an entry in the Job Request Database containing
the user's identification, security option required, and
request identifier.
The Scheduler will now gather the information it needs
to calculate a scheduling solution. It will query the RRD
and RSS . These queries and responses will be encrypted and
or authenticated as required by the MSHN core communications
security option parameter. These communications will be
encrypted and/or signed with the MSHN session key (K
s )
that
was distributed at initialization time.
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The Scheduler will calculate a solution based upon the
data returned from the RSS, RRD, and the resources
accessible to the user. The Security Module on the
Scheduler will generate a unique job session key (Kj) . The
job session key will be added to the job request database,
and the job request will be distributed to the RSS and RRD
security modules.
The Scheduler security module will create a security
token, which contains the job session key encrypted by the
compute resource's public key. The job session key will be
encrypted with the user's public key. All items will be
signed using the MSHN core private key, and all these items,
along with the Scheduler's certificate, will be encrypted by
the user's public key and bundled as follows:
Bundle = Eupub [Scorepri (Job info, Eu^tkj],
token (Er^ [Kj] ) , Corecert ) ]
This bundle will be transmitted to the MSHN shell on
the client machine.
4 . Application Execution
After receiving the job information from the Scheduler,
the MSHN shell will decrypt the bundle using the user's
private key and verify the signature of the job data using
the Scheduler's public key. It will decrypt the job session
key using the user's private key. The client now knows
which compute resource to use. The client bundles the
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user's certificate, job info, and security token. The
bundle is signed and encrypted.
Bundle = Er^ [Supri (Ucert , token, job info)]
The bundle is then transmitted to the appropriate
compute resource
.
The compute resource accepts the bundle from the client
and decrypts it and verifies the signature. The compute
resource decrypts the job session key that was extracted
from the security token of the bundle . The compute resource
executes the job application on behalf of the user and
collects the output. The application output is signed and
encrypted before being transmitted back to the client.
Once the application has completed, and possibly during
execution of the application, the compute resource will
forward job statistics to the resource requirements database
and the resource status server. These status messages are
encrypted and signed with the job session key before
transmission to the respective database server.
The RSS and RRD accept incoming job statistic messages.
The security module at each server will retrieve the
appropriate job session key from the job request database,
as specified by the request identifier. The messages are
decrypted and verified using the job session key before they
are entered into the database.
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The client accepts the application output from the
compute resource and decrypts/verifies the output before
presenting it to the user. At this point, the client has
finished, and will wait for the user to submit another job
or terminate the program.
G. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE
A complete implementation of the MSHN architecture is
beyond the scope of any one thesis. However, we have
developed a prototype security implementation to demonstrate
how a MSHN server might communicate securely with a MSHN
client using CDSA.
1. MSHN Security Layer
The foundation of the prototype implementation is
encapsulated in a single C++ class definition. This class
is called the MSHN Security Layer (MSHN_SL) . The purpose of
the MSHN_SL is to provide an interface through which MSHN
can access the underlying security mechanisms provided via
CDSA. C++ was chosen as the prototype language because
Intel's reference CDSA implementation is written to support
C++ . We choose to execute our prototype in a Windows NT PC
environment because this was the operating system upon which
Intel's CDSA was implemented.
We created this layer as an interface between MSHN and
CDSA so that, in the event that a competitive security API
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is chosen to implement MSHN security, rather than CDSA, MSHN
will still function with minimal reprogramming2 .
2. MSHN SECURITY SERVICES
The MSHN Security Layer defines the methods that are
invoked to support the MSHN security policy. These security
services are defined below, and a complete listing of the
source code is included in Appendix A.
a) mshn_sl_init:
This method performs initialization tasks as
required by the underlying security API
.
b) mshn_sl_create_cert:
This method will create a certificate to include
the public-private key pair associated with it. The
certificate created will contain the public key, while the
private key is placed into a secure key storage facility.
c) mshn_sl_get_cert:
This method will search the certificate database
for a certificate whose subject name matches the input
parameter and if found, returns the requested certificate.
2 Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [Ref
23] and its security services [Ref. 24] have been under
consideration since December, 1997.
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d) mshn_sl_cert_yerify:
This method will check the signature on a given
certificate and return a Boolean value based upon the
signature verification.
e) mshn_sl_cert_zevoked:
This method will check a given certificate against
a certificate revocation list and return a Boolean value
depending on the revocation status.
f) mshn_sl_get_public_key:
This method will return a public key obtained from
a given certificate.
g) mshn_sl_get_private_key:
This method will return a reference to a private
key given the associated public key.
h) mshn_sl_put_audit
:




This method will accept a data buffer and key, and




This method will accept a data buffer and key, and
return a decrypted copy of the input data.
k ) mshn_s1_sym_key_gen
:
This method generates a symmetric key.
1) mshn_sl_asym_key_gen:
This method generates an asymmetric
(public/private) key pair.
m ) mshn_sl_diges t
:
This method creates a message digest for a given
input buffer of data.
n) mshn_sl_sign:
This method creates a digital signature for a
given buffer of data.
o ) mshn_sl_sig_yerify
This method accepts a signature and data buffer.
It returns a Boolean value depending on the verification of
the signature against the input data.
H. PROTOTYPE DEMONSTRATION
Once the MSHN_SL class was designed and tested, the
next step was to develop sample programs to simulate the
MSHN Client, MSHN Servers: Scheduler, Resource Status
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Server, Resource Requirements Database, and the Compute
Resource. We created five programs to test our prototype.
The programs executed on three separate personal computers
connected on a local area network (LAN) . One PC served as
the client. Another PC served as the compute resource, and
one PC served as the MSHN scheduler, MSHN RSS and MSHN RRD,
each of which executes as a separate process. These
programs are described below and a complete listing of the
source code is included in Appendix B.
1. Client
This program simulated the user interface to MSHN. The
client accepts requests for MSHN jobs from the user and
initiates the MSHN Scheduler. After receiving scheduling
advice, the Client submits the job to the Compute Resource.
Once execution of the job is complete, the Client receives
the output from the Compute Resource, and after verification
and/or decryption, returns it to the user.
2 . Resource
Resource substitutes for the actions taken by the
Compute Resource. Upon start-up, Resource goes into a wait
state. It monitors the LAN until it receives a MSHN job to
execute. Upon receipt, it will decrypt and/or verify the
job request bundle and execute the job. The job output is
transmitted to the Client, and job statistics are forwarded
to the MSHN servers (RSS/RRD)
.
79
3. MSHN Core: Scheduler, RSS & RRD
These programs substitute for the actions taken by the
MSHN Scheduler, the Resource Status Server, and the Resource
Requirements Database. Each program begins execution in a
wait status. Once the scheduler receives a job request from
the Client, it performs the required security tests, pauses
as a substitute for calculating a scheduling solution and
returns the scheduling advice to the Client along with the
required security token. The RSS and RRD programs wait for
receipt of job statistics from the compute resource and
after decryption/verification of these messages, store them
in their respective databases.
I. SUMMARY
The MSHN security services prototype demonstrates that
the MSHN_SL is a viable concept. It also verifies that CDSA
is a workable solution for providing the necessary
cryptographic mechanisms.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Clearly, if MSHN is to be successful, it must provide a
level of trust and assurance consistent with the value of
the information it is processing. This thesis demonstrates
a security architecture for MSHN that is practical,




The completion of the MSHN security services
demonstration program is merely the starting point upon
which further research can be conducted. Using this working
model, we can now begin to perform statistical analysis on
the overhead cost of security, in terms of computational
speed.
The demonstration program is written specifically for
personal computers running Windows NT. We recommend
adapting the MSHN security layer to other platforms, such as
UNIX. Also, the current demonstration program is written
specifically for Intel's CDSA implementation. We recommend
researching competitive vendor cryptographic products for
comparison versus the Intel baseline.
Audit service is an essential component of the MSHN
security-enhanced architecture. The current demonstration
program does not implement this critical service. We
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recommend further research on the design and implementation
of an audit server for MSHN.
The inclusion of local proxy servers in the MSHN
architecture may affect the security framework defined in
this thesis. Their use was not considered during the
security architecture design. Further research is required
to determine the security implications of local proxies.
B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
When MSHN is fully implemented, its ability to maximize
the computational power of a complex, heterogeneous, network
of resources will be a valuable tool. There appears to be
no limit to users 1 appetite for automated decision support.
Military and civilian decision makers alike demand and
deserve the best information available, in a timely manner.
MSHN will be well suited to support command and control
information systems. However, it is usable only to the
extent that users have confidence that the security of their
sensitive data will be preserved. MSHN must provide
security mechanisms that are transparent and that take
advantage of assurance in the underlying components of the
VHM. We have concluded that the security services provided
by the MSHN security layer can help achieve this objective.
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APPENDIX A. MSHN SECURITY LAYER SOURCE CODE








// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//





// MSHN Security layer class
// Maximum number of open data stores
#define NUM_DS_HANDLES 6






// Cryptographic algorithm structure











// Attached module handles









// Crypto Services module handle
// Data Store module handle










// symmetric enc/decrypt context
// asymmetric enc/decrypt context
// message digest context





key_gen_context ; // key generation context
// open data store handles
unsigned int ds_handles [NUM_DS_HANDLES]
;
char *ds names [NUM DS HANDLES]
;
int initialized; // Has CSSM been initialized?





// The Security Layer databases will be filled in based on
// the values in the configuration file. The underlying
// security services will be "attached" based on the
// configuration values. Any necessary security "contexts"
// will be created by this function.
int mshn_sl_init (const char *config_file_name)
;



















// This function will find and return the certificate for
// the specified subject.
int mshn_sl_get_cert (
const char *subjectname,
mshn data *the cert)
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// This function will determine if the specified certificate





// This function will return the public key for the subject














// This function will encrypt the specified buffers using
// the specified key and algorithm. The caller of this





const mshn_data buffer [],
int num_buffers,




// This function will decrypt the specified buffers using
// the specified key and algorithm. The caller of this






const mshn_data enc_buf f []















// This function will create a public-private key pair to be










// This function will hash the specified buffers and
// generate a message digest.
int mshn_sl_msg_digest (
int the_alg,




// This function will produce a signature for the specified
// data. First the data will undergo a message digest
// operation. The result of the message digest will then be









// This function will verify a signature on the specified
// data. First the data will undergo a message digest
// operation. The result of the message digest will be











// This function will return a character string description
// of the specified error code. The caller of this function







// Get the error code from the underlying services
int get_error ( )
;
// Find the chosen algorithm structure
int find_alg_params (
int the_id,
struct alg_params &the_j?arams) ;














B . MSHN_SL . CPP
//*****+*********************************************+***************
// File: mshn_sl.cpp




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
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// Description: Security services for MSHN components

























for (int idx=0; idx < NUM_DS_HANDLES;idx++) {
ds_handles [ idx ] = CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE
;






mshn_sl : : ~mshn_sl (
)
{





for (int idx=0; idx < NUM_DS_HANDLES; idx++) {
if (ds_names [idx] != NULL) {
mshn_free (ds_names [idx] , NULL)
;




// The Security Layer databases will be filled in based on
// the values in the configuration file. The underlying
// security services will be "attached" based on the
// configuration values. Any necessary security "contexts"
// will be created by this function.
// Input: Configuration file name.
// Output: error code.
// Process: This method performs initialization tasks as required by
// the underlying security API. The mshn_sl_init method will read the
// configuration file specified by the input parameter and initialize
// the CSSM, and add-in modules according to the configuration values.
// An error code is returned if the initialization is unsuccessful.
// (For simplicity, the demonstration program uses a dummy file name.
// The actual initialization data is encoded as constants in the
// method.)
int mshn_sl : :mshn_sl_init (
const char rconfig_file_name)
int result = MSHN OK;




CSSM_RETURN retval = MSHN_CSSM_INIT ( )
;
if (retval != CSSM_OK) {
result = get_error ( )
;
}else{
// Now initialize the crypto algorithm structures
// In the future, get this from a config file
alg_param_array =
(alg_params *) mshn_malloc (sizeof (alg_j?arams)
















































. alg_mode = ;
. alg_padding = ;
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MSHN_CSP_INIT (pGUIDList, plnfo, CSP_handle)
;
if (CSP_handle == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE) {
result = get_error ( ) ,-
}else{
MSHN_CL_INIT (pGUIDList, plnfo, CL_handle)
;
if (CL_handle == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE) {
result = get_error ( )
;
}else{
// This call will also attach a data store
// For now just hard code datastore name
char *hard_coded_name = "mshn";
ds_names [0] = (char *)
mshn_malloc (strlen (hard_coded_name) +1, NULL)
;









if ( (DL_handle == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE)
|
|
(ds_handles [0] == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE) ) {
result = get_error ( ) ,-
}else{








// This function will create a certificate with the provided
// parameters.
// Input: certificate fields.
// Output: error code, pointer to a certificate.
// Process : This method will create a certificate to include the
// public -private key pair associated with it. The certificate created
// will contain the public key, while the private key is placed into a
// secure key storage facility. An error code is returned if the
// initialization is unsuccessful. (This method is not implemented in
// the demonstration program. Instead, we used the certificate manager
// supplied by CDSA to create the certificates needed for the
// demonstration.)
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mshn data *new cert)
{
int result = MSHN_OK;
if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{






// ===================== := : = = = = = = = = ==== ======= = ========= :=
II This function will find and return the certificate for the specified
// subject.
// Input: certificate subject name.
// Output: error code, pointer to a certificate.
// Process: This method will search the certificate database for a
// certificate whose subject name matches the input parameter and if
// found, returns the requested certificate. The method uses CSSM Data
// library functions to query the database. An error code is returned
// if the operation was unsuccessful.




int result = MSHN_OK;
the_cert->the_length = 0;
the_cert->the_data = NULL;





dbHand. DBHandle = ds_handles [0]
;









// Use a NULL filter to CSSM to get all certificates in database
Query. NumSelectionPredicates = 0;
Query . SelectionPredicate = NULL;
Query. RecordType = CSSM_DL_DB_RECORD_CERT;
Query. Conjunctive = CSSM_DB_NONE;









cout << "CSSM_DL_DataGetFirst done" << endl;
#endif




// if end of data store before we even begin. .
.
if ( (EODS == CSSM_TRUE) || (record_ptr == NULL)) {




int cntr = 1
int found = ;
while ((EODS == CSSM_FALSE) && ! found)
{
// now find the certificate matching the subject
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_CERT
cout << "get_cert_field" << endl;
#endif







cout << "get_cert_field done" << endl;
#endif
CSSM_DATA_PTR pstring;

















the_cert->the_length = certdata- >Length;






// Get the next certificate
mshn_free (certdata- >Data, NULL)
;





















// Done querying for information
if (ResultsHandle)





// This function will determine if the specified certificate is valid.
// Input: pointer to a certificate.
// Output: error code, Boolean.
// Process: This method will check the signature on a given certificate
// and return a Boolean value based upon the signature verification.
// (This method is not currently implemented in the demonstration
// program. If called, it will always return true.)




}int result = MSHN_OK;
*cert_valid = MSHN_FALSE
;
if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{





// This function will determine if the specified certificate has been
// revoked.
// Input: pointer to a certificate.
// Output: error code, Boolean.
// Process: This method will check a given certificate against a
// certificate revocation list and return a Boolean value depending on
// the revocation status. (This method is not currently implemented in
// the demonstration program. If called, it will always return false.)




int result = MSHN_OK;
*cert_revoked = MSHN_TRUE;
if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{






// This function will return the public key for the subject associated
// with the specified certificate.
// Input: pointer to a certificate.
// Output: error code, pointer to a public key.
// Process: This method will return a public key obtained from a given
// certificate. The method uses CSSM Certificate library functions to
// extract the key data. An error code is returned if the operation was
// unsuccessful.
int mshn_sl : :mshn_sl_get_public_key (




int result = MSHN_OK;
public_key->the_length = 0;
public_key->the_data = NULL;




(CSSM_DATA_PTR) mshn_malloc (sizeof (CSSM_DATA) , NULL)
;
temp_cert->Length = the_cert->the_length;






(CSSM_KEY_PTR)mshn_malloc (sizeof (CSSM_KEY) ,NULL)
;
temp_key = CSSM_CL_CertGetKeyInfo (CL_handle, temp_cert)
;
show_error ( "CSSM_CL_CertGetKeyInfo" )
;




show_key (temp_key, "Public Key");
#endif
// Now clean up the allocated memory







// This function will return the private key for the specified subject.
// Input: pointer to a public key.
// Output: error code, pointer to a private key.
// Process: This method will return a reference to a private key given
// the associated public key. The method uses CSSM Cryptographic
// Service Module functions to retrieve the key data from the CSP key
// storage file. The private key is never openly exposed to the
// application program. Instead, the pointer returned references an
// encrypted copy of the private key. The private key can only be used
// when it is accompanied by its pass phrase. An error code is returned
// if the operation was unsuccessful.





int result = MSHN_OK;
private_key->the_length = 0;
private_key->the_data = NULL;
CSSM_KEY_PTR temp_key = NULL;
if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{
// convert inputs into CDSA structure




show_key( (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_pub_key, "public key");
#endif
temp_key = (CSSM_KEY_PTR)mshn_malloc (sizeof (CSSM_KEY) ,NULL)
;
// setting these fields to NULL will tell the CSP to allocate the
// memory for us
temp_key- >KeyData . Data = NULL
;




CSP_handle, (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_pub_key, temp_key)
if (ok_key != CSSM_OK) {







show_key( (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_key, "private key");
#endif
}
// Now clean up the allocated memory











// This function will write a record to the audit log.
// Input: audit record.
// Output: error code.
// Process: This method will post a transaction to the MSHN audit
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// server. (The mshn_sl_put_audit method is not currently implemented
// in the demonstration program.)
int mshn_sl : :mshn_sl_jput_audit (
const char *audit_record)
{
int result = MSHN_OK;
if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{
// For now just output the audit data




// This function will encrypt the specified buffers using the specified
// key and algorithm. The caller of this function is responsible for
// deleting the memory returned by this function.
// Input: pointers to a key, array of input buffers, and a count of the
// number of input buffers, and an algorithm identifier.
// Output: error code, pointer to an array of encrypted buffers, a
// count of the number of encrypted buffers, and a count of the total
// number of bytes encrypted.
// Process: This method will accept a data buffer and key, and return
// an encrypted copy of the input data. The method uses CSSM
// Cryptographic Service Module functions to encrypt the data based upon
// the key type and algorithm chosen. This method supports both
// symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. (Only symmetric encryption is
// operational in the demonstration program. The Intel CSP lacks the
// implementation of a public key algorithm.) An error code is returned
// if the operation was unsuccessful.
int mshn_sl : :mshn_sl_encrypt (
const mshn_data *the_key,
int the_alg,
const mshn_data buffer [] ,
int num__buffers,




int result = MSHN_OK;
struct alg_params the_params;









for (int x=0; x<*num_encbuf f s; x++) {
enc_buf f [x] ->the_data = NULL;
enc_buf f [x] ->the_length = 0;
}
*num_encbuf f s = 0;
*bytes_enc = ;
// make sure we have enough output buffers
if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{
// Get the algorithm parameters
result = find_alg_params (the_alg, the^params)
;
}
if (result == MSHNJDK) {
// convert inputs into CDSA structure




show_key ( (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_key, "encrypt key");
cout << endl << "Press enter "; cin.getline (debug_in, 80);
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_ENCRYPT
show_data_ptr ( (CSSM_DATA_PTR) buffer,
"encrypt input ", num_buffers)
;
cout << endl << "Press enter "; cin.getline (debug_in, 80);
#endif
// create encryption context




( CSSM_KEY_PTR ) temp_key
,





if (hCC == 0) {
cout << "Error creating encrypt context" << endl;
show_error ( "CSSM_CSP_CreateSymmetricContext " )
;




// Now clean up the allocated memory
CSSM_KEY_PTR pKey = (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_key;





if (result == MSHN_OK) {
CSSM_QUERY_SIZE_DATA queryData [10] ;
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for (int x = 0; x<num_buf fers ; x++) {
queryData [x] . SizelnputBlock = buffer [x] . the_length;
queryData [x] . SizeOutputBlock = 0;
}
CSSM_QuerySize (hCC,





// allocate memory to hold the encrypted bits
for (int x = 0; x<num_buffers; x++) {
enc_buf f [x] ->the_length = queryData [x] . SizeOutputBlock
;
enc_buf f [x] ->the_data = (unsigned char*)
mshn_malloc (queryData [x] .SizeOutputBlock, NULL)
;
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_ENCRYPT
cout << "encrypt length: " << enc_buf f [x] ->the_length << endl;
#endif
}
unsigned int temp_encrypted = 0;
CSSM_RETURN cssmstatus;
CSSM_DATA remData;
remData . Length = ;
remData. Data = 0;
for (int x=0; ( (x<num_buffers) && (result == MSHN_OK) ) ; x++) {
cssmstatus = CSSM_EncryptData (hCC,
(CSSM_DATA_PTR) &buffer [x]
,
1, // number of input buffers
(CSSM_DATA_PTR) enc_buf f [x]
,






# i fdef DEBUG_MSHN_ENCRYPT
show_data_ptr ( (CSSM_DATA_PTR) enc_buff [x] , "Encrypted", 1) ;
cout << endl << "Press enter " ; cin.getline (debug_in, 80);
#endif
if (remData. Data != NULL) {
cout << "rem data not null, rem data length: "
<< remData . Length << endl;
mshn_free (remData. Data, NULL)
;
}
if (cssmstatus != CSSM_0K) {






if (result == MSHN_OK) {





// This function will decrypt the specified buffers using the specified
// key and algorithm. The caller of this function is responsible for
// deleting the memory returned by this function.
// Input: pointers to a key, array of input buffers, and a count of the
// number of input buffers, and an algorithm code.
// Output: error code, pointer to an array of decrypted buffers, a
// count of the number of decrypted buffers, and a count of the total
// number of bytes decrypted.
// Process: This method will accept a data buffer and key, and return a
// decrypted copy of the input data. The method uses CSSM Cryptographic
// Service Module functions to decrypt the data based upon the key type
// and algorithm chosen. This method supports both symmetric and
// asymmetric algorithms. (Only symmetric decryption is operational in
// the demonstration program) . An error code is returned if the
// operation was unsuccessful.
int mshn_sl : :mshn_sl_decrypt (
const mshn_data *the_key,
int the_alg,







int result = MSHN_OK;
struct alg_params the_params
;
unsigned int bytes_decrypted = 0;
CSSM_CC_HANDLE hCC;




for (int x=0; x<*num_buf fers; x++) {
buffer [x] ->the_data = NULL;





// make sure we have enough output buffers
if (initialized = = MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{
// Get the algorithm parameters
result = find_alg_params (the_alg, the_params)
;
}
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// convert inputs into CDSA structure




show_key ( (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_key, "encrypt key");
cout << endl << "Press enter " ; cin.getline (debug_in, 80);
iendif
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_DECRYPT
show_data_ptr ( (CSSM_DATA_PTR) enc_buf f
,
"To Be Decrypted", num_encbuffs)
;
cout << endl << "Press enter "; cin.getline (debug_in, 80);
#endif
// create encryption context










if (hCC == 0)
{




result = get_error ( )
;
}
// Now clean up the allocated memory
CSSM_KEY_PTR pKey = (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_key
;




if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// this is the return value
CSSM_QUERY_SIZE_DATA gueryData [10]
;
for (int x = 0; x<num_encbuf fs; x++) {
gueryData [x] .SizelnputBlock = enc_buf f [x] . the_length;
gueryData [x] .SizeOutputBlock = 0;
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}CSSM_QuerySize (hCC,





// allocate memory to hold the encrypted bits
for (int x = 0; x<num_encbuf fs; x++) {
buffer [x] ->the_length = queryData [x] . SizeOutputBlock ,-
buffer [x] ->the_data = (unsigned char*)
mshn_malloc (queryData [x] . SizeOutputBlock, NULL)
;
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_DECRYPT
cout << "decrypt length: " << buffer [x] ->the_length << endl;
#endif
}
unsigned int temp_decrypted = 0;
CSSM_RETURN cssmstatus;
CSSM_DATA remData;
remData . Length = ;
remData . Data = ;
for (int x=0; ( (x<num_encbuf f s) && (result == MSHN_0K) ) ; x++) {
cssmstatus = CSSM_DecryptData (hCC,
(CSSM_DATA_PTR) &enc_buf f [x]
,
1, // number of input buffers
(CSSM_DATA_PTR) buffer [x]
,







show_data_ptr ( (CSSM_DATA_PTR) buffer [x] , "Decrypted", 1)
;
cout << endl << "Press enter " ; cin.getline (debug_in, 80);
#endif
if (remData. Data != NULL) {
cout << "rem data not null " << "rem data length:
<< remData . Length <<endl;
mshn_free (remData. Data, NULL) ,-
}
if (cssmstatus != CSSMJDK) {







}if (result == MSHNJDK) {
*bytes_dec = bytes_decrypted;
*num_buffers = num_encbuf f s;
}
return result;
// This function will create a key to be used with symmetric
// encryption/decryption.
// Input: algorithm code, key size, salt, and key label.
// Output: error code, pointer to a key.
// Process: This method generates a symmetric key. It uses CSSM
// Cryptographic Service Module functions to create the key data. The
// salt parameter can be used to effectively expand the key size. An
// error code is returned if the operation was unsuccessful.













if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{
// Get the algorithm parameters





CSSM_CC_HANDLE hCC = NULL;
if (result == MSHN_0K) {
hCC = CSSM_CSP_CreateKeyGenContext
(
CSP_handle, // CSP handle
the_params . alg_id,
NULL, // pass phras
key_size, // key size
NULL, // seed
NULL, // salt
NULL, // start date





if (hCC == NULL)
{
cout << "Error creating key generation context" << endl;
show_error ( "CSSM_CSP_CreateKeyGenContext" )
;








// setting these fields to NULL will tell the CSP to allocate
// the memory for us
pKey- >KeyData . Data = NULL;
pKey- >KeyData . Length = ;
CSSM_DATA key_lab;
key_lab. Length = strlen (key_label)
;
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_KEY
cout << "key label length: " << key_lab. Length << endl;
#endif
key_lab.Data = (unsigned char*) mshn_malloc (key_lab. Length, NULL);
strncpy (key_lab.Data, key_label, key_lab. Length) ;




pKey) ; // the key
if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{
cout << "Error creating CSSM key" << endl;







void *temp_key = NULL;
mshn_data_to_key (the_key, &temp_key)
;
show_key( (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_key, "extracted key");
// Now clean up the allocated memory
CSSM_KEY_PTR tpKey = (CSSM_KEY_PTR) temp_key;





// Now clean up the allocated memory
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// This function will create a public -private key pair to be used with
// asymmetric encryption/decryption.
// Input: algorithm code, key size, salt, key labels, and pass phrase
// for the private key.
// Output: error code, pointer to a key pair.
// Process: This method generates an asymmetric (public/private) key
// pair. The private key is placed in a secure key storage facility.
// (The mshn_sl_asym_key_gen method is not implemented in the
// demonstration program. We used the certificate manager that came
// with CDSA to create the certificates needed for the demonstration.
// Certificate manager generated the public/private key pairs as part of
// the certificate creation process.)










int result = MSHN_OK;
if (initialized == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}else{






// This function will hash the specified buffers and generate a message
// digest.
// Input: pointer to an array of input buffers, and a count of the
// number of input buffers, and an algorithm identifier.
// Output: error code, pointer to a digest structure.
// Process: This method creates a message digest for a given input
// buffer of data. The method uses CSSM Cryptographic Service Module
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// functions to generate the digest, based upon the algorithm chosen.
// The demonstration program uses the MD5 algorithm to create a fixed
// size, 16 byte digest from the given data. An error code is returned
// if the operation was unsuccessful.
int mshn_sl : :mshn_sl_msg_digest (
int the_alg,




int result = MSHNJDK;
digest- >the_data = NULL;
digest- >the_length = 0;
struct alg_params the_params
;




// Get the algorithm parameters
result = find_alg_params (the_alg, the_params) ;
CSSM_RETURN cssmstatus;
CSSM_CC_HANDLE hdigestContext;
// this is the return value
CSSM_DATA_PTR pDig =
(CSSM_DATA_PTR)mshn_malloc(sizeof (CSSM_DATA) ,NULL) ;
pDig->Data = NULL;
pDig->Length = 0;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
hdigestContext = CSSM_CSP_CreateDigestContext
(
CSP_handle, thejparams . alg_id)
;
if (hdigestContext == 0)
{
cout << "Error creating digest context" << endl;




if (result == MSHNJDK) {





if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK) {
cout << "Digest creation failed" << endl;
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show_error ( "Digest Error")
;




cout << "\nDigest Size: " << pDig->Length << endl;
#endif
digest- >the_data = pDig->Data;









// This function will produce a signature for the specified data.
// First the data will undergo a message digest operation.
// The result of the message digest will then be encrypted to generate
// the signature.
// Input: Signature algorithm identifier, hash algorithm identifier,
// pointers to the key, key passphrase, and input data buffers, along
// with a count of the number of buffers provided.
// Output: error code, pointer to a signature structure.
// Process: This method creates a digital signature for a given buffer
// of data. This method supports the creation of signatures using
// symmetric and asymmetric keys. For example, if the signature
// algorithm identifier is DES, and hash algorithm identifier is MD5,
// then the method will create an MD5 digest of the data, and encrypt
// the digest with the supplied DES key. If the signature algorithm
// identifier is DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) , and the hash
// algorithm identifier is SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) , the method will
// create an SHA digest of the data and encrypt the digest with the
// supplied private key. An error code is returned if the operation was
// unsuccessful.









int result = MSHN_OK;
int alg_result = MSHN_OK;
int hash_result = MSHN_OK;
signature- >the data = NULL;
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signature- >the_length = 0;








(CSSM_DATA_PTR)mshn_malloc(sizeof (CSSM_DATA) ,NULL) ;
CSSM_CRYPTO_DATA cspData;
CSSM_DATA paramData;
mshn_data *encSigBuf f [1]
;
encSigBuf f [0] = (mshn_data *) mshn_malloc (sizeof (mshn_data *) , NULL);
int bytesEnc = 0;
int numEncBuf f s = 1;





// Get the algorithm parameters
alg_result = find_alg_params (the_alg, the_alg_params)
;
hash_result = f ind_alg_params (hash_alg, hash_params)
;
if (alg_result == MSHN_OK && hash_result == MSHN_OK) {
switch (the_alg_params .mshn_id) {
case MSHN_ALG_DSA : { // DSA Algorithm
// create signature context
// this is the return value
pSig->Data = NULL;
pSig->Length = 0;
// Set up the crypto data
cspData. Callback = NULL;
// The "cspData" is the password for the signer's
// private key
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN




if (strlen (password) )
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{paramData . Length = strlen (password)
;
paramData.Data =
(uint8*)mshn_malloc (paramData. Length, NULL)
;





paramData . Length = ;
paramData . Data = NULL
;
}
cspData . Param = &paramData;
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN
cout << "sig context password length: "
<< paramData . Length << endl;
#endif






if (hSigContext == 0)
{
cout << "Error creating sig context" << endl;
show_error ( "CSSM_CSP_CreateSignatureContext" )
result = get_error ( )
;
}
// Now cleanup allocated data
mshn_free (paramData.Data, NULL)
;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {






cout << "Signature size: " << pSig->Length << endl;
#endif
if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK) {
show_error ( "Signature failed" )
;
result = get_error ( ) ,-
mshn_free (pSig->Data, NULL);
}else{
signature ->the_data = pSig->Data;








case MSHN_ALG_DES : { // DES Algorithm
mshn_data sig_digest;







if (result == MSHN_OK) {
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN









1, // num input buffers
encSigBuf f
,
&numEncBuf fs, // num output buffers
ScbytesEnc) ;
}
// Now cleanup allocated data
mshn_free (sig_digest . the_data, NULL)
;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
iifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN
show_j?ointer ( (uint8 *) encSigBuf f [0] ->the_data,
encSigBuff [0] ->the_length #
"Encrypted msg Digest");
iendif
signature- >the_data = encSigBuf f [0] ->the_data ,
•




default: // Invalid Signature algorithm





// Now clean up the allocated memory
CSSM_KEY_PTR tpKey = (CSSM_KEY_PTR) pKey;









// This function will verify a signature on the specified data.
// First the data will undergo a message digest operation.
// The result of the message digest will be compared to the decryption
// of the specified signature.
// Input: Signature algorithm code, hash algorithm code, pointers to the
// key, input data buffers, and signature, along with a count of the
// number of buffers provided.
// Output: error code, verification result.
// Process: This method accepts a signature and data buffer. It
// returns a Boolean value depending on the verification of the
// signature against the input data. If a symmetric signature algorithm
// was used, the method will decrypt the signature using the supplied
// key. Then the method will generate a digest of the input data and
// compare the new digest to the decrypted signature. If they match,
// the method returns true. If an asymmetric algorithm was specified,
// then the signature is similarly verified using the supplied public
// key. An error code is returned if the operation was unsuccessful.










int result = MSHN_OK;
int alg_result = MSHN_OK;
int hash_result = MSHN_OK;
*sig_valid = MSHN_FALSE;








mshn_data *decSigBuf f [1]
;
decSigBuff [0] = (mshn_data *)mshn_malloc (sizeof (mshn_data *) ,NULL)
;
int bytesDec = 0;
int numDecBuffs = 1;
void *decrypted_sig = NULL;
mshn_data *digest;
digest = (mshn_data *) mshn_malloc (sizeof (mshn_data) , NULL);





// Get the algorithm parameters
alg_resu.lt = find_alg_params (the_alg, the_alg_params)
;
hash_resu.lt = find_alg_params (hash_alg, hash_params) ;
}
if (alg_result == MSHN_OK &k hash_result == MSHN_OK) {
switch (the_alg_params .mshn_id) {
case MSHN_ALG_DSA: {// DSA Algorithm






NULL, // pass phrase not needed
(CSSM_KEY_PTR) pKey)
;
if (hVerifContext == 0)
{
cout << "Error creating signature verification
context" << endl;
show_error ( "CSSM_CSP_CreateSignatureContext " )
;
result = get_error ( )
;
}
if (result == MSHNJDK) {
cssmstatus = CSSM_VerifyData (hVerifContext,




if (cssmstatus != CSSM_TRUE) {
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN













case MSHN_ALG_DES : { // DES Algorithm
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#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN
show_j?ointer ( (uint8 *) signature- >the_data,
signature - >the_length
,
"Verify Encrypted msg Digest") ;
#endif
result = mshn_sl_decrypt (the_key,
the_alg,
signature,
1, // number of input buffers
decSigBuff
,
&numDecBuffs , // num output buffers
SbytesDec) ;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN













if (result == MSHNJDK) {
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN
show_pointer ( (uint8 *) digest- >the_data,




if ( Imemcmp (digest ->the_data,
decSigBuff [0] ->the_data,
digest ->the_length) ) {
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_SIGN










mshn_free (decSigBuff [0] ->the_data, NULL)
;




}default: // Invalid Signature algorithm
cout << "Invalid Signature Algorithm" << endl;
}
}
// Now clean up the allocated memory
CSSM_KEY_PTR tpKey = (CSSM_KEY_PTR) pKey;









// This function will return a character string description
// of the specified error code.
// The caller of this function is responsible for deleting
// the memory returned by this function.















result = strdupC'MSHN SL already initialized");
break
}
case MSHN_ALG_NOT_FOUND : {
result = strdup ( "Algorithm not found");
break
}
case MSHN_CERT_NOT_FOUND : {
result = strdup ( "Certificate not found");
break
}
case MSHN_CERT_INVALID : {
result = strdup ( "Certificate is invalid");
break
}
case MSHN_CERT_REVOKED : {









result = (char *) mshn_malloc (80, NULL)
;







// This function will return the error code from the underlying
// security services provider,
int mshn_sl : :get_error ()
{
int result = MSHN_UNKNOWN_ERROR
;
CSSM_ERROR_PTR the_error = CSSM_GetError ( )
;
if (the_error != NULL) {








// Find the chosen algorithm structure











for (int idx=0; idx < MSHN_NUM_ALG_IDS ; idx++) {
if (alg_param_array [idx] .mshn_id == the_id) {
the_params.mshn_id = alg_jparam_array [idx] .mshn_id;
the_params . alg_id = alg_j?aram_array [idx] . alg_id;
the_params . alg_mode = alg_param_array [idx] . alg_mode;










// Copy from a CSSM_KEY structure to a mshn_data structure




int result = 0;
CSSM_KEY_PTR temp_key = (CSSM_KEY_PTR) keyjptr;
the_key->the_length = sizeof (CSSM_KEYHEADER)
+ temp_key- >KeyData . Length
;
the_key->the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (the_key->the_length, NULL)
;
memcpy ( the_key- >the_data
,
& (temp_key->KeyHeader) , sizeof (CSSM_KEYHEADER) )
;
memcpy (the_key->the_data + sizeof (CSSM_KEYHEADER)
,
temp_key- >KeyData . Data,




// Copy from a mshn_data structure to a CSSM_KEY structure




int result = ;
CSSM_KEY_PTR temp_key = (CSSM_KEY_PTR) mshn_malloc
(
sizeof (CSSM_KEY) , NULL)
;
temp_key- >KeyData . Length = the_key->the_length
sizeof (CSSM_KEYHEADER)
;
temp_key->KeyData.Data = (uint8 *)mshn_malloc
(




the_key->the_data, sizeof (CSSM_KEYHEADER) ) ;
memcpy ( temp_key- >KeyData . Data , the_key- >the_data





APPENDIX B. MSHN DEMONSTRATION SOURCE CODE
A. CLIENT. CPP
//*****************************************************
// File: client. cpp




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 12 MAY 98
//







#include "mshn_s 1 . h
"
#include "mshn_mem.h"




#include "mshn_def s .h"
#include "mshn_demo.h"
#include " showutil . h"
#include " commutil . h"







// verify data that was received from the scheduler










int result = MSHNJDK;
// Now prepare the inputs for verification
const int num_signed_j?arams = 5;
const int num_params = 6
;













. the_length = resource_id. the_length;
. the_data = resource_id. the_data;
.
the_length = job_info. the_length;
.
the_data = job_info. the_data;
. the_length = token_data. the_length;
, the_data = token_data . the_data
;
the_length = job_sess_key. the_length;
the_data = j ob_sess_key . the_data
;
. the_length = core_cert . the_length;
the_data = core_cert . the_data;
the_length = sched_sig. the_length;
the_data = sched_sig . the_data
;
mshn_data public_key;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_get_public_key (&core_cert , &public_key) ;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;










&work_array [5] , // the sig
&sig_valid)
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->tnshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "mshn_sl_sig_verify " << err_out << endl;








// verify data that came from the compute resource






int result = MSHN_OK;
// Now prepare the inputs for verification
const int num_signed_j?arams = 1;
const int num_params = 2
;
mshn_data work_array [num_jparams] ;
work_array [0] . the_length = results .the_length,
•
work_array [0] . the_data = results .the_data;
work_array [1] .the_length = app_signature. the_length;
work_array [1] .the_data = app_signature. the_data;








, // the sig
&sig_valid)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_sig_verify " << err_out << endl;
















int result = MSHN_OK;




// Now prepare the inputs for signing
const int num_sign = 3;
mshn_data work_array [num_sign]
;
work_array [0] . the_length = user_id->the_length;
work_array [0] . the_data = user_id->the_data;
work_array [1] . the_length = cert->the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = cert->the_data;
work_array [2] . the_length = sched_info->the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = sched_info->the_data;
mshn_data public_key;
mshn_data private_key;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_get_j?ublic_key (cert , &public_key)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "mshn_sl_get_j?ublic_key " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}
else{




if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "mshn_sl_get_private_key " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}
}
if (result == MSHNJDK) {








if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "mshn_sl_sign " << err_out << endl;
















int result = MSHNJDK;
// Clear the output
the_sig->the_length = 0;
the_sig->the_data = NULL;
// Now prepare the inputs for signing
const int num_sign = 3;
mshn_data work_array [num_sign]
;
work_array [0] . the_length = job_info->the_length;
work_array [0] . the_data = job_info->the_data;
work_array [1] . the_length = token_data->the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = token_data->the_data;
work_array [2] . the_length = user_cert->the_length;
work_array [2] .the_data = user_cert->the_data;
mshn_data public_key;
mshn_data private_key;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_get_public_key (user_cert, &public_key)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_get_public_key " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}
else{




if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_get_private_key " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}
}
if (result == MSHNJDK) {










if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_sign " << err_out << endl;




// decrypt data that came from the scheduler






int result = MSHN_OK;
// Now prepare the inputs for decryption
const int num_signed_params = 5;
const int num_params = 6 ;

















. the_length = resource_id->the_length;
. the_data = resource_id->the_data;
. the_length = job_info->the_length;
. the_data = job_info->the_data;
. the_length = token_data->the_length;
.the_data = token_data->the_data;
. the_length = job_sess_key->the_length;
. the_data = j ob_sess_key- >the_data ,-
.the_length = core_cert->the_length;
. the_data = core_cert->the_data;
. the_length = sched_sig->the_length;
. the_data = sched_sig->the_data;
mshn_data *dec_array [num_params]
;
for (int i = 0; i < num_params; i++) {
dec_array[i] = (mshn_data *)
















if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_decrypt " << err_out << endl
mshxi_free (err_out , NULL);
}
else {







































// decrypt data that came from the compute resource




int result = MSHN_OK;
// Now prepare the inputs for decryption
const int num_j?arams = 2 ;
mshn_data work_array [num_j?arams] ;
work_array [0] . the_length = results- >the_length;
work_array [0] . the_data = results- >the_data
;
work_array [1] .the_length = app_signature- >the_length;
work_array [1] • the_data = app_signature->the_data;
mshn_data *dec_array [num_params]
;
for (int i = 0; i < num_params ; i++) {
dec_array[i] = (mshn_data *)
















if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj - >mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;




// replace input with decrypted copy
results ->the_length = dec_array [0] ->the_length;
results ->the_data = dec_array [0] ->the_data;
app_signature->the_length = dec_array [1] ->the_length;












int result = MSHN OK;
// Now prepare the inputs for encryption




work_array [0] . the_length = user_id->the_length;
= user_id->the_data;'iuj . tne_aata a n a c
r [l] . the_length = cert->the_length;
'Til .the data = cert->the data
:
work_array [0] h d
work_array 1 ^
work_array [1] . _ _ ;
work_array [2] . the_length sched_info->the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = sched_info->the_data;
work_array [3] . the_length = signature- >the_length;




for (int i = 0; i < num_params; i++) {
enc_array[i] = (mshn_data *)
















if (result != MSHN_0K) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_encrypt " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}
else {
// replace input with encrypted copy
user_id- >the_length = enc_array [0] ->the_length;
user_id->the_data = enc_array [0] ->the_data;
cert->the_length = enc_array [1] ->the_length;
cert->the_data = enc_array [1] ->the_data;
sched_info->the_length = enc_array [2] ->the_length;
sched_info->the_data = enc_array [2] ->the_data;
signature ->the_length = enc_array [3] ->the_length;
signature- >the_data = enc_array [3] ->the_data;
return result;
//; === = ======= ======= = = === == === ==== = = z








int result = MSHNJDK;
// Now prepare the inputs for encryption




work_array [0] . the_length = job_info->
work_array [0] . the_data = job_info->
work_array [1] . the_length = token_data
work_array [1] . the_data = token_data
work_array [2] . the_length = user_cert-
work_array [2] . the_data = userjcert-
work_array [3] . the_length = signature-











for (int i = 0; i < numjparams ; i++) {
enc_array[i] = (mshn_data *)

















if (result != MSHNjOK) {
err_out = msljobj ->mshnj3l_showj3rror
(
cout << "mshnjsl_encrypt " << err_out
mshnjfree (errjout , NULL);
}
else {











= encjarray [0] - >the_length;
= encjarray [0] - >the_data;
= encjarray [1] ->the_length
;
= encjarray [1] ->the_data;
= encjarray [2] ->the_length;
= encjarray [2 ] - >thejiata
;
= encjarray [3 ] - >the_length




// receive bundle from the scheduler,
// if necessary, decrypt and verify bundle








int result = 0;
int bytes_recv;
















if (result == MSHN_C0M_0K) {
if ( (comm_sec == C0MSEC_C0N)
//We must do decryption











if ( (comm_sec == COMSEC_INT)
//We must verify signature
|| (comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {





















// receive results from compute resource,
// if necessary, decrypt and verify results





int result = ;
int bytes_recv;









if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
if ( (comm_sec == COMSEC_CON) | | (comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {








if ((comm_sec == COMSEC_INT) || (comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
// We must verify signature










cout << "Signature failure. Application results are
NOT valid." << endl;
}
}
cout << endl << *********** APPLICATION RESULTS **********..
< < endl
;




// send job to compute resource and wait for results
// sign and encrypt job bundle if required








int result = 0;
cout << "Sending job to compute resource..." << endl;
// Set up connection to the Compute Resource
result = mc_obj - >mc_connect (resource_id. the_data,
PORT_CLIENT_RESOURCE)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_0K) {
int bytes_sent;
cout << "Connection made" << endl;
mc_obj - >mc_display ( cout ) ;
// sign data before sending
mshn_data signature
;
signature. the_data = NULL;
signature . the_length = 0;
if ( (comm_sec == COMSEC_INT) | | (comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
//We must do signature










if ( (comm_sec == COMSEC_CON)
|
| (comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
129






// send job input to the compute resource

















if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes,
}else{
cout << "send_int_4_data: "





cout << "mc_connect: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
return result;
// prompt user for application to run
int do_choose_app (mshn_data &sched_info)
{
int result = 0;
sched_info. the_data = (unsigned char *)





cout << "Choose an application to run:" << endl;
cout << endl;
cout << " 1) Application 1" << endl,
cout << " 2) Application 2" << endl
cout << " 3) Application 3" << endl,
cout << " 4) Application 4" << endl,
cout << " 5) Application 5" << endl,
cin.getline (choice, 80);
}
while (atoi (choice) < 1 atoi (choice) > 5)
;
switch (atoi (choice) ) {
case 1
:
strcpy (sched_info. the_data, "Applicationl")
;





strcpy (sched_info. the_data, "Application2")
sched_info. the_length = strlen ( "Application2")
break ,-
case 3
strcpy (sched_info. the_data, "Application3")
















// no default case
}




// send job request to the scheduler,
// if necessary, sign and encrypt the bundle






int result = MSHN_OK;
// Set up connection to the Scheduler
result = mc_obj - >mc_connect (IP_SCHEDULER, PORT_CLIENT_SCHEDULER)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
int bytes_sent
;
cout << "Connection made" << endl;
mc_obj - >mc_display ( cout )
;
// sign data before sending
mshn_data signature;
signature. the_data = NULL;
signature. the_length = 0;
if ( (comm_sec == COMSEC_INT)
|
|







(comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
if
}
( (comm_sec == COMSEC_CON)






(comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
// send job input to the scheduler
















if (result » MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHNJDK;
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
}else{
cout << "send_int_4_data: "




























mc_obj = new mshn_com ( )
;
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "Hello World" << endl;





msl_obj = new mshn_sl()
;
int result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_init ( "dummy file");
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_init " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out, NULL) ,-
}else{




cout << endl << ******************** MSHN CLIENT SHELL "
;
cout << "*******************" << endl
•
cout << endl;
cout << "This program will allow you to submit a job to MSHN."
<< endl;
cout << "You must identify yourself, (certificate name and
passphrase) " << endl
;


















cout << "Choose an application to submit to MSHN." << endl;
cout << "Submit job, wait for results, display results."
< < endl
;
cout < < endl
cout << "Continue? Enter y/n. "
;
cin.getline (quit, 80);
if (quit[0] == 'y' || quit[0] == 'Y') {
do_choose_app (sched_info)
;





















// make sure the connection to scheduler is closed
mc_obj ->mc_close ( )
;















// make sure the connection to compute resource is closed
mc_obj ->mc_close ( )
}







// File: scheduler . cpp




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//































































int result = MSHN OK;
if ( (c_sec == C0MSEC_C0N) | | (c_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
// We must do encryption
// Now prepare the inputs for signing
const int num_j?arams = 6
;
mshn_data work_array [num_j?arams] ;
work_array [0] . the_length = resource_id->the_length;
work_array [ ] . the_data = resource_id->the_data;
work_array [1] . the_length = job_info->the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = job_info->the_data;
work_array [2] . the_length = the_token->the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = the_token->the_data;








. the_data = job_sess_key->the_data 1
.the_length = core_cert->the_length;
. the_data = core_cert->the_data;
. the_length = the_sig->the_length;
. the_data = the_sig->the_data;
mshn_data *enc_array tnum_params]
;
for (int i = 0; i < numjarams ; i++) {
enc_array[i] = (mshn_data *)
















if (result != MSHN_0K) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_sign " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL)
;
}else{
































































int result = MSHN_OK;
// Clear the output
the_sig->the_length = 0;
the_sig->the_data = NULL;
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_INT) ||
// We must do signature
// Now prepare the inputs
const int num_sign = 5;
mshn_data work_array [num_
work_array [0] . the_length
work_array [ ] . the_data
work_array [1] .the_length
work_array [1] . the_data
work_array [2 ] . the_length
work_array [2] . the_data
work_array [3] .the_length
work_array [ 3 ] . the_data
work_array [4] .the_length





















= core cert- >the data;
mshn_data public_key;
mshn_data private_key;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_get_public_key (core_cert, &public_key)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_getj?ublic_key " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL)
}else{




if (result != MSHN_0K) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_get_private_key " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}
}
if (result == MSHNjDK) {










if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;




// Now clean up the allocated memory
mshn_free (public_key. the_data, NULL)
;





// Process the received data
//
// this routine will do the following
//
// create unique request_id.
// consult scheduler
// create unique job session key
// write user_id, security level, request id, session key to REQUEST DB
// Fill in security token (output), encrypt session key with resource's
// public key
// Encrypt session key (output) with users ' s public key
// Send to client, resource id (from scheduler) , job info (from





mshn com *new conn,
comm_security c sec,
mshn data user id,
mshn data blob)
int result = MSHN_OK;
// Lets display what we received
cout << endl << endl << endl;
show_data_char_ptr( (CSSM_DATA_PTR) &user_id, "User Id", 1)
;
show_data_char_ptr( (CSSM_DATA_PTR) &blob, "Job Info", 1)
;
cout << endl << "Press enter "; cin.getline (dummy_in, 80);
// create unique request_id.










// FOR NOW JUST FAKE IT
resource_id. the_data = strdup (IP_RESOURCE_l)
;
resource_id. the_length = strlen (IP_RESOURCE_l) + 1;
j ob_info . the_data = strdup ("Run the job as fast as you can." )
;
job_info. the_length = strlen (job_info. the_data) + 1;
// create unique job session key
char key_label[] = "DES Key Label";









if (result != MSHN_0K) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_sym_key_gen " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL)
;
}else{
// write user_id, security level, request id, session key
//to REQUEST DB




if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// Fill in security token (output) , encrypt session key
// with resource's public key
//WE HAVE NO PUBLIC/PRIVATE KEY ENCRYPT/DECRYPT, SO SEND
// THE KEY IN THE CLEAR
the_token. request_id = request_id;
the_token. job_session_key . the_length = job_sess_key . the_length;
the_token. job_session_key. the_data = job_sess_key . the_data;
// convert the token to a mshn_data
token_to_mshn_data (the_token, &token_data)
;
// Encrypt session key (output) with users ' s public key
//WE HAVE NO PUBLIC/PRIVATE KEY ENCRYPT/DECRYPT, SO SEND
// THE KEY IN THE CLEAR
// Sign the data to be transmitted
result = do_signature (c_sec, &resource_id, &job_info,
&token_data, &job_sess_key, &core_cert, &the_sig)
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mshn_data temp_cert;
temp_cert . the_data = NULL;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// do an encrypt if necessary
temp_cert . the_length = core_cert . the_length;
temp_cert . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (temp_cert . the_length, NULL)
;




result = do_encrypt (c_sec, &resource_id, &job_info,
&token_data, &job_sess_key, &temp_cert, &the_sig)
;
}
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// Send to client, resource id (from
// (from scheduler) , security token,
// MSHN core certificate, signature
int bytes_sent;











if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {










"Job session key "
"MSHN core certificate"
"Scheduler signature "
// Free up allocated memory
mshn_free (temp_cert . the_data, NULL)
mshn_free (resource_id. the_data, NULL)
;
mshn_free ( job_info. the_data, NULL)
;
mshn_free ( j ob_sess_key . the_data , NULL) ,-
mshn_free (the_sig. the_data, NULL)
;
mshn_free ( token_data . the_data , NULL)
;
return result;

















int result = MSHN_OK;
const int num_j?arams = 4 ;
const int num_signed_params = 3
;




work_array [0] . the_length = user_id. the_length;
work_array [ ] . the_data = user_id . the_data
;
work_array [1] . the_length = cert . the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = cert . the_data;
work_array [2] . the_length = blob. the_length;
work_array [2 ] . the_data = blob . the_data
;
work_array [3] . the_length = signature. the_length,
work_array [3 ] . the_data = signature . the_data
;
mshn_data *dec_array [num_j?arams] ;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_params ; idx++) {
dec_array [idx] = (mshn_data *)
mshn_malloc (sizeof (mshn_data *) , NULL);
}
// Determine how to handle the inputs
// What decryption/signature verification is necessary?
comm_security c_sec = comm_sec;
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_CON) | | (c_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
// We must do decryption
int numdecBuff, bytesdec;
numdecBuff = num_params;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_decrypt (&sym_key, MSHN_ALG_DES
,
work_array, num_params, dec_array, SnumdecBuff,
&bytesdec)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_decrypt " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL)
;
}else{
// Prepare for the next steps, by putting the decrypted
// buffers into work_array
for (int idx=0; idx<num_j?arams ; idx++) {
work_array [idx] . the_length =
dec_array [idx] ->the_length;




if (result == MSHN_OK) {
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_INT) | | (c_sec == C0MSEC_B0TH) ) {
//We must do signature verification
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// First verify the certificate
mshn_data *certificate = &work_array [1]
;
result = do_cert_check (msl_obj , core_cert_check,
certificate)
;
// Now get the public key
mshn_data public_key;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_getjpublic_key(
certificate, &public_key)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;




// Now do signature verification
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
int sig_valid = 0;






&work_array [ 3 ] , // this one is the sig
&sig_valid)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)




if (sig_valid == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_INVALID_SIG;
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
cout << "mshn_sl_sig_verify " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// If we get here, the inputs have been decrypted and verified
// so lets do something with them
result = do_schedule (new_conn, c_sec,
work_array [0] , // this is the user_id
work_array [2] ) ; // this is the blob
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for (int idx=0; idx<num_params ; idx++) {







int result = MSHNJDK;
// Now accept connections from the client/laptop
mshn_com *new_conn
;




if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "Accepted connection" << endl;




mshn_data user_id, cert, blob, signature;
// get the input from the client/laptop
result = recv_int_4_data (new_conn,
&comm_sec, "Communication security option"
&user_id, "Client ID "
&cert, "Client certificate "
&blob, "Job information "
&signature, "Client signature "
bytes_rec)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHNJDK;
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl
;
// Now process the received data




cout << "recv_int_4_data: "
<< new_conn- >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
// make sure the connection is closed
new_conn- >mc_close ( )
;
}else{
cout << "mc_accept : " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
// make sure the connection is closed





int main (int, char * [] ) {
randomize () ; // init random number generator
mc_obj = new mshn_com ( ) ,-
msl_obj = new mshn_sl()
;
core_cert_check = CERT_NONE;
int result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_init ( "dummy file");
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ,-
cout << "mshn_sl_init " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL)
;
}else{
// Get the shared symmetric key for encryption/decryption
read_data ( &sym_key , key_fname , BUFF_S IZE )
;
do_register (msl_obj , core_id, core_cert, fcpassphrase,
core_comm_sec, core_cert_check)
;
// now receive and handle incoming scheduling requests
while (result == MSHN_OK) {





C. RESOURCE STATUS SERVER
//*****************************************************
// File: rss.cpp




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date:
//



















































int result = MSHNJDK;
const int num_params = 4 ;
const int num_encrypted_params = 3 ;
const int num_signed_params = 3;
char dummy [80];





for (int idx=0; idx<num_params ; idx++) {
dec_array [idx] = (mshn_data *)
mshn_malloc (sizeof (mshn_data *) , NULL);
}










if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;




cout << endl << "For request ID: " << request_id << endl;
cout << "FOUND: communication security: " << comm_sec << endl;
memcpy (dummy, user_id . the_data , user_id . the_length)
;
dummy [user_id . the_length] = ' \ ' ;
cout << "FOUND: user id : " << dummy << endl;
cout << "FOUND: session key: " << endl;
show_pointer (sess_key. the_data, sess_key . the_length,
"session key")
;
// Determine how to handle the inputs
// What decryption/signature verification is necessary?
c_sec = comm_sec
;
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_CON)
|
| (c_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {




work_array [0] . the_length = resource_id. the_length;
work_array [0] . the_data = resource_id. the_data;
work_array [1] . the_length = stat_info. the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = stat_info. the_data;
work_array [2] . the_length = signature. the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = signature. the_data;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_decrypt (&sess_key, MSHN_ALG_DES
,
work_array, num_encrypted_params , dec_array,
SnumdecBuf f , &bytesdec)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_decrypt " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out, NULL);
}else{
// Prepare for the next steps, by putting the decrypted
// buffers into work_array
work_array [ ] . the_length = sizeof(int);
// This field can't be encrypted
work_array [0] . the_data = (unsigned char *) &request_id;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_encrypted_params ; idx++) {
work_array [idx + 1] . the_length =
dec_array [idx] ->the_length
;




work_array [0] . the_length = sizeof (int)
;
// This field can't be encrypted
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work_array [0] . the_data = (unsigned char *) &request_id;




work_array [2] . the_data
work_array [ 3 ] . the_lengt
h








signature . the data
}
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
if ((c_sec == COMSEC_INT) || (c_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
// We must do signature verification
int sig_valid = 0;







&work_array [3] , // this one is the signature
&sig_valid)
;
if (result != MSHN_0K) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
cout << "mshn_sl_sig_verify " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}else{
if (sig_valid == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_INVALID_SIG;
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_sig_verify " << err_out << endl;
mshn free (err out, NULL);
}
}
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// If we get here, the inputs have been decrypted and verified
// so lets do something with them
cout << "Received update from resource" << endl;
memcpy ( dummy , work_array [ 1 ] . the_data
,
dummy [work_array [1] .the_length] = ' \0
cout << "Resource id : '
memcpy (dummy , work_array [ 2 ] . the_data
dummy [work_array [2] . the_length] = '\0
cout << "Resource status info : '
work_array [1] .the_length)
;
< < dummy < < endl
;
work_array [2] . the_length)
dummy endl ;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_jparams ; idx++) {








int result = MSHNJDK;
// Now accept connections from the client/laptop
mshn_com *new_conn
;
result = mc_ob j - >mc_accept ("Resource" , PORT_RESOURCE_RSS, &new_conn)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHNJDK;
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "Accepted connection" << endl;




mshn_data resource_id, stat_info, signature;
// get the input from the client/laptop
result = recv_int_3_data (new_conn,
&req_id, "Job request ID ",
&resource_id, "Resource ID ",
&stat_info, "Resource status info",
&signature, "Resource signature ",
bytes_rec)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHNJDK;
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl;
// Now process the received data












cout << "mc_accept: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
// make sure the connection is closed




int main(int, char * [] ) {
mc_obj = new mshn_com ( )
;
msl_obj = new mshn_sl ( )
core_cert_check = CERT_NONE;
int result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_init ( "dummy file");
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "mshn_sl_init " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out, NULL);
}else{
// Get the shared symmetric key for encryption/decryption
read_data (&sym_key, key_fname, BUFF_SIZE)
;
do_register (msl_obj , core_id, core_cert, fcpassphrase,
core_comm_sec, core_cert_check)
;
// now receive and handle incoming scheduling requests
while (result == MSHN_OK) {





D. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS DATABASE
//*****************************************************
// File: rrd.cpp




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date:
//







































int result = MSHN_OK;
const int num_params = 4
;
const int num_encrypted_params = 3 ;
const int num_signed_jparams = 3;
char dummy [80];





for (int idx=0; idx<num_params ; idx++) {
dec_array [idx] = (mshn_data *)
mshn_malloc (sizeof (mshn_data *) , NULL);
}





result = get_from_req_db ( reqdb_fname , request_id, &user_id,
comm_sec, &sess_key)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "get_from_req_db " << err_out << endl;
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mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}else{
cout << endl << "For request ID: " << request_id << endl;
cout << "FOUND: communication security: " << comm_sec << endl;
memcpy (dummy, user_id. the_data, user_id. the_length)
;
dummy [user_id.the_length] = ' \0 ' ;
cout << "FOUND: user id : " << dummy << endl;
cout << "FOUND: session key: " << endl
;
show_j?ointer (sess_key. the_data, sess_key . the_length,
"session key")
;
// .Determine how to handle' the inputs
// What decryption/signature verification is necessary?
c_sec = comm_sec;
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_CON) | | (c_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {




work_array [0] . the_length = resource_id. the_length;
work_array [0] . the_data = resource_id. the_data;
work_array [1] . the_length = req_info. the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = req_info . the_data
;
work_array [2] . the_length = signature. the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = signature. the_data;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_decrypt (&sess_key, MSHN_ALG_DES
,
work_array, num_encrypted_params , dec_array,
&numdecBuff , &bytesdec)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
cout << "mshn_sl_decrypt " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL)
;
}else{
// Prepare for the next steps, by putting the decrypted
// buffers into work_array
work_array [0] . the_length = sizeof(int);
// This field can't be encrypted
work_array [0] . the_data = (unsigned char *) &request_id;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_encrypted_j?arams ; idx++) {
work_array [idx + 1] .the_length =
dec_array [idx] ->the_length;




work_array [0] . the_length = sizeof(int);
// This field can't be encrypted
work_array [0] . the_data = (unsigned char *) &request_id;
work_array [1] . the_length = resource_id. the_length;




work_array [2] . the_length = req_info. the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = req_info. the_data;
work_array [3] . the_length = signature. the_length;
work_array [3 ] . the_data = signature . the_data
;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_INT) | | (c_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
// We must do signature verification
int sig_valid = 0;







&work_array [3] , // this one is the signature
&sig_valid)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
cout << "mshn_sl_sig_verify " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out, NULL);
}else{
if (sig_valid == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_INVALID_SIG;
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;




if (result == MSHN_0K) {
// If we get here, the inputs have been decrypted and verified
// so lets do something with them
cout << "Received update from resource" << endl;
memcpy (dummy, work_array [1] .the_data, work_array [1] . the_length) ,-
dummy [work_array [1] . the_length] = '\0';
cout << "Resource id : " << dummy << endl;
memcpy (dummy , work_array [ 2 ] .the_data, work_array [2] . the_length)
;
dummy [work_array [2] . the_length] = '\0';
cout << "Requirements info : " << dummy << endl;
}
for (int idx=0; idx<num_j?arams ; idx++) {








int result = MSHN_OK;
// Now accept connections from the client/laptop
mshn_com *new_conn
;
result = mc_obj->mc_accept ("Resource" , PORT_RESOURCE_RRD , &new_conn)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)





mshn_data resource_id, req_info, signature;
// get the input from the client/laptop
result = recv_int_3_data (new_conn,
&req_id, "Job request ID "
,
&resource_id, "Resource ID ",
&req_info, "Resource requirements info",
^signature, "Resource signature ",
bytes_rec)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl;
// Now process the received data
result = verify_request (req_id, resource_id, req_info, signature);
}else{




// make sure the connection is closed
new_conn->mc_close ()
}else{
cout << "mc_accept: " << mc_obj ->mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
// make sure the connection is closed





int main (int, char * [] ) {
mc_obj = new mshn_com ( )
;
msl_obj = new mshn_sl()
core cert check = CERT NONE;
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int result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_init ( "dummy file");
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_init " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL);
}else{
// Get the shared symmetric key for encryption/decryption
read_data(&sym_key, key_fname, BUFF_SIZE)
;
do_register (msl_obj , core_id, core_cert, &passphrase,
core_comm_sec , core_cert_check)
;
// now receive and handle incoming scheduling requests
while (result == MSHN_OK) {







// File: resource. cpp




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 12 MAY 98
//





























mshn_data resource_cert , resource_id;
int request_id;
char dummy_in [8 0]






int result = MSHNjDK;
// Now prepare the inputs for encryption
const int num_params = 2
;
mshn_data work_array[num_params] ;
work_array [0] . the_length = results- >the_length
;
work_array [0] . the_data = results ->the_data ,
•
work_array [1] . the_length = app_signature->the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = app_signature->the_data;
mshn_data *enc_array[num_params] ;
for (int i = 0; i < num_params; i++) {
enc_array[i] = (mshn_data *)















if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj - >mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "mshn_sl_encrypt " << err_out << endl;




// copy the decrypted buffers to the output buffers
results- >the_length = enc_array [0] ->the_length;
results- >the_data = enc_array [0] ->the_data;
app_signature->the_length = enc_array [1] ->the_length;











int result = MSHNJDK;
// Now prepare the inputs for encryption
const int num_params = 3
;
mshn_data work_array [num_params] ;
work_array [0] . the_length = resource_id->the_length;
work_array [0] . the_data = resource_id->the_data;
work_array [1] . the_length = info->the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = info->the_data;
work_array [2] . the_length = signature- >the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = signature- >the_data;
mshn_data *enc_array [num_j?arams] ;
for (int i = 0; i < num_params; i++) {
enc_array[i] = (mshn_data *)















if (result != MSHNJDK) {
err_out = msl_obj - >mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_encrypt " << err_out << endl;




// copy the decrypted buffers to the output buffers
resource_id->the_length = enc_array [0] ->the_length;
resource_id->the_data = enc_array [0] ->the_data;
info->the_length = enc_array [1] ->the_length;
info->the_data = enc_array [1] ->the_data;
signature- >the_length = enc_array [2] ->the_length;
signature- >the_data = enc_array [2] ->the_data;
return result;
}






int result = MSHNJDK;
// Clear the output
app_signature->the_length = 0;
app_signature->the_data = NULL;
// Now prepare the inputs for signing
const int num_sign = 1;
mshn_data work_array [num_sign]
;
work_array [0] . the_length = results- >the_length;











if (result != MSHNJDK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_sign " << err_out << endl;




// Sign the data to be transmitted to the mshn core components
int do_sign_core
(




int result = MSHN_OK;
// Clear the output
signature- >the_length = 0;
signature- >the_data = NULL;
// Now prepare the inputs for signing
const int num_sign = 3;
mshn_data work_array [num_sign]
;
work_array [0] . the_length = sizeof (int)
;
work_array [0] . the_data = (unsigned char *) &request_id;
work_array [1] . the_length = resource_id->the_length;
work_array [1] . the_data = resource_id->the_data;
work_array [2] . the_length = info->the_length;
work_array [2] . the_data = info->the_data;










if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;














int result = MSHN_0K;
const int num_params = 4
;
const int num_signed_params = 3
;










































for (int idx=0; idx<num_j?arams ; idx++) {
dec_array [idx] = (mshn_data *)
mshn_malloc (sizeof (mshn_data *) , NULL);
}
// Determine how to handle the inputs
// What decryption/signature verification is necessary?
comm_security c_sec = (comm_security) comm_sec;
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_CON) | | (c_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
//We must do decryption
int numdecBuff, bytesdec;
numdecBuff = num_j?arams;
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_decrypt (&sym_key, MSHN_ALG_DES
,
work_array, num_params, dec_array,
&numdecBuff , &bytesdec) ;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;
cout << "mshn_sl_decrypt " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL)
;
}else{
// Prepare for the next steps, by putting the decrypted buffers
// into work_array
for (int idx=0; idx<num_params ; idx++) {
work_array [idx] . the_length = dec_array [idx] ->the_length;
work_array [idx] . the_data = dec_array [idx] ->the_data;
}
// copy decrypted data back to original
job_info. the_length = work_array [0] . the_length;
j ob_info . the_data = work_array [ ] . the_data
;
token_data. the_length = work_array [1] . the_length;
token data. the data = work_array [1] . the_data;
= work_array [2] . the_length;
= work_array [2] . the_data;
= work_array [3] . the_length;
= work_array [ 3 ] . the_data
}
}
if (result == MSHN_0K) {
if ( (c_sec == COMSEC_INT) | | (c_sec COMSEC_BOTH) ) {






// First verify the certificate
mshn_data *certificate = &work_array [2] ;
result = do_cert_check (msl_obj , resource_cert_check, certificate);
// Now get the public key
mshn_data public_key;
if (result == MSHN_OK) {




if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;




// Now do signature verification
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
int sig_valid = 0;






&work_array [3] , // this one is the signature
&sig_valid)
;
if (result != MSHN_0K) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ;




if (sig_valid == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_INVALID_SIG;
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;





if (result == MSHN_OK) {
// If we get here, the inputs have been decrypted and verified
// so lets do something with them
cout << "Job Request accepted." << endl;
}
for (int idx=0; idx<num_params ; idx++) {








int result = MSHN_OK;
// Now accept connections from the client/laptop
mshn_com *new_conn;




if (result « MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
#ifdef DEBUG_MSHN_COM





mshn_data job_info, token_data, user_cert, signature;
// get the input from the client/laptop















if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl;
// Now process the received data








if (result == MSHN_OK) {
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// decrypt job session key
// run the application





mshn_data_to_token ( &token_data , &the_token)
;
j ob_sess_key . the_length =
the_token. job_session_key . the_length;
j ob_sess_key . the_data =
the_token
.
j ob_session_key . the_data
;
request_id = the_token.request_id;
// fill results with data just to test comms
char *result_data = "This is sample job results";
results . the_length = strlen (result_data)
results . the_data = result_data;
if ( (resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_INT)
| |
(resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {
//We must do signature
do_sign_client (^results, &app_sighature)
}
if ( (resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_CON)
(resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {












cout << " recv_int_4_data : "
<< new_conn- >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
// make sure the connection is closed
new conn- >mc close ();
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}else{
cout << "mc_accept : " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
// make sure the connection is closed




// send job status info to the resource status server




int result = MSHN_OK;
mshn_data status_info;
cout << "Sending status info to resource status server..." << endl;
// Set up connection to the RSS
result = mc_obj - >mc_connect (IP_RSS, PORT_RESOURCE_RSS)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
int bytes_sent;
cout << "Connection made" << endl;
mc_obj ->mc_display (cout) ;
// create bogus status info
char *stat_data = "This is sample job status data";
status_info. the_length = strlen (stat_data)
;
status_info . the_data = stat_data;
// sign data before sending
mshn_data signature;
signature . the_data = NULL;
signature . the_length = ;
mshn_data temp_resource_id;
temp_resource_id. the_length = resource_id. the_length;
temp_resource_id. the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (resource_id. the_length, NULL)
;




if ( (resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_INT)
(resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {








}if ( (resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_CON)
|
|
(resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_BOTH) ) {







// send job status info to the resource status server












if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
}else{





cout << "mc_connect: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl
}
// make sure the connection is closed
mc_obj - >mc_close ( )
return result;
//mmmmm„mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm„mmmmmmm ,
II send job requirements info to the resource requirements database




int result = MSHNJDK;
mshn_data requirements_info;
cout << "Sending requirements info to resource requirements
database. . . " << endl;
// Set up connection to the RRD
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result = mc_obj - >mc_connect (IP_RRD, PORT_RESOURCE_RRD)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
int bytes_sent;
cout << "Connection made" << endl ;
mc_obj - >mc_display ( cout )
;
// create bogus requirements info
char *req_data = "This is sample job requirements data";
requirements_info. the_length = strlen (req_data)
;
requirements_info. the_data = req_data;
// sign data before sending
mshn_data signature;
signature. the_data = NULL;
signature . the_length = 0;
mshn_data temp_resource_id;
temp_resource_id . the_length = resource_id . the_length
;
temp_resource_id. the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (resource_id. the_length, NULL)
memcpy (temp_resource_id. the_data, resource_id. the_data,
resource_id. the_length)
;
if ( (resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_INT)
|
|
(resource_comm_sec == C0MSEC_B0TH) ) {







if ( (resource_comm_sec == COMSEC_CON) |
(resource_comm_sec == C0MSEC_B0TH) ) {








// send job status info to the resource status server















if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = MSHN_OK;
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
}else{





cout << "mc_connect: " << mc_obj ->mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
// make sure the connection is closed
mc_obj - >mc_close ( ) ;
return result;
}
int main (int, char * [] ) {
mc_obj = new mshn_com ( ) ;
msl_obj = new mshn_sl() ,-
resource_cert_check = CERT_NONE;
int result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_init ( "dummy file");
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_init " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out, NULL);
}else{
// Get the shared symmetric key for encryption/decryption












// now receive and handle incoming scheduling requests
while (result == MSHN_OK) {
















// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//










#define MSHN_COM_CONNECTED -2 003
idefine MSHN_COM_BOUND -2 004





















tnshn_com ( ) ;
protected:










// This function will create a socket and wait for an incoming
// connection on the specified port.
// The accepted connection will be available for sending/receiving
// on the returned 'mshn_coin' object.
// The 'mshn_com' object that does the accept should not be used








// This function will create a socket and wait until it can connect
// with a socket at the specified address, on the specified port.






// This function will send data via the connected socket.





// This function will receive data via the connected socket.
// The 'len' parameter should specify the size of the 'data' buffer.






// This function will close the socket,
int mc_close ( )
;
// This function will display the current object.
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void mshn_com: :mc_display (
ostream &stream)
;
// This function will return a description of the error,




// This function is used to set the class to a clean, uninitialized
state











// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//
// Description: TCP/IP socket communication services for MSHN components
//*****************************************************
#include <stdio.h>
#include ,<dos.h> // for sleep
#include "mshn_com.h"
#include "showutil .h"
// Default WinSock Version (1.1)
#define WS_VERSION_REQD 0x0101
WSADATA stWSAData; // WinSock DLL Info





























// This function will create a socket and wait for an incoming
// connection on the specified port.
// The accepted connection will be available for sending/receiving
// on the returned 'mshn_com' object.
// The ' mshn_com ' object that does the accept should not be used
// for sending/receiving, it should be used only for accepting
// more connections.









cout << "Accepting connections on port: " << port << endl;
#endif
// Make sure we are in the right state
if (our_socket != INVALID_SOCKET) {
switch (socket_state) {


























// Make sure it is ok to proceed, and that we aren't already accepting
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
if (our_state == MSHN_UNINITIALIZED_STATE) {
// Initialize Windows Sockets DLL
result = WSAStartup(WS_VERSION_REQD, kstWSAData)
;
// WSAStartupO returns error value if failed
// (0 on success)
if (result == 0) result = MSHN_COM_OK;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "wVersion " << stWSAData. wVersion << endl;
cout << "wHighVersion " << stWSAData. wHighVersion << endl;
cout << "szDescription " << stWSAData. szDescription << endl;
cout << "szSystemStatus " << stWSAData. szSystemStatus << endl;
cout << "iMaxSockets " << stWSAData. iMaxSockets << endl;
cout << "iMaxUdpDg " << stWSAData. iMaxUdpDg << endl;
cout << "lpVendorlnfo " << stWSAData . lpVendorInfo << endl;
#endif
our state = MSHN INITIALIZED STATE;
}
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
// Get a TCP socket
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "About to create a socket" << endl;
#endif
our_socket = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)
;
if (our_socket == INVALID_SOCKET) {








cout << "socket (" << our_socket << ")" << endl;
#endif




// Now bind the socket
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struct sockaddr the_addr;
int namelen = sizeof (the_addr)
;
u_short temp_port = htons (our_jport) ;
memset (the_addr . sa_data, , sizeof (the_addr . sa_data) )
;
memcpy (the_addr . sa_data, &temp_port, sizeof (temp_port) )
;
the_addr . sa_family = AF_INET;
result = bind(our_socket, &the_addr, namelen);
if (result == 0) result = MSHN_C0M_0K;
if (result != MSHN_C0M_0K) {












// Make sure it is ok to proceed
if (result == MSHN_C0M_0K) {
// make our socket non-blocking
u_long lOnOff = TRUE;
result = ioctlsocket (our_socket, FIONBIO, &10n0ff )
;
if (result == 0) result = MSHN_COM_OK;
if (result != MSHN_COM_OK) {









// Make sure it is ok to proceed with the accepting
if (result == MSHN_C0M_0K) {
// Now its time to listen for connections
result = listen (our_socket, 0)
;
if (result == 0) result = MSHN_COM_OK;
if (result != MSHN_COM_OK) {
result = WSAGetLastError ()
mc_cleanup ( )
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)











// Display the label to tell the user what is happening
cout << endl << "Accepting connections from " << label
<< " on port " << port << endl;
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)




child_socket = accept (our_socket, &child_addr, &child_len)
;
if (child_socket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
result = WSAGetLastError ()
;
if (result == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) {
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)






cout << result << endl;
#endif
//







cout << "Accept returns (" << child_socket << ")" << endl;
#endif
result = MSHN_COM_OK;










// This function will create a socket and wait until it can connect
// with a socket at the specified address, on the specified port.
// After successful connection the 'mshn_com' object can be used
// for sending/receiving,




int result = MSHN COM OK;
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#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "Attempting a connection to (" << addr << ") on port ("
<< port << ") ." << endl;
#endif
// Make sure we are in the right state
if ( (our_socket != INVALID_SOCKET) ||
(socket_state != MSHN_UNINITIALIZED_STATE) ) {
switch (socket_state) {






















// Make sure it is ok to proceed
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
if (our_state == MSHN_UNINITIALIZED_STATE) {
// Initialize Windows Sockets DLL
result = WSAStartup(WS_VERSION_REQD, fcstWSAData)
;
// WSAStartupO returns error value if failed (0 on success)
if (result == 0) result = MSHN_COM_OK;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "wVersion " << stWSAData. wVersion << endl;
cout << "wHighVersion " << stWSAData. wHighVersion << endl;
cout << "szDescription " << stWSAData. szDescription << endl;
cout << "szSystemStatus " << stWSAData. szSystemStatus << endl;
cout << "iMaxSockets " << stWSAData. iMaxSockets << endl;
cout << "iMaxUdpDg " << stWSAData. iMaxUdpDg << endl;
cout << "lpVendorlnfo " << stWSAData. lpVendorlnfo << endl;
#endif
our state = MSHN INITIALIZED STATE;
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// Make sure it is ok to proceed
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
// Get a TCP socket
our_socket = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
;
if (our_socket == INVALID_SOCKET) {















// Make sure it is ok to proceed
if (result == MSHN_C0M_0K) {
// save the inputs in our class
our_port = port
;
our_addr = strdup (addr)
;
struct sockaddr_in the_addr_in;
memset (&the_addr_in, 0, sizeof (the_addr_in) )
;




the_addr_in . sin_addr . s_addr = inet_addr (our_addr )
;
int the_len = sizeof (the_addr_in)
;
// Now its time to make a connection
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "About to connect" << endl;
#endif
result = connect (our_socket, (struct sockaddr *)
&the_addr_in , the_len)
;
if (result == 0) result = MSHN_C0M_0K;
if (result != MSHN_COM_OK) {













// This function will send data via the connected socket.
// The number of bytes sent will be returned,





int result = MSHN_COM_OK
;
bytes_sent = ;
// Make sure we are in the right state
if (socket_state != MSHN_CONNECTED_STATE) {
switch (socket_state) {





















// Make sure it is ok to proceed
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "Sending (" << len << ") bytes." << endl;
#endif
result = send(our_socket, data, len, 0) ;
if (result < 0) {



















// This function will receive data via the connected socket.
// The 'len 1 parameter should specify the size of the 'data' buffer.
// The number of bytes recevied will be returned.





int result = MSHN_COM_OK;
bytes_received = ;
// Make sure we are in the right state
if (socket_state != MSHN_CONNECTED_STATE) {
switch (socket_state) {






















// Make sure it is ok to proceed
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
#if defined (DEBUG_MSHN_COM)
cout << "Waiting to receive (" << len << ") bytes." << endl;
#endif
// Now read some data from the other side
do {
result = recv(our_socket , data, len, 0)
;
if (result < 0) {




cout << "recv error: " << result;
if (result == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) cout << " , WSAEWOULDBLOCK";
















// This function will close the socket,
int mshn_com: :mc_close ()
{
int result = MSHN_COM_OK;












// This function will display the current object,




if (our_socket == INVALID_SOCKET) {
stream << "We don't have a socket." << endl;
}else{
stream << "Our socket is (" << our_socket << ")." << endl;
}
stream << "Our port is (" << our_port << ")." << endl;
if (our_addr == NULL) {
stream << "We don't have an address." << endl;
}else{




























stream << "Our current state is (" << state_char << ") ."
< < endl < < endl
;
}
// This function will return the MSHN_COM error condition,
char *mshn_com: :mc_get_error (
int err_num)
{
char *result = NULL;
switch (err_num) {
case MSHN_COM_OK: {




case MSHN_COM_CONNECTING : {
result = strdupC'MSHN COM is connecting,
this is an invalid state for the desired operation.");
break
}
case MSHN_COM_CONNECTED : {
result = strdupC'MSHN COM is connected, this is an
invalid state for the desired operation.");
break
}
case MSHN_COM_BOUND : {
result = strdupC'MSHN COM is bound, this is an





case MSHN_COM_ACCEPTING : {
result = strdupC'MSHN COM is accepting, this is an




result = strdupC'MSHN COM is uninitialized, this is an




result = (char *) malloc (80) ;







// This function is used to set the class to a clean,
// uninitialized state
void mshn_com : : mc_cleanup (
)
{
// close the socket
mc_close ( )
;




if (our_state == MSHN_INITIALIZED_STATE) {






//********* + + * + * + **+*******+***+***********************
II File: commutil.h




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
181
//







// This function will read from the specified file into the




const char * filename,
int buff_size)
;
// This function will write the specified data to the specified file
int write_data (
const mshn_data *new_data,
const char * filename) ; .









// This function will find and return the REQUEST DB info









// This function will bundle up two mshn_data types and send











// This function will bundle up three mshn_data types and send





















// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and












// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and










// This function will bundle up an integer and 3 mshn_data types and
// send them out the supplied connection,























// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and
// break it into an integer and 3 mshn_data types.
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// This function will bundle up an integer and 4 mshn_data types and
// send them out the supplied connection,



























// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and
// break it into an integer and 4 mshn_data types,

























// This function will bundle up 6 mshn_data types and send






const mshn data *dt2,
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const char *dt2_label,
const mshn data *dt3,
const char *dt3_label,
const mshn data *dt4,
const char *dt4_label,
const mshn_ data *dt5,
const char *dt5_label,




// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and






























// obtains the user ID, certificate, passphrase, communications
// security option and certificate validation level from the user
//







// checks the given certificate for authenticity
int do cert check (mshn si *the si,
185
cert_checking c_check,















#include " commutil . h"
const int BUFF_SIZE = 1024;
// Internal function for copying integers to a buffer
void add_int (unsigned char **new_buff_ptr , int the_int)
{
memcpy (*new_buff_ptr, &the_int, sizeof (the_int) )
;
*new_buff_ptr += sizeof (the_int)
}
// Internal function for copying mshn_data structures to a buffer
void add_mshn_data (unsigned char **new_buff_ptr,
const mshn_data *the_data)
{
memcpy ( *new_buf f_ptr , &the_data- >the_length,
sizeof (the_data->the_length) )
;
*new_buff_ptr += sizeof (the_data->the_length)
;
if (the_data->the_length > 0) {





// Internal function for copying integers from a buffer
void get_int (unsigned char **new_buff_ptr, int *the_int)
{
memcpy ( the_int , *new_buf f_ptr, sizeof (the_int) )
;
*new_buff_ptr += sizeof (the_int)
}
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// Internal function for copying mshn_data structures from a buffer
void get_mshn_data (unsigned char **new_buff_ptr, mshn_data *the_data)
{




*new_buff_ptr += sizeof (the_data->the_length)
;
if (the_data->the_length > 0) {
the_data->the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn__malloc (the_data->the_length, NULL) ;
memcpy (the_data->the_data, *new_buff_ptr, the_data->the_length)
;






// This function will read from the specified file into the specified
// mshn_data type
int read_data (mshn_data *new_data, const char *filename, int buff_size)
{
int result = MSHN_OK;
// Clean out the outputs
new_data->the_data = NULL;
new_data->the_length = 0;
new_data->the_data = (unsigned char *) mshn_malloc (buff_size, NULL) ;
// Now read the key from a file
FILE * inputFile;
int idx=0;
if ( (inputFile = fopen( filename, "rb")) != NULL)
{
// cout << "Read from file" << endl;
while (! feof (inputFile) ) {
new_data->the_data [idx] = fgetc (inputFile)
;
// cout << " " << (int) new_data->the_data [idx] ,-
// if ((idx>0) ScSc ((idx % 19) == 0)) cout << endl;
idx++
;
if (idx == buff_size) {
cout << "buffer overflow on read, truncating at "







new_data->the_length = idx - 1; // ignore eof byte




// This function will write the specified data to the specified file
int write_data (const mshn_data *new_data, const char *filename)
{
int result = MSHNjDK;
// Now write the data to a file
FILE *outputFile;
if ( (outputFile = fopen (filename, "wb")) != NULL)
{
// cout << "Write to file" << endl;
for (int idx = 0; idx< new_data->the_length; idx++) {
fputc (new_data->the_data [idx] , outputFile)
;
// cout << " " << (int) new_data->the_data [idx]
;




// cout << endl << "write length is " << new_data->the_length << endl;
return result;
}
// This function will write the specified data to the REQUEST DB
// The format of the REQUEST DB will be:
// comm_sec, reguest_id,
// 'length of user id'user_id
// 'length of sess_key ' sess_key
//







int result = MSHNJDK;
// Now write the data to a file
FILE *outputFile;
if ((outputFile = fopen ( the_fname , "ab")) != NULL)
{
fprintf (outputFile, "%d,%d,%d", comm_sec, request_id,
user_id->the_length)
;
// cout << "Wrote " << comm_sec << " " << request_id << " "
<< user_id->the_length << endl;
for (int idx = 0; idx< user_id->the_length; idx++) {
fputc (user_id->the_data [idx] , outputFile)
;
}
fprintf (outputFile, "%d", sess_key->the_length)
;
// cout << "Wrote " << sess_key->the_length << endl;
for (int idx = 0; idx< sess_key->the_length; idx++) {







// This function will find and return the REQUEST DB info
// for the specified request_id
int get_from_req__db (const char *the_fname, int desired_req_id,
mshn_data *user_id, int &comm_sec,
mshn_data *sess_key)
{
int result = MSHN_OK;
int request_id, c_sec;
unsigned int temp_len;








if ( (inputFile = fopen ( the_fname , "rb")) != NULL)
{
while (([found) && ( ! feof (inputFile) ) ) {
fscanf (inputFile, "%d, %d, %d" , &c_sec, &request_id,
&temp_len)
;
// cout << "Read " << c_sec << " " << request_id << " " << temp_len
<< endl;
if (request_id == desired_req_id) {





user_id->the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (temp_len, NULL)
;
for (int idx = 0; idx< temp_len,- idx++) {
user_id- >the_data [idx] = fgetc (inputFile)
;
}
fscanf (inputFile, "%d", &temp_len)
;
// cout << "Read " << temp_len << endl;
sess_key->the_length = temp_len;
sess_key->the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (temp_len, NULL)
;
for (int idx = 0; idx< temp_len; idx++) {





}// simply skip to the next record




fscanf (inputFile, "%d", &temp_len)
;







if (! found) result = -1;
return result;
}
// This function will bundle up two mshn_data types and send











int result = MSHN_COM_OK;
int total_length = dtl->the_length + dt2->the_length +
sizeof (unsigned int) * 2;
cout << "total length " << total_length << endl;
mshn_data new_buff
;
new_buf f . the_length = total_length;
new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (total_length, NULL);
unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f__ptr , dt 1 ) ;
add_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt2)
;
cout << "Sending everything: " << new_buf f . the_length
<< " bytes." << endl;
result = mc_obj - >mc_send (new_buf f . the_data, new_buf f . the_length,
bytes_sent)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
;




cout << "mc_send: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}




// This function will bundle up three mshn_data types and send














int result = MSHN_COM_OK
;
int total_length = dtl->the_length + dt2->the_length
+ dt3->the_length + sizeof (unsigned int) * 3
;
cout << "total length " << total_length << endl;
mshn_data new_buff;
new_buf f . the_length .= total_length;
new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (total_length, NULL)
;
unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
add_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dtl) ;
add_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt2) ;
add_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt3) ;
cout << "Sending everything: " << new_buf f . the_length << " bytes."
< < endl
;
result = mc_obj ->mc_send(new_buf f . the_data, new_buf f . the_length,
bytes_sent)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Sent ( " << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
<< endl;
cout << dt2_label << " length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes."
<< endl;




cout << "mc_send: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
mshn_free (new_buf f . the_data, NULL)
return result;
191
// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and













int result = MSHN_COM_OK;






new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (BUFF_SIZE * 16, NULL)
;
new_buff .the_length = BUFF_SIZE * 16;
result = mc_obj - >mc_recv (new_buf f . the_data , new_buf f . the_length,
bytes_rec)
;
unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
get_mshn_data (&new_buf f_j?tr, dtl) ;
get_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt2)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label << " length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
}else{
cout << "mc_recv: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
return result;
// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and












int result = MSHN_COM_OK;








new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshnjnalloc (BUFF_SIZE * 16, NULL);
new_buff .the_length = BUFF_SIZE * 16;
result = mc_obj ->mc_recv(new_buf f . the_data, new_buff . the_length,
bytes_rec)
;
unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
get_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt1 ) ;
get_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt2) ;
get_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt3 )
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label << " length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
cout << dt3_label << " length (" << dt3->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
}else{
cout << "mc_recv: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
return result;
// This function will bundle up an integer and 3 mshn_data types and
// send them out the supplied connection,























int result = MSHN_COM_OK
;
int total_length = sizeof (int) + dtl->the_length + dt2->the_length
+ dt3->the_length + sizeof (unsigned int) * 3;
cout << "total length " << total_length << endl;
mshn_data new_buff;
new_buf f . the_length = total_length;
new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *) mshn_malloc (total_length, NULL);
unsigned char *new_buffjptr = new_buf f . the_data;
add_int (&new_buf f_j?tr, itl);
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dtl
)
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt2
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_j?tr , dt3
cout << "Sending everything: " << new_buf f . the_length << " bytes."
< < endl
;
result = mc_obj ->mc_send (new_buf f . the_data, new_buf f . the_length,
bytes_sent)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << itl_label << " ( " << itl << ")" << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label << " length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
cout << dt3_label << " length (" << dt3->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
}else{
cout << "mc_send: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
mshn_free (new_buf f . the_data, NULL)
;
return result;
//== = == = = = == === === == === = == = = = = ======= = = =: = == == = === = = = == == == = = = = = = = == =
// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and


















int result = MSHN_COM_OK;








mshn data new buff;
new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (BUFF_SIZE * 16, NULL);
new_buff .the_length = BUFF_SIZE * 16;
result = mc_obj ->mc_recv(new_buf f . the_data, new_buf f . the_length,
bytes_rec)
;
unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
get_int (&new_buff_ptr, itl) ;
get_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dtl)
get_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt2)
get_mshn_data (&new_buf f_ptr, dt3)
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << itl_label << " (" << *itl << ")" << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label <<
< < endl
cout << dt3_label <<
< < endl
}else{
cout << "tnc_recv: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
return result;
length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes."
length ( " << dt3->the_length << ") bytes."
// This function will bundle up an integer and 4 mshn_data types and
// send them out the supplied connection,


























int result = MSHN_COM_OK;
int total_length = sizeof (int) + dtl->the_length + dt2->the_length
+ dt3->the_length + dt4->the_length + sizeof (unsigned int) * 4;
cout << "total length " << total_length << endl;
mshn_data new_buf f
;
new_buf f . the_length = total_length;
new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (total_length, NULL);
unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
add_int (&new_buf f_ptr, itl) ;
add_mshn_data (&new_buf fj>tr, dtl) ;
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_j?tr , dt2 ) ;
add_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt3) ;
add_mshn_data (&new_buf f_ptr, dt4) ;
cout << "Sending everything: " << new_buf f . the_length << " bytes."
< < endl
;
result = mc_obj ->mc_send(new_buf f . the_data, new_buf f . the_length,
bytes_sent)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << itl_label << " (" << itl << ")" << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label << " length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
cout << dt3_label << " length (" << dt3->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
cout << dt4_label << " length (" << dt4->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
}else{
cout << "mc_send: " << mc_obj - >mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
mshn_free (new_buf f . the_data , NULL) ,-
return result;
// ===============================================================
II This function will receive data from the supplied connection and

















int result = MSHN_COM_OK;




















new_buff . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (BUFF_SIZE * 16, NULL)
;
new_buf f . the_length = BUFF_SIZE * 16;
result = mc_obj ->mc_recv(new_buf f . the_data, new_buff . the_length,
bytes_rec)
;




get_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt2
)
get_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt 3
get_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt4
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << itl_label << " (" << *itl << ")" << endl;
cout << dtl_label << " length (" << dtl->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label << " length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
cout << dt3_label << " length (" << dt3->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
cout << dt4_label << " length (" << dt4->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
}else{





// This function will bundle up 6 mshn_data types and send

































int result = MSHN_COM_OK;
int total_length = dtl->the_length + dt2->the_length +
dt3->the_length + dt4->the_length + dt5->the_length +
dt6->the_length + sizeof (unsigned int) * 6;
cout << "total length " << total_length << endl;
mshn_data new_buf f
;
new_buf f . the_length = total_length;
new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)mshn_malloc (total_length, NULL) ,-
unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
add_mshn_data ( &new__buf f_jptr , dt 1
)
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt2
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt3
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt4
add_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt5)
add_mshn_data ( &new_buf f_ptr , dt 6
cout << "Sending everything: " << new_buf f . the_length << " bytes."
<< endl;
result = mc_obj ->mc_send(new_buf f . the_data, new_buf f . the_length,
bytes_sent)
;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Sent (" << bytes_sent << ") bytes." << endl;
cout << dtl_label <<
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label <<
< < endl
length (" << dt3->the length <<
length (" << dtl->the_length <<
length (" << dt2->the_length <<
cout << dt3_label <<
<< endl;
cout << dt4_label <<
<< endl
cout << dt5 label <<
length (" << dt4->the_length <<
length (" << dt5->the_length <<
" ) bytes .
"
" ) bytes .
" ) bytes .
" ) bytes .




cout << dt6_label << " length (" << dt6->the_length << ") bytes."
< < endl
}else{
cout << "mc_send: " << mc_obj ->mc_get_error (result) << endl;
}
mshn_free (new_buf f . the_data, NULL)
;
return result;
// This function will receive data from the supplied connection and




















int result = MSHN_COM_OK;













mshn data new buff;
new_buf f . the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (BUFF_SIZE * 16, NULL);
new_buf f . the_length = BUFF_SIZE * 16;




unsigned char *new_buff_ptr = new_buf f . the_data;
get_mshn_data (&new_buf f_ptr, dtl) ;
get_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt2) ;
get_mshn_data (&new_buf f_ptr, dt3)
;
get_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt4)
get_mshn_data (&new_buf f_j?tr, dt5) ;
get_mshn_data (&new_buff_ptr, dt6) ;
if (result == MSHN_COM_OK) {
cout << "Received (" << bytes_rec <<
cout << dtl_label <<
< < endl
;
cout << dt2_label <<
< < endl
cout << dt3_label <<
< < endl
cout << dt4_label <<
< < endl
cout << dt5_label <<
< < endl
cout << dt6_label <<
< < endl
}else{





length (" << dtl->the_length << "
)
bytes',
length (" << dt2->the_length << ") bytes,
length (" << dt3->the_length << " bytes.
length (" << dt4->the_length << ") bytes.
length (" << dt5->the_length << ") bytes.
length (" << dt6->the_length << " bytes.
// Convert from a mshn_token structure to a mshn_data structure
void token_to_mshn_data (
const mshn_token the_token,
mshn data *the data)
{
the_data->the_length = sizeof (the_token.request_id) +
the_token. job_session_key . the_length;
the_data->the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (the_data->the_length, NULL)
;
memcpy (the_data->the_data, & (the_token.request_id)
,
sizeof (the_token.request_id) ) ;
memcpy (the_data->the_data + sizeof (the_token.request_id)
,
the_token. job_session_key. the_data,
the_token. job_session_key . the_length)
;
// Convert from a mshn_data structure to a mshn_token structure
void mshn_data_to_token (
const mshn_data *the_data,
mshn token *the token)
{
200
memcpy (& (the_token->request_id) , the_data->the_data,
sizeof (the_token->request_id) )
;
the_token->job_session_key. the_length = the_data->the_length -
sizeof (the_token->request_id)
;
the_token->job_session_key. the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (the_token->job_session_key. the_length, NULL)
;





// obtains the user ID, certificate, passphrase, communications
// security option and certificate validation level from the user
//







cert_checking &cert valid level)
{




// Clear the screen, so that getpass prompts correctly
clrscr () ;
cout << endl << "Enter your certificate name: ";
cin.getline (response, 80);
result = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_get_cert (response, &user_cert)
;
if (result != MSHNJDK) {
err_out = msl_obj ->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;




cout << "Certificate ok" << endl << endl;
user_id. the_length = strlen (response)
;
user_id. the_data = (unsigned char *)
mshn_malloc (user_id. the_length, NULL)
;
memcpy (user_id . the_data , response , user_id . the_length)
;
passphrase = getpass ( "Enter the pass phrase




}cout << endl << "Enter the communications security option: "
< < endl
;
cout < < " - None " < < endl
;
cout << " 1 - Integrity" << endl;
cout << " 2 - Confidentiality" << endl;
cout << " 3 - Both" << endl;
cin.getline (response, 80);
}
while (atoi (response) < atoi (response) > 3);
com_sec_option = atoi (response)
;
do {
cout << endl << "Enter the certificate validation level:
< < endl
;
cout < < " - None " < < endl
;
cout << " l - Check Authenticity" << endl;
cout << " 2 - Check Revocation List" << endl;
cout << " 3 - Both" << endl;
cin
.
getline ( response , 8 0);
}
while (atoi (response) < atoi (response) > 3)
;




1/ checks the given certificate for authenticity
int do_cert_check (mshn_sl *the_sl,
cert_checking c_check,
mshn data *the cert)
{
int result = MSHN_OK;
char *err_out;
int cert_valid, cert_revoked;
if ( (c_check == CERT_AUTH) || (c_check = = CERT_BOTH) ) {
result = the_sl->mshn_sl_cert_verify (the_cert , &cert_valid)
;
if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = the_sl->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_cert_verify " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out , NULL); .
}else{
if (cert_valid == MSHN_FALSE) {
result = MSHN_CERT_INVALID;
err out = the sl->mshn si show error (result)
;
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cout << "mshn_sl_cert_verify " << err_out << endl;
mshn free (err out, NULL);
}
if (result == MSHN_OK) {
if ( (c_check == CERT_REV) | | (c_check == CERT_BOTH) ) {




if (result != MSHN_OK) {
err_out = the_sl->mshn_sl_show_error (result) ,-
cout << "mshn_sl_cert_revoked " << err_out << endl;
mshn_free (err_out, NULL);
}else{
if (cert_revoked == MSHN_TRUE) {
result = MSHN_CERT_REVOKED
;
err_out = the_sl->mshn_sl_show_error (result)
;
cout << "mshn_sl_cert_revoked " << err_out << endl;







// MSHN Utility Function Header File








void MSHN_CL_INIT (CSSM_LIST_PTR pGUIDList,
CSSM_MODULE_INFO_PTR plnfo,
CSSM_CL_HANDLE SchCL) ;




char *ds names [] ) ;
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CSSM_RETURN MSHN_CSSM_INIT ( )
;




CSSM_DATA_PTR MSHN_EncryptData (CSSM_CSP_HANDLE hCSP,
CSSM_DATA_PTR pClear, // bits to encrypt
CSSM_KEY_PTR pKey)
;
CSSM_DATA_PTR MSHN_DecryptData (CSSM_CSP_HANDLE hCSP,
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CSSM_DATA_PTR MSHN_SignData (CSSM_CSP_HANDLE hCSP,



























K. MSHNUTIL . CPP
// MSHN Utility Function Definitions










#include " showutil . h"
#define FALSE
//cssm memory functions
void * mshn_malloc (uint32 size, void *allocRef)
{
return (malloc (size) )
;
}
void mshn_free (void *mem_ptr, void *allocRef)
{





void * mshn_realloc (void *ptr, uint32 size, void *allocRef)
{
return (realloc (ptr, size) )
;
}
void * mshn_calloc (uint32 num, uint32 size, void *allocRef)
{
return (calloc (num, size));
}
















version. Major = CSSM_MAJOR;
vers ion. Minor = CSSM_MINOR;










CSSM CSP HANDLE &hCSP)
{
hCSP = CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE;
pGUIDList = CSSM_ListModules(CSSM_SERVICE_CSP, FALSE);
if (! pGUIDList)
{
cout << "Error listing CSP modules \n "
;
}else{
// using the first module









cout << "Error getting CSP module info.\n";
}else{
hCSP = CSSM_ModuleAttach(&pGUIDList->Items[0] .GUID,
&pInfo->Version,
&mem_fx,








cout << "CSP Did not Initialize OK " << endl
;
}
















CSSM CL HANDLE &hCL)
{
hCL = CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE;
pGUIDList = CSSM_ListModules(CSSM_SERVICE_CL, FALSE);
if (! pGUIDList)
{
cout << "Error listing CL modules\n"
;
}else{
// using the first module









cout << "Error getting CL module info\n"
;
}else{
hCL = CSSM_ModuleAttach(&pGUIDList->Items [0] .GUID,
&pInfo->Version,
&mem_fx,








cout << "CL Did not Initialize OK " << endl
;
}

















char *ds names [])
{
hDL = CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE;
pGUIDList = CSSM_ListModules(CSSM_SERVICE_DL, FALSE);
if (! pGUIDList)
{




// using the first module









cout << "Error getting module info.\n";
}else{











show_error ("DL CSSM_ModuleAttach" )
;
cout << "DL Did not Initialize OK " << endl;
}else{
// now display the data store names
char dbname[80]
;
//We should really have some sort of loop to handle all the
// passed in names, and output all the handles
if (ds_names[0] == NULL) {








strcpy (dbname, ds_names [0] )
;
}
// Now try and open the data store
CSSM_DB_ACCESS_TYPE dbaccess;
dbaccess.ReadAccess = CSSM_TRUE;
dbaccess. WriteAccess = CSSM_TRUE;
dbaccess. PrivilegedMode = CSSM_FALSE;
dbaccess .Asynchronous = CSSM_FALSE;
CSSM_DB_HANDLE db_hand = CSSM_DL_DbOpen (hDL,
dbname, &dbaccess, NULL, NULL)
;
if (db_hand == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE) {
show_error ("DL CSSM_DL_DbOpen" )
;















// Generates a DES symmetric key based on the given passphrase
//





CSSM_CC_HANDLE hCC = NULL;
CSSM_DATA cssmPassPhrase;
// copy passPhrase to get rid of const
char * pLocalPassPhrase = NULL;







cssmPassPhrase. Length = strlen (pLocalPassPhrase)
;




passPhraseData. Callback = NULL;
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}passPhraseData. Param = &cssmPassPhrase;
hCC = CSSM_CSP_CreateDeriveKeyContext (hCSP, // CSP handle
CSSM_ALGID_MD5_PBE, // alg ID
CSSM_ALGID_DES, // key type
keySizelnBits, // key size






if (hCC == NULL)
{






(CSSM_KEY_PTR)mem_fx.malloc_func(sizeof (CSSM_KEY) ,NULL) ;
// setting these fields to NULL will tell the CSP to allocate the
// memory for us
pKey->KeyData.Data = NULL;
pKey- >KeyData . Length = ;
cssmstatus = CSSM_DeriveKey (hCC, // context handle





pKey ) ; // the key
CSSM_DeleteContext (hCC)
;
if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{





CSSM_DATA_PTR MSHN_EncryptData (CSSM_CSP_HANDLE hCSP,







remData . Length = ;
remData . Data = ;




pEncrypted- >Data = NULL;
pEncrypted- >Length = ;











if (hCC == 0)
{





queryData. SizeOutputBlock = 0;
CSSM_QuerySize (hCC,
CSSM_TRUE, // for encryption
1, // 1 block
&queryData)
;
// allocate memory to hold the encrypted bits
pEncrypted- >Length = queryData. SizeOutputBlock
;
pEncrypted- >Data = (unsigned char*)
mem_fx.malloc_func (queryData. SizeOutputBlock, NULL)
;
unsigned int bytesEncrypted;


























CSSM_DATA_PTR MSHN_DecryptData (CSSM_CSP_HANDLE hCSP,






remData . Length = ;
remData . Data = ;
// this is the return value
CSSM_DATA_PTR pClear =














if (hCC == 0)
{





gueryData.SizelnputBlock = pEncrypted- >Length;
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}queryData. SizeOutputBlock = ;
CSSM_QuerySize (hCC,
CSSM_FALSE, // not for encryption
1, // 1 block
&queryData)
;
// allocate memory to hold the decrypted bits
pClear->Length = queryData. SizeOutputBlock ,-
pClear->Data = (unsigned char*)
mem_fx.malloc_func (queryData. SizeOutputBlock, NULL)
;
if (pClear->Data == NULL)
{
cout << "Throw Memory Exception" << endl;
}
unsigned int bytesDecrypted;








if (remData.Data != NULL)
{




if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{














CSSM_RETURN result = CSSMJDK;





int passphraseLength = 0;
passphraseLength = strlen (ppassphrase)
;
cout << "pass phrase length: " << passphraseLength << endl;
// find length of pass phrase
// Create KPG context. Use password as the key generation seed
seedData . Length = passphraseLength; // default passphrase length
seedData. Data = (unsigned char*)
mem_fx.malloc_func (seedData. Length, NULL) ;
memcpy (seedData . Data
,
ppassphrase , seedData . Length) ;
seed.Param = &seedData;
seed. Callback = NULL;
// Initialize the password information
password_data. Length = passphraseLength;
password_data.Data = (unsigned char*)
mem_fx .malloc_func (password_data . Length, NULL) ;




password_data . Length) ;
password. Param = &password_data,-
password. Callback = NULL;
cout << "passphrase : ";
for (int t = 0; t < passphraseLength; t++) {
cout << password_data.Data [t] ;
}
cout << "*" << endl;
keyGenContext = CSSM_CSP_CreateKeyGenContext (hCSP,
CSSM_ALGID_DSA, // alg ID
^password, // password
512, // key size in bits
&seed, // seed
NULL, // salt
NULL, // start date










// tell CSSM to allocate memory for key
publicKey->KeyData. Length = 0;
publicKey->KeyData.Data = NULL;
privateKey- >KeyData . Length = ;
privateKey- >KeyData . Data = NULL;













if (result != CSSM_OK)
{
cout << "Failed to generate key" << endl;
}




CSSM_DATA_PTR MSHN_SignData (CSSM_CSP_HANDLE hCSP,




// create signature context
CSSM_RETURN cssmstatus;
CSSM_CC_HANDLE hSigContext;
// this is the return value







// Set up the crypto data
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cspData. Callback = NULL;
// The "cspData" is the password for the signer's private key




paramData . Length = strlen (password)
;
paramData . Data = (uint8*)
mem_fx.malloc_func (paramData. Length, NULL)
;




paramData . Length = ;
paramData. Data = NULL;
}
cspData . Param = &paramData;
cout << "sig context password length: " << paramData . Length << endl;





CSSM_ERROR_PTR pError = CSSM_GetError ( )
;
cout << " error creating signing context code " << pError->error
< < endl
;
cout << " sig context: " << hSigContext << endl;
if (hSigContext == 0)
{





queryData. SizelnputBlock = pClear->Length;
queryData. SizeOutputBlock = 0;
CSSM_QuerySize (hSigContext,
CSSM_TRUE, // for encryption
1, // 1 block
&queryData)
;
pError = CSSM_GetError ()
;
cout << " error querying signing data code " << pError- >error
< < endl
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// allocate memory to hold the encrypted bits
pSigned->Length = queryData. SizeOutputBlock;
pSigned->Data = (unsigned char*)
mem_fx.malloc_func (queryData. SizeOutputBlock, NULL)
;






pError = CSSM_GetError ( )
;
cout << " error signing data code " << pError->error << endl;
CSSM_DeleteContext (hSigContext)
;
if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{

















hVerifContext = CSSM_CSP_CreateSignatureContext (hCSP,
CSSM_ALGID_SHAlWithDSA,
NULL, // pass phrase not needed
pKey)
;
CSSM_ERROR_PTR pError = CSSM_GetError ( )
;
cout << " error creating signing context code " << pError- >error
< < endl
;
cout << " verif context: " << hVerifContext << endl;
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}if (hVerifContext == 0)
{
cout << "Error creating signature context" << endl;
return NULL;
}





pError = CSSM_GetError ( )
;
cout << " error verifying data code " << pError->error << endl;
CSSM_DeleteContext (hVerifContext)
;
if (cssmstatus != CSSM_TRUE)
{

















// this is the return value
CSSM_DATA_PTR pdigest = (CSSM_DATA_PTR) mem_fx.malloc_func
(sizeof (CSSM_DATA) ,NULL)
pdigest ->Data = NULL;
pdigest ->Length = 0;
hdigestContext = CSSM_CSP_CreateDigestContext (hCSP, CSSM_ALGID_MD5)
;
if (hdigestContext == 0)
{
cout << "Error creating digest context" << endl;
return NULL;
}







if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{












CSSM_CC_HANDLE hCC = NULL;
hCC = CSSM_CSP_CreateKeyGenContext (hCSP, // CSP handle
CSSM_ALGID_DES, // alg ID
NULL, // pass phrase not req for DES
keySizelnBits, // key size
NULL, // seed
NULL, // salt
NULL, // start date
NULL, // end date
NULL) ; // params
if (hCC == NULL)
{






// setting these fields to NULL will tell the CSP to allocate the
// memory for us
pKey- >KeyData . Data = NULL;
pKey->KeyData. Length = 0;








if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{










CSSM_CC_HANDLE hCC = NULL;
hCC = CSSM_CSP_CreateSymmetricContext (hCSP, // CSP handle








if (hCC == NULL)
{






// setting these fields to NULL will tell the CSP to allocate the
// memory for us
pKey->KeyData.Data = NULL;
pKey- >KeyData . Length = 0;
cssmstatus = CSSM_WrapKey (hCC, // context handle
NULL, // passphrase





if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{












CSSM_CC_HANDLE hCC = NULL;
hCC = CSSM_CSP_CreateSymmetricContext (hCSP, // CSP handle








if (hCC == NULL)
{






// setting these fields to NULL will tell the CSP to allocate the
// memory for us
pKey- >KeyData . Data = NULL;
pKey- >KeyData . Length = ;
cssmstatus = CSSM_UnwrapKey (hCC, // context handle
NULL, // passphrase
psymmetricKey, // wrapped key
CSSM_KEYATTR_RETURN_DEFAULT, // key attributes
NULL, // key label
pKey) ; // unwrapped key
CSSM_DeleteContext (hCC)
;
if (cssmstatus != CSSM_OK)
{















void * certmgr_malloc (uint32 size, void *allocRef )
;
void certmgr_free (void *mem_ptr, void *allocRef )
;
void * certmgr_realloc (void *ptr, uint32 size, void *allocRef )
;
void * certmgr_calloc (uint32 num, uint32 size, void *allocRef )
void fix_key_size (CSSM_KEY_PTR ppublicKey)
;
CSSM_BOOL match_field (CSSM_DATA_PTR pstring, const char* toMatch,
const char* delimiter, int field_pos)
;
char** Split (int* numStrings, const char* toSplit, const char*
delimiter)
;
void show_error (char *err_label)
;
void show_pointer (uint8 *in_data, int length, char *label)
void show_data (const CSSM_DATA in_data, char *label)
;
void show_data_char (const CSSM_DATA in_data, char *label)
;
void show_data_ptr (const CSSM_DATA_PTR injptr, char *label, uint32
num_datas)
;
void show_data_char_ptr (const CSSM_DATA_PTR in_ptr, char *label, uint32
num_datas)
CSSM_BOOL isequaloid (CSSM_OID oidl, CSSM_OID oid2)
CSSM_BOOL translate_oid (CSSM_OID in_oid, char *label)
;
void show_oid (CSSM_OID in_oid, char *label)
;
void show_oid_ptr (CSSM_OID_PTR in_ptr, char *label, uint32 num_oids)
;
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CSSM_DATA_PTR get_cert_field (CSSM_DATA_PTR certdata, CSSM_CL_HANDLE
clhand, CSSMJDID oid)
;
void show_cert_field(CSSM_DATA_PTR certdata, CSSM_CL_HANDLE clhand,
char *label, CSSMJDID oid, CSSM_BOOL translate);
void show_cert_fields(CSSM_DATA_PTR certdata, CSSM_CL_HANDLE clhand);
void show_ds_cert_subj (CSSM_DL_DB_HANDLE dbhand, CSSM_MODULE_HANDLE
clhand)
;
void show_ds_certs (CSSM_DL_DB_HANDLE dbhand, CSSM_MODULE_HANDLE
clhand)
;
CSSM_DATA_PTR get_subject_cert (CSSM_DL_DB_HANDLE dbhand,
CSSM_MODULE_HANDLE clhand,
char *subjectname)
void show_date (CSSM_DATE_PTR in_ptr, char *label)
void show_key (CSSM_KEY_PTR in_ptr, char * label)
;
void show_field_ptr (CSSM_FIELD_PTR in_ptr, char *label, uint32
num_fields)
;
void show_cl_services (void * in_ptr, uint32 num_subsvc)
;
void show_datastore_names (CSSM_DLSUBSERVTCE_PTR sub_ptr)
;
void show_dl_services (void * in_ptr, uint32 num_subsvc)
void show_hard_csp (CSSM_HARDWARE_CSPSUBSERVICE_INFO subsvc)
;
void show_soft_csp (CSSM_SOFTWARE_CSPSUBSERVICE_INFO subsvc)
void show_csp_services (void * in_ptr, uint32 num_subsvc)
void show_tp_services (void * injptr, uint32 num_subsvc)
void show_services (CSSM_SERVICE_INFO_PTR svc_ptr)
void show_mod (CSSM_MODULE_INFO_PTR mod_jptr) ;
void show_list (CSSM_LIST_PTR csp_list, CSSM_SERVICE_MASK svcmask,
CSSM_INFO_LEVEL info_lvl)
;
void show_cssm_info ( )
;
void show_all_modules () ,-
#endif // showutil h
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M. SHOWUTIL.CPP













void fix_key_size (CSSM_KEY_PTR ppublicKey)
{




















show_key (ppublicKey, "Fix Key After");
cout << endl << "Press enter "; cin.getline (debug_in, 80);
#endif
}
//============== ============================== ;== ========
CSSM_BOOL match_field(CSSM_DATA_PTR pstring, const char* toMatch,
const char* delimiter, int field_j?os)
{
CSSM BOOL retval = CSSM FALSE;
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}char** stringArray = NULL;
int numStrings = ;
if (pstring && (pstring->Data) && (pstring->Length > 0) &&
(pstring->Data [pstring->Length-l] == 0))
{
stringArray = Split (SnumStrings, (char*) pstring- >Data,
delimiter)
;
if (numStrings >= field_pos+l)
{
char *target = stringArray [field_pos] ;








for (int j=0; j <numStrings ,- j++)








char** Split (int* numStrings, const char* toSplit,
const char* delimiter)
{
char** toReturn = NULL;
char* pCurrent = (char *)toSplit;
char* pNext = NULL;
int count = ;
if (ItoSplit InumStrings 'delimiter) return NULL;




pNext = strstr (pCurrent, delimiter);
if (pNext) {
(*numStrings) ++;






}// Now, allocate the array of strings to return
toReturn = (char**) mshn_malloc (sizeof (char*) * *numStrings , NULL)
;
if (! toReturn) return NULL;
// Now fill in each string
count = ;
pCurrent = (char *)toSplit;
pNext = NULL;
while (count < *numStrings)
{
pNext = strstr (pCurrent, delimiter);
if (pNext) {
toReturn [count] = (char*) mshn_malloc (sizeof (char) *






toReturn [count] [pNext-pCurrent] = '\0';
} else {
toReturn [count] = (char* )mshn_malloc (sizeof (char) *






// Skip past the delimiter





void show_error (char *err_label)
{
CSSM_ERROR_PTR the_error = CSSM_GetError ( )
;
if ( (the_error != NULL) && (the_error->error != CSSM_OK) ) {
char *err_out = ( ( (err_label != NULL) &&
(strlen (err_label) > 0) ) ? err_label : "");
cout << "Error number is (" << the_error->error




void show_jpointer (uint8 *in_data, int length, char *label)
{
if (in_data != NULL) {
cout << label << " DATA is (" << length << ")" << endl;
int line_cntr = 0;
for (int idx=0; ( (idx< length) && (line_cntr<5) ) ; idx++) {
cout << " " << (int) in_data [idx]
;










//= ======= = === == = , ==================================================
void show_data (const CSSM_DATA in_data, char *label)
{
if (in_data.Data != NULL) {
cout << label << " DATA is (" << in_data . Length << ")" << endl;
int line_cntr = ;
for (int idx=0; ( (idx<in_data. Length) && (line_cntr<5) ) ; idx++) {
cout << " " << (int) in_data.Data [idx]
;









void show_data_char (const CSSM_DATA in_data, char *label)
{
if ( in_data . Data != NULL) {
cout << label << " DATA is (" << in_data . Length << ")" << endl;
for (int idx=0; idx<in_data. Length; idx++) {
cout << (char) in_data. Data [idx]
;
}





void show_data_ptr (const CSSM_DATA_PTR in_j)tr, char *label,
uint32 num_datas)
{
cout << "Number of " << label << " DATA " << num_datas << endl;
if ( (num_datas > 0) && (in_ptr != NULL)) {
for (int jdx=0; jdx<num_datas; jdx++) {





void show_data_char_ptr (const CSSM_DATA_PTR in_ptr, char *label,
uint32 num datas)
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cout << "Number of " << label << " DATA " << num_datas << endl;
if ( (num_datas > 0) && (in_ptr != NULL)) {
for (int jdx=0; j dx<num_datas ; jdx++) {
show_data_char (in_j?tr [jdx] , label) ;
}
}
CSSM_BOOL isequaloid (CSSM_OID oidl, CSSM_OID oid2)
{
CSSM_BOOL result = CSSM_FALSE;
if (oidl. Length == oid2. Length) {






CSSM_BOOL translate_oid (CSSM_OID in_oid, char *label)
{
CSSM_BOOL result = CSSM_FALSE;




CSSMOID_X509V3SignedCertificate) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509V3SignedCertificate"
;
}else if ( isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509V3Certificate) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509V3Certificate"
;
}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlVersion) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509VlVersion"
;
}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlSerialNumber) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509VlSerialNumber"
;
}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlIssuerName) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509VlIssuerName"
;
}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlValidityNotBefore) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509VlValidityNotBefore"
;
}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlValidityNotAfter) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509VlValidityNotAfter"
;
}else if ( isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlSubjectName) == CSSMJTRUE) {
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the_type = "CSSMOID_X509VlSubjectName" ;
}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_CSSMKeyStruct) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_CSSMKeyStruct"
;










}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlSubjectPublicKey) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509VlSubjectPublicKey"
;
}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlCertificateIssuerUniqueId)
== CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = M CSSMOID_X509VlCertificatelssuerUniqueld"














}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X5 9V3CertificateExtensionId) == CSSM_TRUE) {
the_type = "CSSMOID_X509V3CertificateExtensionId"
;














}else if (isequaloid (in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlSignatureStruct) == CSSM_TRUE) {
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the_type = l, CSSMOID_X509VlSignatureStruct" ;
}else if (isequaloid(in_oid,
CSSMOID_X509VlSignatureAlgorithm) == CSSM_TRUE) {













if (result == CSSM_TRUE) {






void show_oid (CSSM_OID in_oid, char *label)
{
if (in_oid.Data != NULL) {
cout << label << " OID is (" << in_oid. Length << ") chars";
for (int idx=0; idx<in_oid. Length; idx++) {
cout << " " << (int) in_oid. Data [idx]
;
}





void show_oid_j>tr (CSSM_OID_PTR in_j?tr , char *label, uint32 num_oids)
{
cout << "Number of " << label << " OIDs " << num_oids << endl;
if ( (num_oids > 0) && (in_ptr != NULL)) {
for (int jdx=0; jdx<num_oids; jdx++) {
if (translate_oid(injptr [jdx] , label) != CSSMJTRUE) {










}CSSM_HANDLE ResultsHandle = NULL;
uint32 numFields = 0;
CSSM_DATA_PTR pData = NULL;
if (clhand == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
cout << "Invalid CL handle" << endl;
}else if (icertdata)
{
cout << "No certificate data" << endl;
}else{
CSSM_ClearError ( ) ;
pData = CSSM_CL_CertGetFirstFieldValue (clhand,










//== :== : ===== = === ==== =============== ====== =
void show_cert_field(CSSM_DATA_PTR certdata, CSSM_CL_HANDLE clhand,
char *label, CSSM_OID oid, CSSM_BOOL translate)
{
CSSM_HANDLE ResultsHandle = NULL;
uint32 numFields = 0;
CSSM_DATA_PTR pData = NULL;
if (clhand == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
cout << "Invalid CL handle" << endl;
}else if (icertdata)
{
cout << "No certificate data" << endl;
}else{
CSSM_ClearError ( ) ;
pData = CSSM_CL_CertGetFirstFieldValue (clhand,




show_error ( "CSSM_CL_CertGetFirstFieldValue" )
;
cout << "No field found for OID" << endl;
show_oid (oid, "cert field");
}else{
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for (uint32 idx=0; idx<numFields ; idx++) {
if (translate == CSSM_TRUE) {
CSSM_DATA_PTR pstring;


























void show_cert_f ields (CSSM_DATA_PTR certdata, CSSM_CL_HANDLE clhand)
{
CSSM_KEY_PTR kData = NULL;
if (clhand == CSSM_INVALID_HANDLE)
{
cout << "Invalid CL handle" << endl;
}else if (! certdata)
{
cout << "No certificate data" << endl;
}else{
show_cert_field (certdata, clhand, "subject name",
CSSMOID_X509VlSubjectName, CSSM_TRUE)
show_cert_field (certdata, clhand, "issuer name",
CSSMOID_X509VlIssuerName, CSSM_TRUE)
show_cert_field (certdata, clhand, "serial number",
CSSMOID_X509VlSerialNumber, CSSM_FALSE)
;
show_cert_f ield (certdata, clhand, "valid from",
CSSMOID_X509VlValidityNotBefore, CSSM_FALSE)
;
show_cert_field (certdata, clhand, "valid to",
CSSMOID_X509VlValidityNotAfter, CSSM_FALSE)
;
kData = CSSM_CL_CertGetKeyInfo (clhand, certdata);
show_key (kData, "Public Key");
mshn_free (kData- >KeyData. Data, NULL)
;
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// :== ; ====== ======= = = == ===== === ====== = ==== ==========
void show_ds_cert_subj (CSSM_DL_DB_HANDLE dbhand,
CSSM_MODULE_HANDLE clhand)
{






// Use a NULL filter to CSSM to get all certificates in database
Query .NumSelectionPredicates = 0;
Query. SelectionPredicate = NULL;
Query . RecordType = CSSM_DL_DB_RECORD_CERT;
Query. Conjunctive = CSSM_DB_NONE;
record_ptr = CSSM_DL_DataGetFirst (dbhand, &Query, ^ResultsHandle,
&EODS, NULL, &Data)
;
show_error ( "CSSM_DL_DataGetFirst " )
CSSM_ClearError ( )
;
// if end of data store before we even begin. .
.
if ((EODS == CSSM_TRUE) j| (record_ptr == NULL)) {
cout << "Couldn't get first record" << endl;
}
int cntr = 1
;
while ( (EODS == CSSM_FALSE)
)
{
// now show some of the certificate fields
show_cert_field(&Data, clhand, "subject name",
CSSMOID_X509VlSubjectName, CSSM_TRUE)
;
CSSM_DL_FreeUniqueRecord (dbhand, record_j?tr) ;
// Get the next certificate
record_ptr = CSSM_DL_DataGetNext (dbhand, ResultsHandle, &EODS,
NULL, &Data)
;










//======= ================= ====== = ====== ============= ===============
void show_ds_certs (CSSM_DL_DB_HANDLE dbhand, CSSM_MODULE_HANDLE clhand)
{







// Use a NULL filter to CSSM to get all certificates in database
Query. NumSelectionPredicates = ,-
Query . SelectionPredicate = NULL;
Query. RecordType = CSSM_DL_DB_RECORD_CERT;
Query. Conjunctive = CSSM_DB_NONE;
record_ptr = CSSM_DL_DataGetFirst (dbhand, &Query, &ResultsHandle,
&EODS, NULL, &Data)
;
show_error ( "CSSM_DL_DataGetFirst" ) ;
CSSM_ClearError ( )
;
// if end of data store before we even begin. .
.
if ( (EODS == CSSM_TRUE)
|
| (record_ptr == NULL) ) {
cout << "Couldn't get first record" << endl;
}
int cntr = 1
;
while ( (EODS == CSSM FALSE)
)
{
cout << "Data record number " << cntr++ << endl;
// show_data (Data, "from data store");
// now show some of the certificate fields
show_cert_fields (&Data, clhand)
;
CSSM_DL_FreeUniqueRecord (dbhand, record_ptr) ;
// Get the next certificate
record_ptr = CSSM_DL_DataGetNext (dbhand, ResultsHandle, &EODS,
NULL, &Data)
;
show_error ( "CSSM_DL_DataGetNext " ) ;
CSSM ClearError ()
}








CSSM_DATA_PTR retval = NULL;








// Use a NULL filter to CSSM to get all certificates in database
Query. NumSelectionPredicates = 0;
Query. SelectionPredicate = NULL;
Query. RecordType = CSSM_DL_DB_RECORD_CERT;
Query. Conjunctive = CSSM_DB_NONE;
record_ptr = CSSM_DL_DataGetFirst (dbhand, &Query, &ResultsHandle,
&EODS, NULL, certdata)
;




// if end of data store before we even begin. .
.
if ( (EODS == CSSM_TRUE) | | (record_jptr == NULL) ) {
cout << "Couldn't get first record" << endl;
}else{
int cntr = 1;
int found = ;
while ((EODS == CSSM_FALSE) && ! found)
{
// now find the certificate matching the subject









show_data_char (*pstring, "trying subject name")
;
CSSM_DL_FreeUniqueRecord (dbhand, record__ptr) ;
if (match_field (pstring, subj ectname , " ;
"





// Get the next certificate
record_ptr = CSSM_DL_DataGetNext (dbhand, ResultsHandle,
&EODS, NULL, certdata)
;














void show_date (CSSM_DATE_PTR in_j)tr, char * label)
{
if (in_j>tr == NULL) {
cout << label << " NULL date input" << endl;
}else{
cout << label << " year : month : day " << in_ptr->Year << " :
"
<< in_j?tr->Month << " : " << in_ptr->Day << endl;
}
//== ==========================================
void show_key (CSSM_KEY_PTR in_ptr, char * label)
{
if (in_j>tr == NULL) {
cout << label << " NULL key input" << endl;
}else{
char *sdt = " starting date";
char *edt = " ending date "
;
char *slabel = (char*)mshn_malloc




strcat (slabel, sdt) ;
char *elabel = (char*)mshn_malloc
(strlen (label) +strlen(edt) +1, NULL)
strcpy (elabel, label)
strcat (elabel, edt) ;
CSSM_KEYHEADER kh = in_j?tr->KeyHeader
;
cout << label <<
cout << label <<
cout << label <<
cout << label <<
cout << label <<
cout << label <<
< < endl
;
cout << label <<









show_date (& (kh.StartDate) , slabel)
show_date (& (kh.EndDate) , elabel)
;
cout << label << " wrap alg ID
cout << label << " wrap mode
show_data ( in_ptr- >KeyData , label )
;
mshn_free (slabel, NULL);
mshn free (elabel, NULL);
<< kh.HeaderVersion << endl;
<< kh.BlobType << endl;
<< kh. Format << endl;
<< kh.Algorithmld << endl;
<< kh.KeyClass << endl
;
<< kh.EffectiveKeySizelnBits
<< kh.KeyAttr << endl;
<< kh.KeyUsage << endl
<< kh. WrapAlgorithmld << endl;
<< kh.WrapMode << endl;




cout << "Number of " << label << " FIELDS " << num_fields << endl;
if ( (num_fields > 0) && (in_ptr != NULL)) {
// for (int jdx=0; jdx<num_fields ; jdx++) {
// cout << "Not NULL" << endl;
// CSSM_0ID oid_val = in_j>tr->FieldOid;
// uint32 zxzx = (uint32) in_ptr;
// cout << "Not NULL2" << endl;
// cout << zxzx << endl;
// CSSM_FIELD field_val = in_ptr[jdx];
// show_oid(field_val .FieldOid, label);
// show_data (field_val .FieldValue, label);
// }
}
void show_cl_services (void * in_j?tr, uint32 num_subsvc)
{
if (injptr != NULL) {
CSSM_CLSUBSERVICE_PTR sub_jptr = (CSSM_CLSUBSERVICE_PTR) in__ptr;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_subsvc ; idx++) {
cout << "Sub-service ID " << sub_ptr->SubServiceId << endl;
cout << "Description " << sub_ptr->Description << endl;
cout << "Cert type " << sub_ptr->CertType << endl;
cout << "Cert encoding " << sub_ptr->CertEncoding << endl;
cout << "Authentication Mechanism "





cout << "Num translate types "
<< sub_ptr->NumberOfTranslationTypes << endl;
cout << "Num encoder prods. "
<< sub_ptr- >WrappedProduct .NumberOfEncoderProducts
< < endl
;
cout << "Num CAs accessible "




cout << "NULL subservice" << endl;
}
}
void show_datastore_names (CSSM_DLSUBSERVICE_PTR sub_ptr)
{
if (sub_ptr != NULL) {
if (sub_ptr->DataStoreNames != NULL)
{









void show_dl_services (void * in^ptr, uint32 num_subsvc)
{
if (in_ptr != NULL) {
CSSM_DLSUBSERVICE_PTR sub_ptr = (CSSM_DLSUBSERVICE_PTR) in_j>tr;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_subsvc; idx++) {
cout << "Sub-service ID " << sub_ptr->SubServiceId << endl;
cout << "Description " << subjptr- description << endl;
cout << "Type " << sub_ptr->Type << endl;
if (sub_ptr->Type == CSSM_DL_ODBC) {
cout << "OBDC attributes" << endl;
}else{
cout << "Unknown attribute type" << endl;
}
cout << "Num rel . oper. "
<< sub_ptr->NumberOfRelOperatorTypes << endl;
cout << "Num conj . oper. "
<< sub_ptr->NumberOfConjOperatorTypes << endl;
cout << "Query limits supported ";
if (sub_ptr->QueryLimitsSupported == CSSM_TRUE) {
cout << "TRUE" << endl;
}else{
cout << "FALSE" << endl;
}
cout << "Num data stores " << sub_ptr->NumberOfDataStores
< < endl
;
if (sub_ptr->DataStoreNames != NULL)
{
cout << "There are "
<< sub_ptr->DataStoreNames->NumStrings









cout << "NULL subservice" << endl;
}
}
void show_hard_csp (CSSM_HARDWARE_CSPSUBSERVICE_INFO subsvc)
{
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cout << "HARDWARE subservice" << endl;
}
//==========================================================
void show_soft_csp (CSSM_SOFTWARE_CSPSUBSERVICE_INFO subsvc)
{
cout << "SOFTWARE subservice" << endl;
cout << "Number of capabilities "
<< subsvc. NumberOfCapabilities << endl;
// show_context (subsvc .CapabilityList,
// "SOFTWARE CSP capabilities",
// subsvc .NumberOfCapabilities )
;







void show_csp_services (void * in_ptr, uint32 num_subsvc)
{
if (in_ptr != NULL) {
CSSM_CSPSUBSERVICE_PTR sub_ptr = (CSSM_CSPSUBSERVICE_PTR) in_ptr;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_subsvc ; idx++) {
cout << "Sub-service ID " << sub_ptr->SubServiceId << endl;
cout << "Description " << sub_ptr->Description << endl;
cout << "Flags " << sub_ptr->CspFlags << endl;
cout << "Custom Flags " << sub_ptr->CspCustomFlags << endl;
cout << "Access Flags " << sub_ptr->AccessFlags << endl;
cout << "CSP type " << sub_ptr->CspType << endl;










cout << "NULL subservice" << endl;
}
}
void show_tp_services (void * in_j?tr, uint32 num_subsvc)
{
if (in_ptr != NULL) {
CSSM_TPSUBSERVICE_PTR sub_jptr = (CSSM_TPSUBSERVICE_PTR) in_ptr;
for (int idx=0; idx<num_subsvc ; idx++) {
cout << "Sub-service ID " << sub_ptr->SubServiceId << endl;
cout << "Description " << subjptr- description << endl;
cout << "Cert type " << sub_ptr->CertType << endl;
cout << "Authentication Mechanism "
239
}<< sub_ptr->AuthenticationMechanism << endl;







cout << "NULL subservice" << endl;
}
void show_services (CSSM_SERVICE_INFO_PTR svc_ptr)
{
if (svc_ptr != NULL) {
cout << "Description " << svc_ptr->Description << endl;
cout << "Type " << svc_ptr->Type << endl;
cout << "Flags " << svc_ptr->Flags << endl;
cout << "Number Of Sub-Services "
<< svc_ptr->NumberOfSubServices << endl;
if (svc_ptr->Type == CSSM_SERVICE_CL) {




}else if (svc_ptr->Type == CSSM_SERVICE_DL) {
show_dl_services (svc_ptr->SubServiceList
svc_ptr->NumberOfSubServices)
}else if (svc_ptr->Type == CSSM_SERVICE_CSP) {
show_csp_services (svc_ptr->SubServiceList,
svc_ptr->NumberOfSubServices)







void show_mod (CSSM_MODULE_INFO_PTR mod_j)tr)
{
if (mod_jptr != NULL) {
cout << "Version (Major) " << mod_j?tr->Vers ion. Major << endl;
"Description " << mod_ptr- description << endl;
"Vendor " << mod_ptr->Vendor << endl
;
"Flags " << mod_ptr->Flags << endl;
"Service Mask " << mod_ptr->ServiceMask << endl;












void show_list (CSSM_LIST_PTR csp_list, CSSM_SERVICE_MASK svcmask,
CSSM_INFO_LEVEL info_lvl)
{
if (csp_list != NULL) {
cout << endl << "Number of modules " << csp_list->NumberItems
< < endl
;
CSSM_LIST_ITEM_PTR csp_j)tr = csp_l is t ->I terns;
for (int idx=0; idx<csp_list->NumberItems; idx++) {
cout << csp_ptr [idx] .GUID.Datal <<" "<< csp_ptr [idx] .Name
< < endl
;
// Now get the module info
CSSM_ClearError ( )
;







if (mod_jptr != NULL) {
show_mod(mod_j?tr) ;
}else{



















cssm_info_ptr = CSSM_GetInfo ()
;
if (cssm_info_ptr != NULL) {
cout << "CSSM description " << cssm_info_ptr- description
<< endl;
cout << "CSSM vendor " << cssm__info_j?tr->Vendor << endl;
cout << "CSSM location " << cssm_info_ptr->Location << endl;
cout << "CSSM version (major) " << cssm_info_ptr->Vers ion. Major
< < endl
cout << "CSSM version (minor) " << cssm_info_ptr->Version. Minor
< < endl
if (cssm_info_ptr->ThreadSafe == CSSM_TRUE) {
cout << "CSSM is thread safe" << endl;
}else{













CSSM_RETURN verify = CSSM_VerifyComponents ( )
;
if (verify == CSSM_FALSE) {
show_error ( "CSSM_VerifyComponents " )
;
}




// now get the list of modules
CSSM_LIST_PTR csp_list;
csp_list = CSSM_ListModules(CSSM_SERVICE_CSP, CSSM_FALSE)
;




csp_list = CSSM_ListModules(CSSM_SERVICE_DL, CSSM_FALSE)
;
show_list (csp_list, CSSM_SERVICE_DL, CSSM_INFO_LEVEL_ALL_ATTR)
;
CSSM_FreeList (csp_list)
csp_list = CSSM_ListModules (CSSM_SERVICE_CL, CSSM_FALSE)
show_list (csp_list, CSSM_SERVICE_CL, CSSM_INFO_LEVEL_ALL_ATTR)
CSSM_FreeList (csp_list)
csp_list = CSSM_ListModules(CSSM_SERVICE_TP, CSSM_FALSE)





// File: mshn_demo .
h




// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//
// Description: MSHN demonstration constant definitions
#ifndef _MSHN_DEMO_H
#define MSHN DEMO H
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// MSHN demonstration constant definitions
// Ports to be used for demonstration communications
const int PORT_CLIENT_SCHEDULER = 5001,
const int PORT_CLIENT_RESOURCE = 5002
const int PORT_RESOURCE_RSS = 5003
const int PORT_RESOURCE_RRD = 5004,
// IP addresses of demonstration computers
const char *IP_CLIENT = "131.120.10.89";
const char *IP_SCHEDULER = "131.120.10.90";
const char *IP_RSS = "131.120.10.90";
const char *IP_RRD = "131.12 0.10.90";
const char *IP_RES0URCE_1 = "131.120.10.94";
// Filename for shared key storage
const char *key_fname = "mshn.key";
// Filename for shared 'REQUEST_DB'








// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//
// Description: MSHN demonstration type definitions
#ifndef _MSHN_TYPES_H
idefine _MSHN_TYPES_H
// MSHN demonstration type definitions
// Data passing structure, to be used for keys, certificates,
// chunks of data to be encrypted, decrypted, signed, etc.






// Communication security options






// No communications security
// Communications are signed
// Communications are encrypted
// Communications are signed and encrypted
// Certificate validation levels






// No certificate validation
// Check certificate authenticity
// Check for certificate revocation
// Check certificate authenticity and revocation









#define SIGN 7 0x8
//No fields are signed
// All fields are signed
// First field is signed
// Second field is signed
// Third field is signed
// Fourth field is signed
// Fifth field is signed
// Sixth field is signed
// Seventh field is signed
// MSHN signature
typedef struct mshn_sig {
int fields_set; // Use 'signed fields bitmasks
mshn_data signature; // The actual signature
} mshn_sig;
to set/check
// MSHN security token




// Job request identifier
// Job session key, should be encrypted
#endif









// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//








// MSHN Memory Function Header File
// Written by David Shifflett
#ifndef _MSHN_MEM_H
#define _MSHN_MEM_H
typedef unsigned int uint32;
// memory function headers
void * mshn_malloc (uint32 size, void *allocRef )
;
void mshn_free (void *mem_j?tr, void *allocRef )
;
void * mshn_realloc (void *ptr, uint32 size, void *allocRef )
;












// Operating Environment: Windows 95/Windows NT
// Compiler: Borland C++ for Windows
// Date: 18 MAY 98
//


























(MSHN SL BASE ERROR -7)
#endif
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APPENDIX C. MSHN DEMONSTRATION OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
A. EQUIPMENT/SOFTWARE SETUP
The demonstration program is configured to run on three personal
computers using the Windows NT operating system. These computers must
be linked via a network that supports TCP/IP communications protocol.
IP addresses and port numbers can be modified to specify the particular
computers you will use for the demonstration. These parameters are
stored in the MSHN_DEMO . H file.
The demonstration program requires the use of Intel's CDSA version
1.2. This software may be obtained from Intel at their web site
(http://developer.intel.com/ial/security). The MSHN demonstration
program assumes you have installed CDSA in the default directory:
"c : \cdsa_l . 2\"
.
The MSHN demonstration program is written in C++. We used Borland
C++ 5.0 to compile the source code. The MSHN demonstration described in
this appendix assumes you have compiled the source code and placed the
executable files in the following directory: "c:\cdsa_1.2\demo9\".
Intel's CDSA comes with a sample application program called
"certmgr.exe" This program can be used to create a certificate
database, certificates, and public/private key pairs. Prior to running
the MSHN demonstration, you must create a certificate database for each
personal computer used in the demo. The MSHN demonstration program
assumes you will name the certificate database on each PC "mshn" . You
must create a certificate for each user and compute resource along with
the corresponding public/private key pairs. You must also create a MSHN
core certificate and distribute it to the core components you will be
using. The certmgr program has a utility for importing and exporting
certificates to floppy disk. Use this utility to distribute the MSHN
core certificate to each of the PC's serving as a MSHN core component.
Intel's CDSA does not come with a public/private key encryption
algorithm. Therefore, a symmetric (DES) key is used in its place. This
shared symmetric key must be created and distributed to each of the
components before execution. The demonstration assumes you will store
this key in a file called "mshn. key".
247
B. EXECUTING THE DEMO
1. Start Up
Follow these instructions for operating the MSHN demonstration
program. Instructions are followed by an illustration. The
illustrations show the program output as the demonstration progresses
On the machine that will serve as the client, open an MS-DOS window and
execute the command "client".
;•'£ Shortcut to Cmd.exe
Microsoft <K> Windows NKI11)




On the machine that will serve as the resource, open an MS-DOS window
and execute the command "resource".
VMS-DOS Prompt
C:\CDSfl_l. 2\DEM09>dir
Uolume in drive C has no label.





















C : \CDS ft_1 . 2\DEM09 >res oarc
e
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On the machine that will serve as the MSHN core, you must open three MS-
DOS Windows
.
In the first window, execute the program "scheduler'
V
S MS-DOS Prompt BsfHEl
In the second window, execute the program "rss
'"$ Command Piompt -|D|x|
In the third window execute the program "rrd"
';5 Command Prompt
Starting the scheduler: After you start the scheduler program, the
scheduler will ask you to enter your certificate name.
Enter the name of the MSHN core certificate. For our demonstration, the
certificate is named "MSHN core"
.
Next you must enter the pass phrase for the private key of the MSHN core
certificate. Note that the pass phrase will not echo to the display.
The pass phrase is: cdsacdsa.
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Next the scheduler will ask you to enter the required communications
security option.
You may choose from none, integrity, confidentiality or both.
Next the scheduler will ask you to enter the required certificate
validation level.
You may choose from none, check authenticity, check revocation list, 'or
both.
-ft MS-DOS Prompt - scheduler
Enter your certificate name: HSHN core
Certificate ok
Enter the pass phrase for your private key:





Enter the certificate validation level:
- None
1 - Check Authenticity
2 - Check Revocation List
3 - Both
3
Accepting connections fron Client on port 5081
mmm
Now the scheduler is ready to accept connections from the client
Starting the resource status server: After you start the resource status
server program, it will ask you to enter the certificate name for the
MSHN core.
For our demonstration, the certificate is named "MSHN core"
Next you must enter the pass phrase for the private key of the MSHN core
certificate
.
The pass phrase is: cdsacdsa.
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Next the RSS will ask you to enter the required communications security
option.
You may choose from none, integrity, confidentiality or both.
Next the RSS will ask you to enter the required certificate validation
level
.
You may choose from none, check authenticity, check revocation list, or
both.
S Command Prompt - rss
Enter your certificate name: H8HN core
Certificate ok
Enter the pass phrase fo** your private key:





Enter the certificate validation level:
- None
1 - Check Authenticity
2 - Check Revocation List
3 - Both
3




.:. ..;-. ., ,,:.::,.
: . .,,: , ..,......,,,..,::
Now the RSS is ready to accept connections from the compute resource.
Starting the resource requirements database: After you start the
resource requirements database program, it will ask you to enter the
certificate name for the MSHN core.
For our demonstration, the certificate is named "MSHN core"
.
Next you must enter the pass phrase for the private key of the MSHN core
certificate
.
The pass phrase is: cdsacdsa,
251
Next the RRD will ask you to enter the required communications security-
option.
You may choose from none, integrity, confidentiality or both.
Next the RRD will ask you to enter the required certificate validation
level
.
You may choose from none, check authenticity, check revocation list, or
both.
Command Prompt - rrd
Enter your certificate name: MSHN core
Certificate ok
Enter the pass phrase for your private key:






Enter the certificate validation level:
8 - None
i - Check Authenticity
2 - Check Revocation List
3 - Both
Accepting connections from Resource on port 5084
Now the RRD is ready to accept connections from the compute resource.
Starting the compute resource: After you start the compute resource
program, it will ask you to enter the certificate name for the compute
resource. For our demonstration, the certificate is named "resourcel",
Next you must enter the pass phrase for the private key of the resource
certificate
.
The pass phrase is: cdsacdsa
Next the resource will ask you to enter the required communications
security option.
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You may choose from none, integrity, confidentiality or both.
Next the resource will ask you to enter the required certificate
validation level.
You may choose from none, check authenticity, check revocation list, or
both.
*3 MS-DOS Prompt
Enter your certificate nane : resourcel
Certificate ok
Enter the pass phrase for .your private hey:






Entei* the certificate validation level:
6 - None
1 - Check Authenticity
2 - Check Revocation List
3 - Both
Rcceptiny connections on port: 5882
Accepting connections fron Client on port 5882
HteiEa
Now the resource is ready to accept connections from the client.
Starting the MSHN client: After you start to the MSHN client shell
program, it will ask you to enter the certificate name for the user.
For our demonstration, the certificate is named "Roger Wright"
.
Next you must enter the pass phrase for the private key of the user's
certificate
.
The pass phrase is: password.
Next the client will ask you to enter the required communications
security option.
You may choose from none, integrity, confidentiality or both.
Next the client will ask you to enter the required certificate
validation level.
You may choose from none, check authenticity, check revocation list, or
both.
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Enter the pass phrase for your pi^ivate key:






Enter the certificate validation level:
8 - Hone
1 - Check Authenticity
2 - Check Revocation List
3 - Both
3
Choose an application to submit to HSHN.
Submit job, wait for results, display results.
[Continue? Enter y/n . y
Now you must choose an application to run.
to five.
Enter your choice from one
tniA Shortcut to Cmd.exe - client -IDJXI







Vou chose application: Application3
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Job execution.
The client has signed, encrypted, and bundled the user ID, user
certificate, schedule information, and signature.
Connection made
Our socket is <3?2>.
Our port is <5881>.
Our address is <131 .128.18.98>
.
Otu« current state is <Connected>,
total length 988













This bundle has been transmitted to the scheduler. The scheduler has
received the bundle, decrypted it, and verified the signature.
The scheduler pauses to display the user name and application submitted.
Make sure the scheduler window is active and press enter to continue.
^MS-DOS Prompt - scheduler
Accepting connections from Client on port 5881
Received <988> bytes.
Communication security option <3>
Client IB length <16> byte
Client certificate length <888> byt
Job information length C16) byte
Client signature length <56> byte
Received <908> bytes.
Number of User Id DATA 1
User Id DATA is <12>
Roger Wright
Number of Job Info DATA 1





The scheduler simulates the calculation of a scheduling solution. The
scheduler encrypts and signs a bundle containing the compute resource
ID, job information, security token, job session key, and MSHN core
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certificate. This bundle is transmitted back to the client
scheduler now waits for the next job scheduling request.
The
;g MS-DOS Prompt - scheduler
total length 1184
Sending everything: 1184 bytes.
Sent C1184) bytes.
Resource ID length <lb) bytes.
Job information length <48> bytes.
Security token length <%> bytes.
Job session key length <88) bytes.
USHN core certificate length <792) bytes.
Scheduler signature length <48) bytes.
Accepting connections from Client on port 5881
ma
The client receives the scheduling information bundle from the
scheduler. This bundle is decrypted and verified.
The client creates a signed and encrypted bundle containing the
communications security option, job information, security token, and
user certificate. This bundle is transmitted to the compute resource.
ifS Shortcut to Cmd.exe
Received <1104> bytes.
Resource ID length <16> bytes.
Job Info length <48> bytes.
Security Token length <9S> bytes.
Job Session Key length <8S> bytes.
RSHN Core Certificate length <792> bytes
Scheduler Signature length <4S> bytes.
Sending job to compute resource...
Connection roade
Our socket is <3?2>.
Our port is <5082>.
Our address is <131.120.10.94>.
Our current state is <Connected>.
total length 1884













The compute resource receives the job information bundle from the
client. The resource decrypts and verifies the bundle.
The resource executes the user's application and collects the results.
The results are signed and encrypted. The results are then transmitted
back to the client.
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The compute resource signs and encrypts a bundle containing the resource
ID and status information for the job just completed.
This bundle is transmitted to the resource status server.
The compute resource signs and encrypts a bundle containing the resource
ID and requirements information for the job just completed.
This bundle is transmitted to the resource requirements database,
The compute resource has finished processing the job and now waits for
the next job request.
MS-DOS Prompt
Received (1884) bytes.
Communications Security Option <3>
Job Info length <40> hytes.
Security Token length <96> hytes.
User Certificate length <888> bytes.




Sending everything: 72 bytes.
Sent <72> bytes.
Results length <32> bytes.
Application Signature length <32> bytes.
Sending status info to resource status server. .
.
Connection made
Our socket is <360>.
Our port is <SB83>.
Our address is <1 31. 128. 18.98).
Our current stc\te is (Connected).
total length 96
Sending everything: 96 bytes.
Sent <96) hytes.
Request ID (5388)
Resource ID length <16> byter
Status Info length (32) byte:
Resource Signature length (32) bytes.
Sent (96) bytes.
Sending requirements info to resource requirements database
Connection made
Our socket is (368).
Our port is (5884).
Our address is <131 .120.18.98>
.
Our current state is (Connected).
total length 184
Sending everything: 184 bytes.
Sent (184) bytes.
Request ID (5388)
Resource ID length (16) bytes.
Requirements Info length (40) byte:
Resource Signature length (32) bytes.
Sent <184> bytes.
HUE!
Accepting connections from Client on port 5882
The resource requirements database receives the bundle from the compute
resource. The bundle is decrypted and verified. The RRD displays the
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user, the resource, and the requirements information. The RRD has
finished processing the job and now waits for the next update.










info length <48> hytei
length <32> byte;
For request ID: 5388
FOUND: communication security: 3
FOUND: user id : Roger Wright
FOUND: session key:
session key DATA is <84>
2 8 8 8 51 46 98 225 134 3 289 17 156 189 8 168 281 112 129 9888888888 14 8882888 48 8888888880 128 888 8888888688888888888088880 15
8 2 23 13 1
Received update from resource
Resource id : res<
Requirements info : This is sample job requirements data
Accepting connections from Resource on port 5884
The resource status server receives the bundle from the compute
resource. The bundle is decrypted and verified. The RSS displays the
user, the resource, and the resources status information. The RSS has
finished processing the job and now waits for the next update.
''5 Command Prompt - rss
Received <96> bytes.
Job request ID <5388>
Resource ID length <16) bytes.
Resource status info length <32> bytes.
Resource signature length <32> bytes.
Received <96> bytes.
For request ID: 5388
FOUND: communication security: 3
FOUND: user id : Roger Wright
FOUND: session key:
session key DATA is <84>
2 8 8 8 51 46 90 225 134 3 289 1? 156 189 8 168 281 112 129 9880080000 14 0002088 40 8000080000 128 0080888080000080000000000808 15
8 8 2 23 13 1
Received update from resource
Resource id : resourcel
Resource status info : This is sample job status data
Accepting connections from Resource on port 5003
S
The client receives the results bundle from the compute resource,
bundle is decrypted and verified.
This
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The client displays the application results and allows the user the
option to submit another job to MSHN.
Received </A> bytes.
Results length <32> bytes
Application Signature length <32> byte;
WHHMMHHHMI APPLICATION
This is sanple job result;
RESULTS «»«M«mi»»n«
Choose an application to submit to MSHN.
Subnit job, wait for results, display results.
Continue? Enter y/n. n
C:\CDSft_1.2\deno9>_ I **l
To stop execution of the servers, press "Ctrl C




1. Stevens, Rick., Woodward, Paul., DeFanti, Tom., Catlett,
Charlie., From the I-WAY to the National Technology Grid,
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 40, No. 11, November,
1997.
2. Department of Defense., Joint Vision 2010. [Online]
.
Available : http: //www.dtic .mil/doctrine/jv2 010/jvpub.htm
[1998 February 12]
.
3. Department of Defense., Joint Pub 6-0: Doctrine for
Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations , National Defense
University Press, May 1995.
4. Case, Fred T., Hines, Christopher W. and Steven W.
Satchwell, Analysis of Air Operations During Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, US Air Force Studies and Analyses
Agency, 1991.
5. Freund, Richard., and others, Scheduling Resources in
Multi-User, Heterogeneous, Computing Environments with
SmartNet, Proceedings of the Seventh Heterogeneous
Computing Workshop, IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos,
Calafornia, March 1998.
6. Kresho, John P., Quality Network Load Information
Improves Performance of Adaptive Applications, Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
September 1997.
7. Department of Defense Computer Security Center, DoD
5200.28-STD, Department of Defense Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria, December 1985.
8. Anderson, J. Computer Security Technology Planning Study,
ESD-TR-73-51, Vol. I, AD-758206, ESD/AFSC, Hanscom AFB
MA, October 1972.
9. Garf inkle S., and Spafford G., Practical UNIX and
Internet Security, O'Reilly & Associates, Sebastopol,
California 1996.
10. Stinson, Douglas R., Cryptography: Theory and Practice,
CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida 1995.
261
11. Stallings, William., Network and Internetwork Security:
Principles and Practice, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey 1995.
12. Intel Corporation., Common Data Security Architecture
Specification Release 1.2. [Online]. Available:
http://developer.intel.com/ial/security/ [1998 February].
13. Kaufman, C, Perlman, R., Speciner, M. Network Security:
Private Communication in a Public World, Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1995.
14. SETCo, (1997 May 31) The SET Standard Technical
Specification [Online] . Available:
http
:
//www. setco . org/set_specifications . html
15. Netscape Communications, SSL 3.0 Specification [Online].
Available : http: //www. netscape . com/libr/ssl/ssl3/ .
16. Dusse, S., and others, (1998 March) RFC2311: S/MIME
Version 2 Message Specification [Online] . Available:
http : //info . internet . isi . edu/in-
notes/rfc/files/rfc2311 . txt
17. The Open Group. (1998 January 8) . New Security Standard
From The Open Group Brings the Realization of High-Value





18. Foster, I., and others, A Secure Communications
Infrastructure for High-Performance Distributed
Computing, Proceedings from the 6 th IEEE Symposium on
Distributed Computing, 1997.
19. Wulf, W., Wang, C, Kienzle, D., A New Model of Security
for Distributed Systems, Technical Report UVa CS
Technical Report CS- 95-34, University of Virginia,
Richmond, Virginia, August 1995.
20. Irvine, Cynthia E., Trust Relationships, to appear in
Encyclopedia of Distributed Computing, ed. J. Urban and
P. Dasgupta, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
262
21. Wright, R. , Shifflett, D., Irvine, C, Security for a
Virtual Heterogeneous Machine, to appear in the 14 th
Computer Security Applications Conference, December 1998.
22. Shirley, Lawrence J., Schell, Roger R. Mechanism
Sufficiency Validation by Assignment, IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, April 1981.
23. Object Management Group, Inc., The Common Object Request
Broker Architecture and Specification, OMG Document 93-
12-43, December, 1993.
24. Object Management Group, Inc., CORBA Security, OMG




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Rd. , Ste 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218








4 . Dr . Cynthia E . Irvine 5
Computer Science Department Code CS/Ic
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
5 . David Shif flett 1
Computer Science Department Code CS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
6 . Dr . Debra Hensgen 1
Computer Science Department Code CS/Hd
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7 . Dr . William Kemple 1
Joint C4I Department Code 39
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
8 . CPT Roger E . Wright 2
5923 Clear Ridge Rd.
Elkridge, MD 21075
9 . Mr . George Bieber 1
Defense Information Systems Agency
5113 Leesburg Pike, Suite 400
Falls Church, VA 22041-3230
265
1 . Commander 1
Naval Security Group Command
ATTN: Mr. James Shearer
Naval Security Group Headquarters
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6585
Fort G. Meade, MD 20755-6585
1 1 . Commander 1
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command




San Diego, CA 92152-5002




Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-600
266

32 4T B,
11/02 22527-200 <^




